Abstract: In the normal chick, conspicuous visual stimuli induce targetting and pecking together, with vocalization. All three are abolished by lesion of the intercollicular area (ICo) or of connections passing through its medial margin. After such lesions, chicks also cease to treat significant visual stimuli as if they were startling and exciting, and may delay response as a result. However, they are still able to recognise, orient accurately to, and respond appropriately to, a variety of complex visual stimuli (e.g. food grains, copulation object). In addition, they are little affected by strange surroundings. Lesion evidence suggests the mammalian subcollicular area to have similar functions to the ICo and to be homologous with it. A route (present in bird), which is well-known in mammals for its association with threat, defense and escape evoked by strange and frightening objects (amygdala-diencephalic periventricular system-central mesencephalic grey, A-DPS-CMG) is stimuli via the 2 ICo (subcollicular area). Two different mechanisms may be involved caudal to the ICo. One consists of tectal afferents which might modulate the evocation of targetting, pecking and other responses via the tectum. The other is the predorsal system of tectal efferents which may mediate such responses. Classical syndromes of tameness and unresponsiveness produced by various interruptions of the A-DPS-CMG route may depend on interruption of connections to these midbrain mechanisms. Attack is depressed by ICo lesions as one aspect of reduced responsiveness to conspicuous and startling visual stimuli. Avoidance, which is apparently mediated by a separate system, much as in Anura, is facilitated.

Abstract: ABSTRACT Tactical deception occurs when an individual is able to use an “honest” act from his normal repertoire in a different context to mislead familiar individuals. Although primates have a reputation for social skill, most primate groups are so intimate that any deception is likely to be subtle and infrequent. Published records are sparse and often anecdotal. We have solicited new records from many primatologists and searched for repeating patterns. This has revealed several different forms of deceptive tactic, which we classify in terms of the function they perform. For each class, we sketch the features of another individual's state of mind that an individual acting with deceptive intent must be able to represent, thus acting as a “natural psychologist.” Our analysis will sharpen attention to apparent taxonomic differences. Before these findings can be generalized, however, behavioral scientists must agree on some fundamental methodological and theoretical questions in the study of the evolution of social cognition.

Abstract: In Experiment 1 female rats were given one trial per day for 8 days in a T-maze, and their initial direction of choice (left/right) was noted. Vaginal smears were also obtained daily. After this some animals were adrenalectomized and given Ringer's solution; others were adrenalectomozed and given hydrocortisone replacement; a third group was sham adrenalectomized, and a fourth group was an intact control. A week after surgery the animals were again tested for 8 days in the T-maze and vaginal smears were obtained. In Experiment 2 rats were subjected to the same surgical treatments as described above and were then tested for 8 days in the T-maze. In Expt. 1 there was no direction bias among the four groups prior to surgery. However, after surgery the Adrenalectomy + Ringer's group showed a significant increase in their rightward choices in the T-maze. This was also found in Expt. 2. Both adrenalectomized groups in Expt. 1 had a significant reduction in the duration of the estrus phase of their cycle. We conclude that corticosterone can affect lateral preference in a T-maze through a mechanism independent of the hormonal changes involved in the estrus cycle.

Abstract: The work of behavioural pharmacologists has concentrated on small animals, such as rodents and pigeons. The validity of extrapolation of their findings to humans depends upon the existence of parallels in both physiology and psychology between these animals and humans. This paper considers the question whether there are in fact substantial cognitive parallels between, first, different non-human groups of vertebrates and, second, non-humans and humans. Behavioural data from 'simple' tasks, such as habituation and conditioning, do not point to species differences among vertebrates. Using examples that concentrate on the performance of rodents and birds, it is argued that, similarly, data from more complex tasks (learning-set formation, transitive inference, and spatial memory serve as examples) reveal few if any cognitive differences amongst non-human vertebrates. This conclusion supports the notion that association formation may be the critical problem-solving process available to non-human animals; associative mechanisms are assumed to have evolved to detect causal links between events, and would therefore be relevant in all ecological niches. In agreement with this view, recent advances in comparative neurology show striking parallels in functional organisation of mammalian and avian telencephalon. Finally, it is argued that although the peculiarly human capacity for language marks a large cognitive contrast between humans and non-humans, there is good evidence-in particular, from work on implicit learning--that the learning mechanisms available to non--humans are present and do play an important role in human cognition.