Abstract: Social dominance is usually viewed from the perspective of intragroup competition over access to limited resources. The present paper, while not denying the importance of such competition, discusses the dominance concept among monkeys and apes in the context of affiliative bonding, social tolerance, and the reconciliation of aggressive conflicts. Two basic proximate mechanisms are supposed to provide a link between dominance and interindividual affiliation, namely, formalization of the dominance relationship (i.e., unequivocal communication of status), and conditional reassurance (i.e., the linkage of friendly coexistence to formalization of the relationship). Ritualized submission is imposed upon losers of dominance struggles by winners; losers are offered a “choice” between continued hostility or a tolerant relationship with a clearly signalled difference in status. If these two social mechanisms are lacking, aggression is bound to have dispersive effects. In their presence, aggression becomes a well-integrated, even constructive component of social life. In some higher primates this process of integration has reached the stage where status differences are strongly attenuated. In these species, sharing and trading can take the place of overt competition. The views underlying this “reconciled hierarchy” model are only partly new, as is evident from a review of the ethological literature. Many points are illustrated with data on a large semi-captive colony of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), particularly data related to striving for status, reconciliation behavior, and general association patterns. These observations demonstrate that relationships among adult male chimpanzees cannot be described in terms of a dichotomy between affiliative and antagonistic tendencies. Male bonding in this species has not been achieved by an elimination of aggression, but by a set of powerful buffering mechanisms that mitigate its effects. Although female chimpanzees do exhibit a potential for bonding under noncompetitive conditions, they appear to lack the buffering mechanisms of the males.

Abstract: Abstract  The relationships between the relative size of the neocortex and differences in social structures were examined in prosimians and anthropoids. The relative size of the neocortex (RSN) of a given congeneric group in each superfamily of primates was measured based on the allometric relationships between neocortical volume and brain weight for each superfamily, to control phylogenetic affinity and the effects of brain size. In prosimians, “troop-making� congeneric groups (N=3) revealed a significantly larger RSN than solitary groups (N=6), and there was a significant, positive correlation between RSN and troop size. In the case of anthropoids, polygynous/frugivorous groups (N=5) revealed a significantly larger RSN than monogynous/frugivorous groups (N=8). Furthermore, a significant, positive correlation between RSN and troop size was found for frugivorous congeneric groups of the Ceboidea. These results suggest that neocortical development is associated with differences in social structure among primates.

Abstract: We discuss selectivity in great ape imitation, on the basis of an observational study of spontaneous imitation in free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Research on great ape imitation has neglected selectivity, although comparative evidence suggests it may be important. We observed orangutans in central Indonesian Borneo and assessed patterns in the models and actions they spontaneously imitated. The patterns we found resembled those reported in humans. Orangutans preferred models with whom they had positive affective relationships (e.g., important caregiver or older sibling) and actions that reflected their current competence, were receptively familiar, and were relevant to tasks that faced them. Both developmental and individual variability were found. We discuss the probable functions of imitation for great apes and the role of selectivity in directing it. We also make suggestions for more effective elicitation of imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Abstract: If culture is defined as variation acquired and maintained by social learning, then culture is common in nature. However, cumulative cultural evolution resulting in behaviors that no individual could invent on their own is limited to humans, song birds, and perhaps chimpanzees. Circumstantial evidence suggests that cumulative cultural evolution requires the capacity for observational learning. Here, we analyze two models the evolution of psychological capacities that allow cumulative cultural evolution. Both models suggest that the conditions which allow the evolution of such capacities when rare are much more stringent than the conditions which allow the maintenance of the capacities when common. This result follows from the fact that the assumed benefit of the capacities, cumulative cultural adaptation, cannot occur when the capacities are rare. These results suggest why such capacities may be rare in nature.