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Nallan, G. B., Pace, G. M., McCoy, D. F., & Zentall, T. R. (1983). The role of elicited responding in the feature-positive effect. Am J Psychol, 96(3), 377–390.
Abstract: Hearst and Jenkins proposed in 1974 that elicited responding accounts for the feature-positive effect. To test this position, pigeons were exposed to a feature-positive or feature-negative discrimination between successively presented displays--one consisted of a red and a green response key and the other consisted of two green response keys. There were four main conditions: 5-5 (5-sec trials, 5-sec intertrial intervals), 5-30, 30-30, and 30-180. Conditions 5-30 and 30-180 should produce the largest amount of elicited responding, and therefore the largest feature-positive effects. A response-independent bird was yoked to each response-dependent bird to allow direct assessment of the amount of elicited responding generated by each condition. Contrary to the predictions by Hearst and Jenkins's theory, response-dependent birds showed large feature-positive effects in each condition. The largest feature-positive effect was obtained in condition 5-5. Response-independent birds produced similar results, but manifested low response rates.
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Stahlbaum, C. C., & Houpt, K. A. (1989). The role of the Flehmen response in the behavioral repertoire of the stallion. Physiol. Behav., 45(6), 1207–1214.
Abstract: The role of the Flehmen response in equine behavior was investigated under field and laboratory conditions. In Experiment 1, a field study made of five stallions on pasture with between three and eighteen mares each during the season indicated the following: 1) The Flehmen response was most frequently preceded by nasal, rather than oral, investigation of substances; 2) The stallions' rate of Flehmen varied with the estrous cycles of the mares; 3) The rate of Flehmen response did not show a variation with time of day; and 4) The Flehmen response was most frequently followed by marking behaviors rather than courtship behaviors. The results suggest that the Flehmen response is not an immediate component of sexual behavior, e.g., courtship of the stallion but may be involved in the overall monitoring of the mare's estrous cycle. Therefore the Flehmen response may contribute to the chemosensory priming of the stallion for reproduction. In Experiment 2 stallions were presented with urine or feces of mares in various stages of the reproductive cycle as well as with their own or other males' urine or feces. The occurrence of sniffing and Flehmen was used to determine the discriminatory ability of the stallions. Stallions can differentiate the sex of a horse on the basis of its feces alone, but cannot differentiate on the basis of urine. This ability may explain the function of fecal marking behavior of stallions.
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Hauser, M. D., Kralik, J., Botto-Mahan, C., Garrett, M., & Oser, J. (1995). Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 92(23), 10811–10814.
Abstract: Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.
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Wasserman, E. A., Gagliardi, J. L., Cook, B. R., Kirkpatrick-Steger, K., Astley, S. L., & Biederman, I. (1996). The pigeon's recognition of drawings of depth-rotated stimuli. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 22(2), 205–221.
Abstract: Four experiments used a four-choice discrimination learning paradigm to explore the pigeon's recognition of line drawings of four objects (an airplane, a chair, a desk lamp, and a flashlight) that were rotated in depth. The pigeons reliably generalized discriminative responding to pictorial stimuli over all untrained depth rotations, despite the bird's having been trained at only a single depth orientation. These generalization gradients closely resembled those found in prior research that used other stimulus dimensions. Increasing the number of different vantage points in the training set from one to three broadened the range of generalized testing performance, with wider spacing of the training orientations more effectively broadening generalized responding. Template and geon theories of visual recognition are applied to these empirical results.
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Parr, L. A., Hopkins, W. D., & de Waal, F. B. (1997). Haptic discrimination in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): evidence of manual specialization. Neuropsychologia, 35(2), 143–152.
Abstract: Two experiments investigated the effects of haptic and visual discrimination on hand preference in 22 brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). The percentage of left-handed subjects in Experiment 1 were 63.6%, 45.5%, and 18.2% for haptic, bipedal, and quadrupedal reaching, respectively. In Experiment 2, the haptic demands of the task were manipulated by using additional food types and another tactile medium. Left-hand preferences were further strengthened when reaching into water compared to pineshavings in Experiment 1. Reaching with no tactile interference resulted in equal numbers of lateralized and nonlateralized subjects. These results show that when reaching demands the use of haptic cues, as opposed to visual ones, monkeys shift towards greater left hand use. This is consistent with what is known about right hemisphere superiority for haptic discrimination in humans.
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Dusek, J. A., & Eichenbaum, H. (1997). The hippocampus and memory for orderly stimulus relations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 94(13), 7109–7114.
Abstract: Human declarative memory involves a systematic organization of information that supports generalizations and inferences from acquired knowledge. This kind of memory depends on the hippocampal region in humans, but the extent to which animals also have declarative memory, and whether inferential expression of memory depends on the hippocampus in animals, remains a major challenge in cognitive neuroscience. To examine these issues, we used a test of transitive inference pioneered by Piaget to assess capacities for systematic organization of knowledge and logical inference in children. In our adaptation of the test, rats were trained on a set of four overlapping odor discrimination problems that could be encoded either separately or as a single representation of orderly relations among the odor stimuli. Normal rats learned the problems and demonstrated the relational memory organization through appropriate transitive inferences about items not presented together during training. By contrast, after disconnection of the hippocampus from either its cortical or subcortical pathway, rats succeeded in acquiring the separate discrimination problems but did not demonstrate transitive inference, indicating that they had failed to develop or could not inferentially express the orderly organization of the stimulus elements. These findings strongly support the view that the hippocampus mediates a general declarative memory capacity in animals, as it does in humans.
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Brannon, E. M., & Terrace, H. S. (1998). Ordering of the numerosities 1 to 9 by monkeys. Science, 282(5389), 746–749.
Abstract: A fundamental question in cognitive science is whether animals can represent numerosity (a property of a stimulus that is defined by the number of discriminable elements it contains) and use numerical representations computationally. Here, it was shown that rhesus monkeys represent the numerosity of visual stimuli and detect their ordinal disparity. Two monkeys were first trained to respond to exemplars of the numerosities 1 to 4 in an ascending numerical order (1 --> 2 --> 3 --> 4). As a control for non-numerical cues, exemplars were varied with respect to size, shape, and color. The monkeys were later tested, without reward, on their ability to order stimulus pairs composed of the novel numerosities 5 to 9. Both monkeys responded in an ascending order to the novel numerosities. These results show that rhesus monkeys represent the numerosities 1 to 9 on an ordinal scale.
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Fagot, J., Wasserman, E. A., & Young, M. E. (2001). Discriminating the relation between relations: the role of entropy in abstract conceptualization by baboons (Papio papio) and humans (Homo sapiens). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 27(4), 316–328.
Abstract: Two baboons (Papio papio) successfully learned relational matching-to-sample: They picked the choice display that involved the same relation among 16 pictures (same or different) as the sample display, although the sample display shared no pictures with the choice displays. The baboons generalized relational matching behavior to sample displays created from novel pictures. Further experiments varying the number of sample pictures and the mixture of same and different sample pictures suggested that entropy plays a key role in the baboons' conceptual behavior. Two humans (Homo sapiens) were similarly trained and tested; their behavior was both similar to and different from the baboons' behavior. The results suggest that animals other than humans and chimpanzees can discriminate the relation between relations. They further suggest that entropy detection may underlie same-different conceptualization, but that additional processes may participate in human conceptualization.
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Shettleworth, S. J., & Westwood, R. P. (2002). Divided attention, memory, and spatial discrimination in food-storing and nonstoring birds, black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla) and dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(3), 227–241.
Abstract: Food-storing birds, black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla), and nonstoring birds, dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis), matched color or location on a touch screen. Both species showed a divided attention effect for color but not for location (Experiment 1). Chickadees performed better on location than on color with retention intervals up to 40 s, but juncos did not (Experiment 2). Increasing sample-distractor distance improved performance similarly in both species. Multidimensional scaling revealed that both use a Euclidean metric of spatial similarity (Experiment 3). When choosing between the location and color of a remembered item, food storers choose location more than do nonstorers. These results explain this effect by differences in memory for location relative to color, not division of attention or spatial discrimination ability.
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Kuroshima, H., Fujita, K., Fuyuki, A., & Masuda, T. (2002). Understanding of the relationship between seeing and knowing by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 41–48.
Abstract: The ability of four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) to recognize the causal connection between seeing and knowing was investigated. The subjects were trained to follow a suggestion about the location of hidden food provided by a trainer who knew where the food was (the knower) in preference to a trainer who did not (the guesser). The experimenter baited one of three opaque containers behind a cardboard screen so that the subjects could not see which of the containers hid the reward. In experiment 1, the knower appeared first in front of the apparatus and looked into each container; next, the guesser appeared but did not look into any containers. Then the knower touched the correct cup while the guesser touched one of the three randomly. The capuchin monkeys gradually learned to reach toward the cup that the knower suggested. In experiment 2, the subjects adapted to a novel variant of the task, in which the guesser touched but did not look into any of the containers. In experiment 3, the monkeys adapted again when the knower and the guesser appeared in a random order. These results suggest that capuchin monkeys can learn to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.
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