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Call, J. (2006). Inferences by exclusion in the great apes: the effect of age and species. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 393–403.
Abstract: This study investigated the ability of chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos to make inferences by exclusion using the procedure pioneered by Premack and Premack (Cognition 50:347-362, 1994) with chimpanzees. Thirty apes were presented with two different food items (banana vs. grape) on a platform and covered with identical containers. One of the items was removed from the container and placed between the two containers so that subjects could see it. After discarding this item, subjects could select between the two containers. In Experiment 1, apes preferentially selected the container that held the item that the experimenter had not discarded, especially if subjects saw the experimenter remove the item from the container (but without seeing the container empty). Experiment 3 in which the food was removed from one of the containers behind a barrier confirmed these results. In contrast, subjects performed at chance levels when a stimulus (colored plastic chip: Exp. 1; food item: Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) designated the item that had been removed. These results indicated that apes made inferences, not just learned to use a discriminative cue to avoid the empty container. Apes perceived and treated the item discarded by the experimenter as if it were the very one that had been hidden under the container. Results suggested a positive relationship between age and inferential ability independent of memory ability but no species differences.
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Mulcahy, N. J., & Call, J. (2006). How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task. Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 193–199.
Abstract: To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180 degrees rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions.
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Aust, U., & Huber, L. (2006). Picture-object recognition in pigeons: evidence of representational insight in a visual categorization task using a complementary information procedure. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 190–195.
Abstract: Success in tasks requiring categorization of pictorial stimuli does not prove that a subject understands what the pictures stand for. The ability to achieve representational insight is by no means a trivial one because it exceeds mere detection of 2-D features present in both the pictorial images and their referents. So far, evidence for such an ability in nonhuman species is weak and inconclusive. Here, the authors report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. After being trained on pictures of incomplete human figures, the birds responded significantly more to pictures of the previously missing parts than to nonrepresentative stimuli, which demonstrates that they actually recognized the pictures' representational content.
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Washburn, D. A., Smith, J. D., & Shields, W. E. (2006). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 185–189.
Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.
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Ikeda, M., Patterson, K., Graham, K. S., Ralph, M. A. L., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). A horse of a different colour: do patients with semantic dementia recognise different versions of the same object as the same? Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 566–575.
Abstract: Ten patients with semantic dementia resulting from bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy, and 10 matched controls, were tested on an object recognition task in which they were invited to choose (from a four-item array) the picture representing “the same thing” as an object picture that they had just inspected and attempted to name. The target in the response array was never physically identical to the studied picture but differed from it – in the various conditions – in size, angle of view, colour or exemplar (e.g. a different breed of dog). In one test block for each patient, the response array was presented immediately after the studied picture was removed; in another block, a 2 min filled delay was inserted between study and test. The patients performed relatively well when the studied object and target response differed only in the size of the picture on the page, but were significantly impaired as a group in the other three type-of-change conditions, even with no delay between study and test. The five patients whose structural brain imaging revealed major right-temporal atrophy were more impaired overall, and also more affected by the 2 min delay, than the five patients with an asymmetric pattern characterised by predominant left-sided atrophy. These results are interpreted in terms of a hypothesis that successful classification of an object token as an object type is not a pre-semantic ability but rather results from interaction of perceptual and conceptual processing.
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Agrillo, C., Dadda, M., & Bisazza, A. (2007). Quantity discrimination in female mosquitofish. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 63–70.
Abstract: The ability in animals to count and represent different numbers of objects has received a great deal of attention in the past few decades. Cumulative evidence from comparative studies on number discriminations report obvious analogies among human babies, non-human primates and birds and are consistent with the hypothesis of two distinct and widespread mechanisms, one for counting small numbers (<4) precisely, and one for quantifying large numbers approximately. We investigated the ability to discriminate among different numerosities, in a distantly related species, the mosquitofish, by using the spontaneous choice of a gravid female to join large groups of females as protection from a sexually harassing male. In one experiment, we found that females were able to discriminate between two shoals with a 1:2 numerosity ratio (2 vs. 4, 4 vs. 8 and 8 vs. 16 fish) but failed to discriminate a 2:3 ratio (8 vs. 12 fish). In the second experiment, we studied the ability to discriminate between shoals that differed by one element; females were able to select the larger shoal when the paired numbers were 2 vs. 3 or 3 vs. 4 but not 4 vs. 5 or 5 vs. 6. Our study indicates that numerical abilities in fish are comparable with those of other non-verbal creatures studied; results are in agreement with the hypothesis of the existence of two distinct systems for quantity discrimination in vertebrates.
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Hanggi, E. B., Ingersoll, J. F., & Waggoner, T. L. (2007). Color vision in horses (Equus caballus): deficiencies identified using a pseudoisochromatic plate test. J. Comp. Psychol., 121(1), 65–72.
Abstract: In the past, equine color vision was tested with stimuli composed either of painted cards or photographic slides or through physiological testing using electroretinogram flicker photometry. Some studies produced similar results, but others did not, demonstrating that there was not yet a definitive answer regarding color vision in horses (Equus caballus). In this study, a pseudoisochromatic plate test--which is highly effective in testing color vision both in small children and in adult humans--was used for the first time on a nonhuman animal. Stimuli consisted of different colored dotted circles set against backgrounds of varying dots. The coloration of the circles corresponded to the visual capabilities of different types of color deficiencies (anomalous trichromacy and dichromacy). Four horses were tested on a 2-choice discrimination task. All horses successfully reached criterion for gray circles and demonstration circles. None of the horses were able to discriminate the protan-deutan plate or the individual protan or deutan plates. However, all were able to discriminate the tritan plate. The results suggest that horses are dichromats with color vision capabilities similar to those of humans with red-green color deficiencies.
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Sovrano, V. A., Bisazza, A., & Vallortigara, G. (2007). How fish do geometry in large and in small spaces. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 47–54.
Abstract: It has been shown that children and non-human animals seem to integrate geometric and featural information to different extents in order to reorient themselves in environments of different spatial scales. We trained fish (redtail splitfins, Xenotoca eiseni) to reorient to find a corner in a rectangular tank with a distinctive featural cue (a blue wall). Then we tested fish after displacement of the feature on another adjacent wall. In the large enclosure, fish chose the two corners with the feature, and also tended to choose among them the one that maintained the correct arrangement of the featural cue with respect to geometric sense (i.e. left-right position). In contrast, in the small enclosure, fish chose both the two corners with the features and the corner, without any feature, that maintained the correct metric arrangement of the walls with respect to geometric sense. Possible reasons for species differences in the use of geometric and non-geometric information are discussed.
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Hirata, S. (2007). A note on the responses of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to live self-images on television monitors. Behav. Process., 75(1), 85–90.
Abstract: The majority of studies on self-recognition in animals have been conducted using a mirror as the test device; little is known, however, about the responses of non-human primates toward their own images in media other than mirrors. This study provides preliminary data on the reactions of 10 chimpanzees to live self-images projected on two television monitors, each connected to a different video camera. Chimpanzees could see live images of their own faces, which were approximately life-sized, on one monitor. On the other monitor, they could see live images of their whole body, which were approximately one-fifth life-size, viewed diagonally from behind. In addition, several objects were introduced into the test situation. Out of 10 chimpanzees tested, 2 individuals performed self-exploratory behaviors while watching their own images on the monitors. One of these two chimpanzees successively picked up two of the provided objects in front of a monitor, and watched the images of these objects on the monitor. The results indicate that these chimpanzees were able to immediately recognize live images of themselves or objects on the monitors, even though several features of these images differed from those of their previous experience with mirrors.
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