Abstract: Parental care can be costly to a parent in terms of both time and energy invested in the young. In species with cuckoldry or brood parasitism not all of the young under a parent's care are necessarily offspring. In such cases, distinguishing between kin and non-kin, and investing only in the former (nepotism), can be advantageous. Bluegill sunfish ( Lepomis macrochirus) are characterized by paternal care and cuckoldry, and care-providing males appear to show nepotistic behaviours. Here, we investigated nestling recognition in bluegill, determining whether parental males can differentiate between young from their own nest (familiar and related) and young from non-neighbouring nests (unfamiliar and unrelated) using (1) visual and chemical cues, and (2) chemical cues only. In the first experiment, wild-caught parental males were presented with samples of eggs or fry (newly hatched eggs) collected from their own nest or a foreign nest and placed on opposite sides of an aquarium. The time these parental males spent associating with each sample, and their “pecking” behaviours (indicating cannibalism), were recorded. Parental males showed no preference between eggs from their own nest and eggs from a non-neighbouring nest, but they preferred to associate with fry from their own nest over foreign fry. There also was a positive relationship between male body size and the time spent associated with fry from their own nest. Parental males pecked at foreign fry more than 5 times as often as fry from their own nest, though this difference was not statistically significant. In the second experiment, fry that were collected from the nest of a wild-caught parental male or a non-neighbouring nest were placed in different containers and the water from each was dripped into opposite ends of an aquarium. The time the male spent on each side was recorded. In this case, parental males spent more time near the source of water conditioned by unrelated fry, but there was a positive relationship between male condition (fat reserves) and the time he spent near the source of water conditioned by fry from his own nest. Results confirm that chemicals cue nestling recognition by parental male bluegill.

Abstract: Recent studies on perceptual organization in humans claim that the ability to represent a visual scene as a set of coherent surfaces is of central importance for visual cognition. We examined whether this surface representation hypothesis generalizes to a non-mammalian species, the barn owl ( Tyto alba). Discrimination transfer combined with random-dot stimuli provided the appropriate means for a series of two behavioural experiments with the specific aims of (1) obtaining psychophysical measurements of figure-ground segmentation in the owl, and (2) determining the nature of the information involved. In experiment 1, two owls were trained to indicate the presence or absence of a central planar surface (figure) among a larger region of random dots (ground) based on differences in texture. Without additional training, the owls could make the same discrimination when figure and ground had reversed luminance, or were camouflaged by the use of uniformly textured random-dot stereograms. In the latter case, the figure stands out in depth from the ground when positional differences of the figure in two retinal images are combined (binocular disparity). In experiment 2, two new owls were trained to distinguish three-dimensional objects from holes using random-dot kinematograms. These birds could make the same discrimination when information on surface segmentation was unexpectedly switched from relative motion to half-occlusion. In the latter case, stereograms were used that provide the impression of stratified surfaces to humans by giving unpairable image features to the eyes. The ability to use image features such as texture, binocular disparity, relative motion, and half-occlusion interchangeably to determine figure-ground relationships suggests that in owls, as in humans, the structuring of the visual scene critically depends on how indirect image information (depth order, occlusion contours) is allocated between different surfaces.

Abstract: To understand the animal mind, we have to reconstruct how animals recognize the external world through their own eyes. For the reconstruction to be realistic, explanations must be made both in their proximate causes (brain mechanisms) as well as ultimate causes (evolutionary backgrounds). Here, we review recent advances in the behavioral, psychological, and system-neuroscience studies accomplished using the domestic chick as subjects. Diverse behavioral paradigms are compared (such as filial imprinting, sexual imprinting, one-trial passive avoidance learning, and reinforcement operant conditioning) in their behavioral characterizations (development, sensory and motor aspects of functions, fitness gains) and relevant brain mechanisms. We will stress that common brain regions are shared by these distinct paradigms, particularly those in the ventral telencephalic structures such as AIv (in the archistriatum) and LPO (in the medial striatum). Neuronal ensembles in these regions could code the chick's anticipation for forthcoming events, particularly the quality/quantity and the temporal proximity of rewards. Without the internal representation of the anticipated proximity in LPO, behavioral tolerance will be lost, and the chick makes impulsive choice for a less optimized option. Functional roles of these regions proved compatible with their anatomical counterparts in the mammalian brain, thus suggesting that the neural systems linking between the memorized past and the anticipated future have remained highly conservative through the evolution of the amniotic vertebrates during the last 300 million years. With the conservative nature in mind, research efforts should be oriented toward a unifying theory, which could explain behavioral deviations from optimized foraging, such as “naive curiosity,” “contra-freeloading,” “Concorde fallacy,” and “altruism.”

Abstract: We are an intensely social species--it has been argued that our social nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.