Abstract: Handclasp grooming is a unique social custom, known to occur regularly among some, but not all populations of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). As with other cultural behaviors, it is assumed that this distinctive grooming posture is learned socially by one individual from another. However, statistical comparisons among factors thought to influence how a behavior spreads within a group have never, to our knowledge, been conducted. In the present study, the origination and spread of handclasp grooming in a group of captive chimpanzees was followed throughout more than 1,500 h of observation over a period of 12 years. We report on the frequency, bout duration, and number and demography of performers throughout the study period, and compare these findings to those reported for wild populations. We predicted that dyads with strong affiliative ties, measured by time spent in proximity to and grooming one another, were likely to develop a handclasp grooming partnership during the study period. A quadratic assignment procedure was used to compare correlations among observed frequencies of grooming and proximity with handclasp grooming in all possible dyads within the group. As predicted, the formation of new handclasp grooming dyads was positively correlated with the rate of overall grooming and proximity within a dyad. In addition, in nearly all dyads formed, at least one individual had been previously observed to handclasp groom. We concluded that affiliation and individual experience determines the transmission of handclasp grooming among captive chimpanzees.

Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.

Abstract: The authors report a novel approach to testing episodic-like memory for single events. Pigeons were trained in separate sessions to match the identity of a sample on a touch screen, to match its location, and to report on the length of the retention interval. When these 3 tasks were mixed randomly within sessions, birds were more than 80% correct on each task. However, performance on 2 different tests in succession after each sample was not consistent with an integrated memory for sample location, time, and identity. Experiment 2 tested binding of location and identity memories in 2 different ways. The results were again consistent with independent feature memories. Implications for tests of episodic-like memory are discussed.

Abstract: Considered an indicator of self-awareness, mirror self-recognition (MSR) has long seemed limited to humans and apes. In both phylogeny and human ontogeny, MSR is thought to correlate with higher forms of empathy and altruistic behavior. Apart from humans and apes, dolphins and elephants are also known for such capacities. After the recent discovery of MSR in dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), elephants thus were the next logical candidate species. We exposed three Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) to a large mirror to investigate their responses. Animals that possess MSR typically progress through four stages of behavior when facing a mirror: (i) social responses, (ii) physical inspection (e.g., looking behind the mirror), (iii) repetitive mirror-testing behavior, and (iv) realization of seeing themselves. Visible marks and invisible sham-marks were applied to the elephants' heads to test whether they would pass the litmus “mark test” for MSR in which an individual spontaneously uses a mirror to touch an otherwise imperceptible mark on its own body. Here, we report a successful MSR elephant study and report striking parallels in the progression of responses to mirrors among apes, dolphins, and elephants. These parallels suggest convergent cognitive evolution most likely related to complex sociality and cooperation.

Abstract: We review studies demonstrating the ability of some animals to understand the human pointing gesture. We present a 3-step analysis of the topic. (1) We compare and evaluate current experimental methods (2) We compare available experimental results on performance of different species and investigate the interaction of species differences and other independent variables (3) We evaluate how our present understanding of pointing comprehension answers questions about function, evolution and mechanisms. Recently, a number of different hypotheses have been put forward to account for the presence of this ability in some species and for the lack of such comprehension in others. In our view, there is no convincing evidence for the assumption that the competitive lifestyles of apes would inhibit the utilization of this human gesture. Similarly, domestication as a special evolutionary factor in the case of some species falls short in explaining high levels of pointing comprehension in some non-domestic species. We also disagree with the simplistic view of describing the phenomenon as a simple form of conditioning. We suggest that a more systematic comparative research is needed to understand the emerging communicative representational abilities in animals that provide the background for comprehending the human pointing gesture.