Abstract: This study investigated the ability of a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) to recognise when he is being imitated. In the experimental condition of test 1a, an experimenter imitated the postures and behaviours of the chimpanzee as they were being displayed. In three control conditions the same experimenter exhibited (1) actions that were contingent on, but different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, (2) actions that were not contingent on, and different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, or (3) no action at all. The chimpanzee showed more “testing” sequences (i.e., systematically varying his actions while oriented to the imitating experimenter) and more repetitive behaviour when he was being imitated, than when he was not. This finding was replicated 4 months later in test 1b. When the experimenter repeated the same actions she displayed in the experimental condition of test 1a back to the chimpanzee in test 2, these actions now did not elicit those same testing sequences or repetitive behaviours. However, a live imitation condition did. Together these results provide the first evidence of imitation recognition in a nonhuman animal.

Abstract: This review examines the biological background to the development of ideas on rapid eye movement sleep (REM sleep), so-called paradoxical sleep (PS), and its relation to dreaming. Aspects of the phenomenon which are discussed include physiological changes and their anatomical location, the effects of total and selective sleep deprivation in the human and animal, and REM sleep behavior disorder, the latter with its clinical manifestations in the human. Although dreaming also occurs in other sleep phases (non-REM or NREM sleep), in the human, there is a contingent relation between REM sleep and dreaming. Thus, REM is taken as a marker for dreaming and as REM is distributed ubiquitously throughout the mammalian class, it is suggested that other mammals also dream. It is suggested that the overall function of REM sleep/dreaming is more important than the content of the individual dream; its function is to place the dreamer protagonist/observer on the topographical world. This has importance for the developing infant who needs to develop a sense of self and separateness from the world which it requires to navigate and from which it is separated for long periods in sleep. Dreaming may also serve to maintain a sense of 'I'ness or “self” in the adult, in whom a fragility of this faculty is revealed in neurological disorders.

Abstract: The authors studied the interaction between rider and horse by measuring their ensemble motions in a trot sequence, comparing 1 expert and 1 novice rider. Whereas the novice's movements displayed transient departures from phase synchrony, the expert's motions were continuously phase-matched with those of the horse. The tight ensemble synchrony between the expert and the horse was accompanied by an increase in the temporal regularity of the oscillations of the trunk of the horse. Observed differences between expert and novice riders indicated that phase synchronization is by no means perfect but requires extended practice. Points of contact between horse and rider may haptically convey effective communication between them.

Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.