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Bennett, A. T. (1996). Do animals have cognitive maps? J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 219–224.
Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
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Gallistel, C. R., & Cramer, A. E. (1996). Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route. J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 211–217.
Abstract: The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.
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Etienne, A. S., Maurer, R., & Seguinot, V. (1996). Path integration in mammals and its interaction with visual landmarks. J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 201–209.
Abstract: During locomotion, mammals update their position with respect to a fixed point of reference, such as their point of departure, by processing inertial cues, proprioceptive feedback and stored motor commands generated during locomotion. This so-called path integration system (dead reckoning) allows the animal to return to its home, or to a familiar feeding place, even when external cues are absent or novel. However, without the use of external cues, the path integration process leads to rapid accumulation of errors involving both the direction and distance of the goal. Therefore, even nocturnal species such as hamsters and mice rely more on previously learned visual references than on the path integration system when the two types of information are in conflict. Recent studies investigate the extent to which path integration and familiar visual cues cooperate to optimize the navigational performance.
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Wasserman, E. A., Gagliardi, J. L., Cook, B. R., Kirkpatrick-Steger, K., Astley, S. L., & Biederman, I. (1996). The pigeon's recognition of drawings of depth-rotated stimuli. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 22(2), 205–221.
Abstract: Four experiments used a four-choice discrimination learning paradigm to explore the pigeon's recognition of line drawings of four objects (an airplane, a chair, a desk lamp, and a flashlight) that were rotated in depth. The pigeons reliably generalized discriminative responding to pictorial stimuli over all untrained depth rotations, despite the bird's having been trained at only a single depth orientation. These generalization gradients closely resembled those found in prior research that used other stimulus dimensions. Increasing the number of different vantage points in the training set from one to three broadened the range of generalized testing performance, with wider spacing of the training orientations more effectively broadening generalized responding. Template and geon theories of visual recognition are applied to these empirical results.
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Clement, T. S., Weaver, J. E., Sherburne, L. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1998). Simultaneous discrimination learning in pigeons: value of S- affects the relative value of its associated S+. Q J Exp Psychol B, 51(4), 363–378.
Abstract: In a simple simultaneous discrimination involving a positive stimulus (S+) and a negative stimulus (S-), it has been hypothesized that positive value can transfer from the S+ to the S- (thus increasing the relative value of the S-) and also that negative value can transfer from the S- to the S+ (thus diminishing the relative value of the S+; Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991). Evidence for positive value transfer has been reported in pigeons (e.g. Zentall & Sherburne, 1994). The purpose of the present experiments was to determine, in a simultaneous discrimination, whether the S- diminishes the value of the S+ or the S- is contrasted with the S+ (thus enhancing the value of the S+). In two experiments, we found evidence for contrast, rather than value transfer, attributable to simultaneous discrimination training. Thus, not only does the S+ appear to enhance the value of the S-, but the S- appears to enhance rather than reduce the value of the S+.
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Kendrick, K. M. (1998). Intelligent perception. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 57(3-4), 213–231.
Abstract: For an animal from any species to exhibit intelligent perception it must be capable of being consciously aware of what it perceives and capable of learning from this experience. Although many organisms, and for that matter machines, are capable of rapid adaptive learning in response to perception of environmental changes, such adaptations can occur without them being consciously aware either of external stimuli or their response to them. While behavioural and neurophysiological evidence suggests that, apart from ourselves, other higher primates must also be capable of such awareness, an important central question is whether such awareness is a characteristic of primate evolution or if it also occurs in sub-primate mammals as well. In this review I will examine our behavioural and neurophysiological evidence from visual and olfactory recognition studies in the sheep to support the argument that they are likely to be aware of and learn about both social and non-social objects and that they are therefore capable of intelligent perception. However, the impact of motivational changes on these perceptual processes suggests that they may be limited in terms of both prospection and retrospection and dealing with symbolic associations.
Keywords: Intelligent perception; Environmental changes; Primates
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Ruggieri, V. (1999). The running horse stops: the hypothetical role of the eyes in imagery of movement. Percept Mot Skills, 89(3 Pt 2), 1088–1092.
Abstract: To examine the hypothetical role of the eyes in visual mental imagery of movement 72 undergraduate women students in psychology were asked to imagine a running horse and then to produce the same mental image without moving the eyes and the head. In 59% of the subjects interesting modifications of the imagined movement appeared: 37% observed an inhibition of the movement and 19% an evident slowing up of the moving figure. The interpretation of this result was made by hypothesizing that the eyes are concretely involved in visual imagery processes.
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Lonon, A. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1999). Transfer of value from S+ to S- in simultaneous discriminations in humans. Am J Psychol, 112(1), 21–39.
Abstract: When animals learn a simultaneous discrimination, some of the value of the positive stimulus (S+) appears to transfer to the negative stimulus (S-). The present experiments demonstrate that such value transfer can also be found in humans. In Experiment 1 humans were trained on 2 simple simultaneous discriminations, the first between a highly positive stimulus, A (1,000 points); and a negative stimulus, B (0 points); and the second between a less positive stimulus, C (100 points); and a negative stimulus, D (0 points). On test trials, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiments 2 and 3 the value of the 2 original discriminations was equated in training (A[100]B[0] and C[100]D[0]). In Experiment 2 the values of the positive stimuli were then altered (A[1,000]C[0]); again, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiment 3, however, when the values of B and D were altered (B[1,000]D[0]), participants were indifferent to A and C. Thus, the mechanism that underlies value transfer in humans appears to be related to Pavlovian second-order conditioning. Similar mechanisms may be involved in assimilation processes in social contexts.
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Zentall, T. R. (1999). Support for a theory of memory for event duration must distinguish between test-trial ambiguity and actual memory loss. J Exp Anal Behav, 72(3), 467–472.
Abstract: Staddon and Higa's (1999) trace-strength theory of timing and memory for event duration can account for pigeons' bias to “choose short” when retention intervals are introduced and to “choose long” when, following training with a fixed retention interval, retention intervals are shortened. However, it does not account for the failure of pigeons to choose short when the intertrial interval is distinct from the retention interval. That finding suggests that stimulus generalization (or ambiguity) between the intertrial interval and the retention interval may result in an effect that has been attributed to memory loss. Such artifacts must be eliminated before a theory of memory for event duration can be adequately tested.
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Crystal, J. D. (1999). Systematic nonlinearities in the perception of temporal intervals. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 25(1), 3–17.
Abstract: Rats judged time intervals in a choice procedure in which accuracy was maintained at approximately 75% correct. Sensitivity to time (d') was approximately constant for short durations 2.0-32.0 s with 1.0- or 2.0-s spacing between intervals (n = 5 in each group, Experiment 1), 2.0-50.0 s with 2.0-s spacing (n = 2, Experiment 1), and 0.1-2.0 s with 0.1- or 0.2-s spacing (n = 6 in each group, Experiment 2). However, systematic departures from average sensitivity were observed, with local maxima in sensitivity at approximately 0.3, 1.2, 10.0, 24.0, and 36.0 s. Such systematic departures from an approximately constant d' are predicted by a connectionist theory of time with multiple oscillators and may require a modification of the linear timing hypothesis of scalar timing theory.
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