Abstract: Most social scientists would agree that the capacity for human culture was probably fashioned by natural selection, but they disagree about the implications of this supposition. Some believe that natural selection imposes important constraints on the ways in which culture can vary, while others believe that any such constraints must be negligible. This article employs a “thought experiment” to demonstrate that neither of these positions can be justified by appeal to general properties of culture or of evolution. Natural selection can produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are neither adaptive nor consistent with the predictions of acultural evolutionary models (those ignoring cultural evolution). On the other hand, natural selection can also produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are highly consistent with acultural models. Thus, neither side of the sociobiology debate is justified in dismissing the arguments of the other. Natural selection may impose significant constraints on some human behaviors, but negligible constraints on others. Models of simultaneous genetic/cultural evolution will be useful in identifying domains in which acultural evolutionary models are, and are not, likely to be useful.

Abstract: Monkeys recognize the social relations that exist among others in their group. They know who associates with whom, for example, and other animals' relative dominance ranks. In addition, monkeys appear to compare types of social relations and make same/different judgments about them. In captivity, longtailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) trained to recognize the relation between one adult female and her offspring can identify the same relation among other mother-offspring pairs, and distinguish this relation from bonds between individuals who are related in a different way. In the wild, if a vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops) has seen a fight between a member of its own family and a member of Family X, this increases the likelihood that it will act aggressively toward another member of Family X. Vervets act as if they recognize some similarity between their own close associates and the close associates of others. To make such comparisons the monkeys must have some way of representing the properties of social relationships. We discuss the adaptive value of such representations, the information they contain, their structure, and their limitations.

Abstract: It is often assumed that there is more than one kind of learning--or more than one memory system--each of which is specialized for a different function. Yet, the criteria by which the varieties of learning and memory should be distinguished are seldom clear. Learning and memory phenomena can differ from one another across species or situations (and thus be specialized) in a number of different ways. What is needed is a consistent theoretical approach to the whole range of learning phenomena, and one is explored here. Parallels and contrasts in the study of sensory systems illustrate one way to integrate the study of general mechanisms with an appreciation of species-specific adaptations.

Abstract: Baboons' (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) understanding of cause-effect relations in the context of social interactions was examined through use of a playback experiment. Under natural conditions, dominant female baboons often grunt to more subordinate mothers when interacting with their infants. Mothers occasionally respond to these grunts by uttering submissive fear barks. Subjects were played causally inconsistent call sequences in which a lower ranking female apparently grunted to a higher ranking female, and the higher ranking female apparently responded with fear barks. As a control, subjects heard a sequence made causally consistent by the inclusion of grunts from a 3rd female that was dominant to both of the others. Subjects responded significantly more strongly to the causally inconsistent sequences, suggesting that they recognized the factors that cause 1 individual to give submissive vocalizations to another.

Abstract: Animal welfare, or well-being, is a social issue with ethical, scientific, political, and aesthetic properties. Answering questions about the welfare of animals requires scientific definition, assessment, solutions, and public acceptance. With respect to the actual well-being of the animal, most issues are centered on how the animal “feels” when managed within a specific level of confinement, during special agricultural practices (e.g., tail docking, beak trimming, etc.) and handling. Questions of this nature may require exploration of animal cognition, motivation, perception, and emotional states in addition to more commonly recognized indicators of well-being. Several general approaches have emerged for solving problems concerning animal well-being in intensive production systems: environmental, genetic, and therapeutic. Environmental approaches involve modifying existing systems to accommodate specific welfare concerns or development of alternative systems. Genetic approaches involve changing the behavioral and (or) physiological nature of the animal to reduce or eliminate behaviors that are undesirable within intensive system. Therapeutic approaches of a physical (tail docking, beak trimming) and physiological (drug and nutritional therapy) nature bring both concern and promise with regard to the reduction of confinement stress. Finally, the recent focus on commodity quality assurance programs may indirectly provide benefits for animal well-being. Although research in the area of animal well-being will provide important information for better animal management, handling, care, and the physical design of intensive production systems there is still some uncertainty regarding public acceptance. The aesthetics of modern intensive production systems may have as much to do with public acceptance as with science.