Abstract: Living in groups should promote the cultural transmission of a novel behaviour because opportunities for observing knowledgeable individuals are likely to be more numerous in this condition. However, in this study pigeons who shared the food discoveries of others (scroungers) did not learn the food-finding technique used by the discoverers (producers). Individually-caged pigeons prevented from scrounging easily learned the technique from a conspecific tutor. When caged pigeons obtained food from the tutor's performance, most naïve observers failed to learn. In a flock, scroungers selectively followed producers. In individual cages, scrounging during the tutor's demonstration was equivalent to getting no demonstration at all. This effect of scrounging did not interfere with subsequent acquisition of the food-finding behaviour when scrounging was no longer possible.

Abstract: Group foragers may be able to assess patch quality more efficiently by paying attention to the sampling activities of conspecifics foraging in the same patch. In a previous field experiment, we showed that starlings foraging on patches of hidden food could use the successful foraging activities of others to help them assess patch quality. In order to determine whether a starling could also use another individual's lack of foraging success to assess and depart from empty patches more quickly, we carried out two experimental studies which compared the behaviour of captive starlings sampling artificial patches both when alone and when in pairs. Solitary starlings were first trained to assess patch quality in our experimental two-patch system, and were then tested on an empty patch both alone and with two types of partner bird. One partner sampled very few holes and thus provided a low amount of public information; the other sampled numerous holes and thus provided a high amount of public information. In experiment 1, we found no evidence of vicarious sampling. Subjects sampled a similar number of empty holes when alone as when with the low and high information partners; thus they continued to rely on their own personal information to make their patch departure decisions. In experiment 2, we modified the experimental patches, increasing the ease with which a bird could watch another's sampling activities, and increasing the difficulty of acquiring accurate personal sampling information. This time, subjects apparently did use public information, sampling fewer empty holes before departure when with the high-information partner than when with the low-information partner, and sampling fewer holes when with the low-information partner than when alone. We suggest that the degree to which personal and public information are used is likely to depend both on a forager's ability to remember where it has already sampled and on the type of environment in which foraging takes place.

Abstract: The marginal value theorem predicts that when resources are clumped in space, a forager can maximize its rate of intake by deciding to leave a patch when its current feeding rate falls below the average for the habitat. A group version of the model predicts that when rate-maximizing group members share a patch, they should leave sooner, and each with less gain, than single animals exploiting the same patch. We tested these predictions in the laboratory by measuring patch departure decisions of spice finches, Lonchura punctulataexploiting food patches alone or in groups of three under two habitats that require different travel times. As predicted, group members left the patch sooner and with fewer seeds than single foragers. Unlike the model's assumptions, however, birds did not share the patch equally, and their exploitation curves could not be simply derived from those of single foragers. Grouping decreased the effect of travel time on patch exploitation. Moreover, within each group the bird expected to leave first delayed its departure although it collected fewer seeds than the others. This delayed departure could aim to maintain group membership. We noted an increased variability in seed number collected by group members compared with single foragers, which could be a cost of group foraging.Copyright 1997 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour1997The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour

Abstract: When foraging together, animals are often observed to feed from food discoveries of others. The producer-scrounger (PS) game predicts how frequently this phenomenon of food parasitism should occur. The game assumes: (1) at any moment all individuals can unambiguously be categorized as either playing producer (searching for undiscovered food resources) or scrounger (searching for exploitation opportunities), and (2) the payoffs received from the scrounger tactic are negatively frequency dependent; a scrounger does better than a producer when the scrounger tactic is rare, but worse when it is common. No study to date has shown that the payoffs of producer and scrounger conform to the game's assumptions or that groups of foragers reach the predicted stable equilibrium frequency (SEF) of scrounger, whereby both tactics obtain the same payoff. The current study of three captive flocks of spice finches, Lonchura punctulata, provides the first test of the PS game using an apparatus in which both assumptions of the PS game are met. The payoffs to the scrounger, measured as feeding rate (seeds/s), were highly negatively frequency dependent on the frequency of scrounger. The feeding rate for scrounger declined linearly while the rate for producer either declined only slightly or not at all with increasing scrounger frequency. When given the opportunity to alternate between tactics, the birds changed their use of each, such that the group converged on the predicted SEF of scrounger after 5-8 days of testing. Individuals in this study, therefore, demonstrated sufficient plasticity in tactic use such that the flock foraged at the SEF of scrounger. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.

Abstract: Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively.