Abstract: The way in which cognitive functioning is affected by stressors is an important area of research for applied ethologists because stress caused by captive conditions may disrupt cognitive processes and lead to welfare and husbandry problems. Such problems may be minimised through an understanding of the links between stress and cognition. The effects of stress on cognitive function have been studied in disciplines ranging from human perceptual psychology to animal neuroscience. The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to this research, focusing on the effects of stressors on attention, memory formation and memory recall. Findings from such a diverse literature with little apparent inter-disciplinary communication are inevitably complex and often contradictory. Nevertheless, some generalities do emerge. The idea that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between an individual's state of stress or arousal and its ability to perform a cognitive task effectively, the so-called Yerkes-Dodson law, is commonly encountered. The law has limited explanatory value because it is unlikely that different stressors act on cognitive function via the same intervening, non-specific state. Furthermore, the law only provides a very general description of the relationship between stress and cognitive function. Empirical research on attention and memory processes reveals more specific findings. Stressors appear to cause shifts, lapses and narrowing of attention, and can also influence decision speed. These processes may be viewed as serving an adaptive role helping the animal to search for and scrutinise a source of danger. There is conflicting evidence as to whether hormones involved in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal stress response play a part in these processes. These hormones and those involved in the sympathetic-adrenomedullary stress response do appear to play an important role in memory formation. Low or moderate concentrations of circulating glucocorticoids and catecholamines can enhance memory formation, while excessively high or prolonged elevations of these hormones can lead to memory disruption. The effects of stressors on memory recall are less clear. There is evidence for disruptive effects, and for facilitatory effects indicating state-dependent memory recall; events experienced under conditions of high arousal may be best recalled under similar conditions. Applied ethologists have the opportunity to extend work in this area, which often involves studies of single stressors/stress hormones acting in isolation and limited measures of cognitive function, by focusing on real-life husbandry stressors encountered by captive animals. This will yield fundamental information which also has direct relevance to animal welfare and management issues.

Abstract: It has been proposed that memory for personal experiences (episodic memory, rather than semantic memory) relies on the conscious review of past experience and thus is unique to humans. In an attempt to demonstrate episodic-like memory in animals, we first trained pigeons to respond to the (nonverbal) question “Did you just peck or did you just refrain from pecking?” by training them on a symbolic matching task with differential responding required to the two line-orientation samples and reinforcing the choice of a red comparison if they had pecked and the choice of a green comparison if they had not pecked. Then, in Experiment 1, after providing the conditions for (but not requiring) the pigeons to peck at one new stimulus (a yellow hue) but not at another (a blue hue), we tested them with the new hue stimuli and the red and green comparisons. In Experiment 2, we tested the pigeons with novel stimuli (a circle, which they spontaneously pecked, and a dark response key, which they did not peck) and the red and green comparisons. In both experiments, pigeons chose the comparison appropriate to the response made to the test stimulus. Thus, the pigeons demonstrated that they could remember specific details about their past experiences, a result consistent with the notion that they have the capacity for forming episodic-like memories.

Abstract: Episodic memory involves the encoding and storage of memories concerned with unique personal experiences and their subsequent recall, and it has long been the subject of intensive investigation in humans. According to Tulving's classical definition, episodic memory “receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or events and temporal-spatial relations among these events.” Thus, episodic memory provides information about the `what' and `when' of events (`temporally dated experiences') and about `where' they happened (`temporal-spatial relations'). The storage and subsequent recall of this episodic information was thought to be beyond the memory capabilities of nonhuman animals. Although there are many laboratory procedures for investigating memory for discrete past episodes, until recently there were no previous studies that fully satisfied the criteria of Tulving's definition: they can all be explained in much simpler terms than episodic memory. However, current studies of memory for cache sites in food-storing jays provide an ethologically valid model for testing episodic-like memory in animals, thereby bridging the gap between human and animal studies memory. There is now a pressing need to adapt these experimental tests of episodic memory for other animals. Given the potential power of transgenic and knock-out procedures for investigating the genetic and molecular bases of learning and memory in laboratory rodents, not to mention the wealth of knowledge about the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of the rodent hippocampus (a brain area heavily implicated in episodic memory), an obvious next step is to develop a rodent model of episodic-like memory based on the food-storing bird paradigm. The development of a rodent model system could make an important contribution to our understanding of the neural, molecular, and behavioral mechanisms of mammalian episodic memory.

Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.