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Gibson, B. M., Shettleworth, S. J., & McDonald, R. J. (2001). Finding a goal on dry land and in the water: differential effects of disorientation on spatial learning. Behav. Brain. Res., 123(1), 103–111.
Abstract: Two previous studies, Martin et al. (J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 23 (1997) 183) and Dudchenko et al. (J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 23 (1997) 194), report that, compared to non-disoriented controls, rats disoriented before testing were disrupted in their ability to learn the location of a goal on a dry radial-arm maze task, but that both groups learned at the same rate in the Morris water maze. However, the radial-arm maze task was much more difficult than the water maze. In the current set of experiments, we examined the performance of control and disoriented rats on more comparable dry land and water maze tasks. Compared to non-disoriented rats, rats that were disoriented before testing were significantly impaired in locating a goal in a circular dry arena, but not a water tank. The results constrain theoretical explanations for the differential effects of disorientation on different spatial tasks.
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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
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Hare, B., Brown, M., Williamson, C., & Tomasello, M. (2002). The domestication of social cognition in dogs. Science, 298(5598), 1634–1636.
Abstract: Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks in which they must read human communicative signals indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do show these skills. These findings suggest that during the process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to communicate with humans in unique ways.
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Doligez, B., Danchin, E., & Clobert, J. (2002). Public information and breeding habitat selection in a wild bird population. Science, 297(5584), 1168–1170.
Abstract: According to the “public information” hypothesis, some animal species may monitor the current reproductive success of conspecifics to assess local habitat quality and to choose their own subsequent breeding site. To test this hypothesis experimentally, we manipulated two components of public information, the mean number of offspring raised locally (“quantity”) and their condition (“quality”), in the collared flycatcher Ficedula albicollis. Immigration rate decreased with local offspring quantity but did not depend on local offspring quality, suggesting that immigrants are deprived of information regarding local quality. Conversely, emigration rate increased both when local offspring quantity or quality decreased, suggesting that residents can use both components of public information.
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Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Imitation and affordance learning by pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 117(4), 414–419.
Abstract: The bidirectional control procedure was used to determine whether pigeons (Columba livia) would imitate a demonstrator that pushed a sliding screen for food. One group of observers saw a trained demonstrator push a sliding screen door with its beak (imitation group), whereas 2 other groups watched the screen move independently (possibly learning how the environment works) with a conspecific either present (affordance learning with social facilitation) or absent (affordance learning alone). A 4th group could not see the screen being pushed (sound and odor control). Imitation was evidenced by the finding that pigeons that saw a demonstrator push the screen made a higher proportion of matching screen pushes than observers in 2 appropriate control conditions. Further, observers that watched a screen move without a demonstrator present made a significantly higher proportion of matching screen pushes than would be expected by chance. Thus, these pigeons were capable of affordance learning.
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Gibson, B. M., & Shettleworth, S. J. (2003). Competition among spatial cues in a naturalistic food-carrying task. Learn Behav, 31(2), 143–159.
Abstract: Rats collected nuts from a container in a large arena in four experiments testing how learning about a beacon or cue at a goal interacts with learning about other spatial cues (place learning). Place learning was quick, with little evidence of competition from the beacon (Experiments 1 and 2). Rats trained to approach a beacon regardless of its location were subsequently impaired when the well-learned beacon was removed and other spatial cues identified the location of the goal (Experiment 3). The competition between beacon and place cues reflected learned irrelevance for place cues (Experiment 4). The findings differ from those of some studies of associative interactions between cue and place learning in other paradigms.
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Call, J., Brauer, J., Kaminski, J., & Tomasello, M. (2003). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) are sensitive to the attentional state of humans. J Comp Psychol, 117(3), 257–263.
Abstract: Twelve domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) were given a series of trials in which they were forbidden to take a piece of visible food. In some trials, the human continued to look at the dog throughout the trial (control condition), whereas in others, the human (a) left the room, (b) turned her back, (c) engaged in a distracting activity, or (d) closed her eyes. Dogs behaved in clearly different ways in most of the conditions in which the human did not watch them compared with the control condition, in which she did. In particular, when the human looked at them, dogs retrieved less food, approached it in a more indirect way, and sat (as opposed to laid down) more often than in the other conditions. Results are discussed in terms of domestic dogs' social-cognitive skills and their unique evolutionary and ontogenetic histories.
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Rybarczyk, P., Rushen, J., & de Passille, A. M. (2003). Recognition of people by dairy calves using colour of clothing. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 81(4), 307–319.
Abstract: We examined whether very young dairy calves are able to discriminate between two people, and whether they use the colour of clothing or other indices to do so. During the familiarisation phase, one person (the familiar rewarder), who always wore the same colour clothes, gave milk, spoke gently and patted the calves in their individual pen for 6 days each week. During the test phase, the calf had to make a choice in an Y-maze placed in front of the gate of its stall. When the calves chose the familiar rewarder, they received 200 ml of milk as reinforcement. When they made the incorrect choice, they received nothing and were returned to their stall. On each test day, the calves made eight choices. The criterion of success was that the calf made at least six correct choices in eight trials on each of two consecutive test days (P<0.021 by the binomial law). The first experiment was carried out with fourteen 1-week-old male and female Holstein calves to see if calves could approach a person, who changed position in the maze, in order to obtain a feed reward. The familiar rewarder wore the same clothes as during the period of familiarisation and was in one arm of the Y-maze. The other arm was empty and the position of the familiar rewarder in the maze was randomised. Eleven of the 14 calves reached the criterion for success, after only three tests. The second experiment, carried out with five 2-week-old calves, examined whether the calves can differentiate the familiar rewarder (wearing the same clothing as during the period of familiarisation) from another person (the non-rewarder) wearing clothes of a different colour. The criterion of success was reached by all five calves. The third experiment was carried out with seven 2-week-old calves. It examined whether the calves can differentiate the familiar rewarder and the non-rewarder, when the two people are wearing clothes of the same colour (i.e. the same colour worn by the familiar rewarder during the phase of familiarisation). None of the calves were able to reach the criterion of success within a limited number of four test days. Often, calves would always choose the same arm of the maze. The fourth experiment was carried out on six 1-month-old calves. It was similar to experiment 3 with the difference that the familiar rewarder and the non-rewarder both wore the same colour clothes, but which were not the same colour as worn during the phase of familiarisation. Only one calf achieved the criterion of success within two test days. Results demonstrated that colour cues help very young calves to discriminate between two people, when these people wear different colour clothing. Some calves may be able to use other indicators than the colour of clothing. The Y-maze method is an promising way of examining calves' abilities to recognise people.
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Kuroshima, H., Fujita, K., Adachi, I., Iwata, K., & Fuyuki, A. (2003). A Capuchin monkey (Cebus apella) recognizes when people do and do not know the location of food. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 283–291.
Abstract: In a previous study, Kuroshima and colleagues demonstrated that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learned to discriminate between a “knower” who inspected a box for food, and a “guesser” who did not. The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing. In experiment 1, we introduced five types of novel containers to two subjects. Each container was of different shape and color. The subjects gradually learned to reach toward the container the knower suggested. In experiment 2, we diversified the behavior of the knower and the guesser. In experiment 3, in order to eliminate the possibility of discrimination based on differences in the magnitude and the complexity of two trainers, we equated their behaviors. One subject adapted to the novel behaviors of the knower and the guesser, successfully discriminating the two trainers. Thus this monkey clearly learned to use the inspecting action of the knower and the non-inspecting action of the guesser as a discriminative cue to recognize the baited container. This result suggests that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.
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