Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.

Abstract: Dominance hierarchies are widely described in nature. Commonly, an individual's ordinal rank is used as a measure of its position in the hierarchy, and, therefore its priority of access to resources. This use of ordinal ranks has several related drawbacks: (1) it is difficult to assess the magnitude or the significance of the difference in degree of dominance between two individuals; (2) it is difficult to evaluate the significance of differences between dominance matrices based on different behaviours or on the same behaviour at different times, and (3) it is difficult to use parametric statistical techniques to relate dominance rank to other quantities of interest. In this paper we describe a method for assigning cardinal dominance indices that does not suffer from these drawbacks. This technique is based on the Bradley-Terry model from the method of paired comparisons. We show how this model can be reinterpreted in terms of dominance interactions. and we describe a simple iterative technique for computing cardinal ranks. We then describe how to evaluate (1) whether the rank differences between individuals are significant, and (2) whether differences in the cardinal hierarchies based on different behaviours or the same behaviour at different times are significant. We then show how to generalize the method to deal with behaviours that sometimes have ambiguous outcomes, or behaviours for which the rank difference between a pair of individuals affects the rate of interaction between them.

Abstract: We consider the effect of including energy costs on the optimal strategy for animals exploiting a depleting food resource. In the context of central place foraging this leads to the problem of what load size should be brought back to the central place. Two strategies are discussed: (i) maximize gross rate of energy delivery and (ii) maximize net rate of energy delivery. The optimal load size (or optimal patch time) for net maximizers is not always larger than for gross maximizers, as has been claimed. Instead, the difference in optimal load size has the same sign as the difference between metabolic rates of travelling and foraging. We point out that the influence of costs has not always been correctly incorporated in experimental tests of the theory.

Abstract: Social licking patterns of heifer and steer herds were observed and recorded during periods of resting and intermittent feeding. The results revealed the following features: (1) heifers and steers had 15.0 and 15.2 social licking interactions per hour which lasted for 37.8 and 41.0 s on average, respectively. The average time an animal spent licking was about 25 s per hour; (2) all the animals in the herds were licked by others, but only 72.3% of the animals licked other animals; (3) the animals close in the social hierarchy tended to lick each other for a longer time than did remote animals; (4) the time receiving l licking and weight gain tended to be positively correlated. The observations suggest that (1) the motivation of giving licking may be individual-specific and may be influenced by genetic factors, while that of receiving licking appears to be general, and that (2) social licking may mean not only cleaning the skin and hair of a passive partner, but also leading it to psychological stability.