Abstract: This study measured parameters of stress in recreational, trained horses (REC; n = 7) and elite (International Grand Prix level) trained, dressage horses (DRES; n = 5). The training of the DRES horses uses an unnatural head?neck position (Rollkur), whereas in the REC horses such training techniques are not common. The study measured stress by using heart rate variability analysis for 30 min postfeeding in the morning and 30 min postexercise after a morning training session. The study found no significant difference at rest between the REC and DRES horses. During the posttraining measurements, however, the DRES horses showed, among others, a less sympathetic and increased parasympathetic dominance. These results suggest that DRES horses tend to have less acute stress than do REC horses postexercise. The findings of this study suggest maintaining the health and well-being of DRES horses despite nonnatural, biomechanical positions.

Abstract: There is much interest in the evolutionary forces that favored the evolution of large brains in the primate order. The social brain hypothesis posits that selection has favored larger brains and more complex cognitive capacities as a means to cope with the challenges of social life. The hypothesis is supported by evidence that shows that group size is linked to various measures of brain size. But it has not been clear how cognitive complexity confers fitness advantages on individuals. Research in the field and laboratory shows that sophisticated social cognition underlies social behavior in primate groups. Moreover, a growing body of evidence suggests that the quality of social relationships has measurable fitness consequences for individuals.

Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.