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Author Panksepp, J. doi  openurl
  Title Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans Type Journal Article
  Year (up) 2005 Publication Consciousness and Cognition Abbreviated Journal Conscious Cogn  
  Volume 14 Issue 1 Pages 30-80  
  Keywords Affect/*physiology; Animals; Bonding, Human-Pet; Brain/*physiology; Consciousness/*physiology; Fear; Humans; Limbic System/physiology; Social Behavior; Species Specificity; Unconscious (Psychology)  
  Abstract The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.  
  Address Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA. jpankse@bgnet.bgsu.ed  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language English Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN 1053-8100 ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes PMID:15766890 Approved no  
  Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 4159  
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Author Spadavecchia, C.; Arendt-Nielsen, L.; Spadavecchia, L.; Mosing, M.; Auer, U.; van den Hoven, R. doi  openurl
  Title Effects of butorphanol on the withdrawal reflex using threshold, suprathreshold and repeated subthreshold electrical stimuli in conscious horses Type Journal Article
  Year (up) 2007 Publication Veterinary anaesthesia and analgesia Abbreviated Journal Vet Anaesth Analg  
  Volume 34 Issue 1 Pages 48-58  
  Keywords Analgesics, Opioid/pharmacology; Animals; Butorphanol/*pharmacology; Consciousness; Electric Stimulation; Electromyography; Female; Forelimb/physiology; Horses/*physiology; Male; Pain/veterinary; Pain Threshold/*drug effects; Reflex/*drug effects  
  Abstract OBJECTIVE: To assess the effects of a single intravenous dose of butorphanol (0.1 mg kg(-1)) on the nociceptive withdrawal reflex (NWR) using threshold, suprathreshold and repeated subthreshold electrical stimuli in conscious horses. STUDY DESIGN: 'Unblinded', prospective experimental study. ANIMALS: Ten adult horses, five geldings and five mares, mean body mass 517 kg (range 487-569 kg). METHODS: The NWR was elicited using single transcutaneous electrical stimulation of the palmar digital nerve. Repeated stimulations were applied to evoke temporal summation. Surface electromyography was performed to record and quantify the responses of the common digital extensor muscle to stimulation and behavioural reactions were scored. Before butorphanol administration and at fixed time points up to 2 hours after injection, baseline threshold intensities for NWR and temporal summation were defined and single suprathreshold stimulations applied. Friedman repeated-measures analysis of variance on ranks and Wilcoxon signed-rank test were used with the Student-Newman-Keul's method applied post-hoc. The level of significance (alpha) was set at 0.05. RESULTS: Butorphanol did not modify either the thresholds for NWR and temporal summation or the reaction scores, but the difference between suprathreshold and threshold reflex amplitudes was reduced when single stimulation was applied. Upon repeated stimulation after butorphanol administration, a significant decrease in the relative amplitude was calculated for both the 30-80 and the 80-200 millisecond intervals after each stimulus, and for the whole post-stimulation interval in the right thoracic limb. In the left thoracic limb a decrease in the relative amplitude was found only in the 30-80 millisecond epoch. CONCLUSION: Butorphanol at 0.1 mg kg(-1) has no direct action on spinal Adelta nociceptive activity but may have some supraspinal effects that reduce the gain of the nociceptive system. CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Butorphanol has minimal effect on sharp immediate Adelta-mediated pain but may alter spinal processing and decrease the delayed sensations of pain.  
  Address Anesthesiology Section, Department of Clinical Veterinary Sciences, Vetsuisse Faculty, University of Berne, Berne, Switzerland. claudia.spadavecchia@veths.no  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language English Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN 1467-2987 ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes PMID:17238962 Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 92  
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Author Marinsek, N.L.; Gazzaniga, M.S.; Miller, M.B. url  doi
isbn  openurl
  Title Chapter 17 – Split-Brain, Split-Mind Type Book Chapter
  Year (up) 2016 Publication The Neurology of Conciousness (Second Edition) Abbreviated Journal  
  Volume Issue Pages 271-279  
  Keywords Split-brain; consciousness; lateralization; modular; left hemisphere interpreter  
  Abstract The corpus callosum anatomically and functionally connects the two cerebral hemispheres. Despite its important role in interhemispheric communication however, severing the corpus callosum produces few--if any--noticeable cognitive or behavioral abnormalities. Incredibly, split-brain patients do not report any drastic changes in their conscious experience even though nearly all interhemispheric communication ceases after surgery. Extensive research has shown that both hemispheres remain conscious following disconnection and the conscious experience of each hemisphere is private and independent of the other. Additionally, the conscious experiences of the hemispheres appear to be qualitatively different, such that the consciousness of the left hemisphere is more enriched than the right. In this chapter, we offer explanations as to why split-brain patients feel unified despite possessing dual conscious experiences and discuss how the divided consciousness of split-brain patients can inform current theories of consciousness.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Academic Press Place of Publication San Diego Editor Laureys, S.; Gosseries, O.; Tononi, G.  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN 978-0-12-800948-2 Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 6648  
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