Menzel, E. W. J. (1971). Communication about the environment in a group of young chimpanzees. Folia Primatol (Basel), 15(3), 220–232.
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Feist, J. D., & McCullough, D. R. (1976). Behavior patterns and communication in feral horses. Z. Tierpsychol., 41(4), 337–371.
Abstract: The social behavior of feral horses was studied in the western United States. Stable harem groups with a dominant stallion and bachelor hermaphrodite hermaphrodite groups occupied overlapping home ranges. Groups spacing, but not territoriality, was expressed. Harem group, stability resulted from strong dominance by dominant stallions, and fidelity of group members. Eliminations of group members were usually marked by urine of the dominant stallion. Hermaphrodite-hermaphrodite aggression involved spacing between harems and dominance in bachelor groups. Marking with feces was important in hermaphrodite-hermaphrodite interactions. Foaling occurred in May and early June, following the post-partum estrous. All breeding was done by harem stallions. Young were commonly nursed through yearling age. These horses showed social organizations similar to other feral horses and plains zebras.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980). Monkey responses to three different alarm calls: evidence of predator classification and semantic communication. Science, 210(4471), 801–803.
Abstract: Vervet monkeys give different alarm calls to different predators. Recordings of the alarms played back when predators were absent caused the monkeys to run into trees for leopard alarms, look up for eagle alarms, and look down for snake alarms. Adults call primarily to leopards, martial eagles, and pythons, but infants give leopard alarms to various mammals, eagle alarms to many birds, and snake alarms to various snakelike objects. Predator classification improves with age and experience.
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Keiper, R. R. (1986). Social structure. Vet Clin North Am Equine Pract, 2(3), 465–484.
Abstract: Socially feral horses live in stable social groups characterized by one adult male, a number of adult females, and their offspring up to 2 years of age. Extra males either live by themselves or with other males in bachelor groups. The bands occupy nondefended home ranges that often overlap. Many abnormal behaviors seen in domestic horses occur because some aspect of their normal social behavior cannot be carried out in captivity.
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Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
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Anderson, J. R. (1995). Self-recognition in dolphins: credible cetaceans; compromised criteria, controls, and conclusions. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 239–243.
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Marten, K., & Psarakos, S. (1995). Using self-view television to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 205–224.
Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.
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Wasserman, E. A. (1997). The science of animal cognition: past, present, and future. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 23(2), 123–135.
Abstract: The field of animal cognition is strongly rooted in the philosophy of mind and in the theory of evolution. Despite these strong roots, work during the most famous and active period in the history of our science-the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s-may have diverted us from the very questions that were of greatest initial interest to the comparative analysis of learning and behavior. Subsequently, the field has been in steady decline despite its increasing breadth and sophistication. Renewal of the field of animal cognition may require a return to the original questions of animal communication and intelligence using the most advanced tools of modern psychological science. Reclaiming center stage in contemporary psychology will be difficult; planning that effort with a host of strategies should enhance the chances of success.
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Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1998). Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 95(9), 5100–5105.
Abstract: The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory.
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Fischer, J., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2000). Development of infant baboons' responses to graded bark variants. Proc Biol Sci, 267(1459), 2317–2321.
Abstract: We studied the development of infant baboons' (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) responses to conspecific 'barks' in a free-ranging population in the Okavango Delta, Botswana. These barks grade from tonal, harmonically rich calls into calls with a more noisy, harsh structure. Typically, tonal variants are given when the signaller is at risk of losing contact with the group or a particular individual ('contact barks'), whereas harsh variants are given in response to predators ('alarm barks'). We conducted focal observations and playback experiments in which we presented variants of barks recorded from resident adult females. By six months of age, infants reliably discriminated between typical alarm and contact barks and they responded more strongly to intermediate alarm calls than to typical contact barks. Infants of six months and older also recognized their mothers by voice. The ability to discriminate between different call variants developed with increasing age. At two and a half months of age, infants failed to respond at all, whereas at four months they responded irrespective of the call type that was presented. At six months, infants showed adult-like responses by responding strongly to alarm barks but ignoring contact barks. We concluded that infants gradually learn to attach the appropriate meaning to alarm and contact barks.
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