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Mitchell, D., Kirschbaum, E. H., & Perry, R. L. (1975). Effects of neophobia and habituation on the poison-induced avoidance of exteroceptive stimuli in the rat. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 1(1), 47–55.
Abstract: Two experiments on the role of neophobia in poison-induced aversions to exteroceptive stimuli are reported. In Experiment 1, rats were given either 10 or 25 days of habituation to the test situation prior to conditioning. Those animals with the longer habituation period avoided a complex of novel exteroceptive stimuli while those with the shorter habituation period did not. In Experiment 2 rats initially avoided the more novel of two containers, but gradually came to eat equal amounts from both. A single pairing of toxicosis with consumption from either the novel or the familiar container reinstated the avoidance of the novel container in both cases. The results were discussed in terms of an interaction between habituation and conditioning procedures. It was suggested that previously reported differences between interoceptive and exteroceptive conditioning effects may have been influenced by the differential novelty of the two classes of stimuli in the test situation. It was further suggested that non-contingently poisoned control groups should routinely be included in poison avoidance conditioning studies.
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Domjan, M. (1976). Determinants of the enhancement of flavored-water intake by prior exposure. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 2(1), 17–27.
Abstract: The intake of a 2.0% sodium saccharin solution in rats was observed to increase as a function of both the number (Experiment 1) and the duration (Experiment 3) of prior periods of access to the saccharin flavor, but did not increase when subjects were maintained on a fluid deprivation procedure in the absence of saccharin exposure (Experiment 2). The enhancement of intake was further influenced by the schedule of saccharin preexposures in the absence of variations in the amount of solution tasted (Experiment 4). The effect was not a function of the opportunity for subjects to determine their own pattern of contact with the saccharin flavor, the opportunity for association of the flavor with hunger and thirst reduction, or the amount of saccharin swallowed during preexposure (Experiment 5). These results suggest that mere exposure to a flavored solution is sufficient to increase subsequent intakes. The phenomenon is discussed in terms of the attenuation of neophobia elicited by the novelty of flavored solutions.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
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Cheney, D., Seyfarth, R., & Smuts, B. (1986). Social relationships and social cognition in nonhuman primates. Science, 234(4782), 1361–1366.
Abstract: Complex social relationships among nonhuman primates appear to contribute to individual reproductive success. Experiments with and behavioral observations of natural populations suggest that sophisticated cognitive mechanisms may underlie primate social relationships. Similar capacities are usually less apparent in the nonsocial realm, supporting the view that at least some aspects of primate intelligence evolved to solve the challenges of interacting with conspecifics.
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Rumbaugh, D. M., Savage-Rumbaugh, S., & Hegel, M. T. (1987). Summation in the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 13(2), 107–115.
Abstract: In this research, we asked whether 2 chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) subjects could reliably sum across pairs of quantities to select the greater total. Subjects were allowed to choose between two trays of chocolates. Each tray contained two food wells. To select the tray containing the greater number of chocolates, it was necessary to sum the contents of the food wells on each tray. In experiments where food wells contained from zero to four chocolates, the chimpanzees chose the greater value of the summed wells on more than 90% of the trials. In the final experiment, the maximum number of chocolates assigned to a food well was increased to five. Choice of the tray containing the greater sum still remained above 90%. In all experiments, subjects reliably chose the greater sum, even though on many trials a food well on the “incorrect” tray held more chocolates than either single well on the “correct” tray. It was concluded that without any known ability to count, these chimpanzees used some process of summation to combine spatially separated quantities. Speculation regarding the basis for summation includes consideration of perceptual fusion of pairs of quantities and subitization.
Keywords: Animals; Choice Behavior; *Cognition; Male; *Mathematics; *Pan troglodytes; Visual Perception
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Duncan, I. J., & Petherick, J. C. (1991). The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5017–5022.
Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.
Keywords: *Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/*psychology; *Cognition
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Curtis, S. E., & Stricklin, W. R. (1991). The importance of animal cognition in agricultural animal production systems: an overview. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5001–5007.
Abstract: To describe and then fulfill agricultural animals' needs, we must learn more about their fundamental psychological and behavioral processes. How does this animal feel? Is that animal suffering? Will we ever be able to know these things? Scientists specializing in animal cognition say that there are numerous problems but that they can be overcome. Recognition by scientists of the notion of animal awareness has been increasing in recent years, because of the work of Griffin and others. Feeling, thinking, remembering, and imagining are cognitive processes that are factors in the economic and humane production of agricultural animals. It has been observed that the animal welfare debate depends on two controversial questions: Do animals have subjective feelings? If they do, can we find indicators that reveal them? Here, indirect behavioral analysis approaches must be taken. Moreover, the linear additivity of several stressor effects on a variety of animal traits suggests that some single phenomenon is acting as a “clearinghouse” for many or all of the stresses acting on an animal at any given time, and this phenomenon might be psychological stress. Specific situations animals may encounter in agricultural production settings are discussed with respect to the animals' subjective feelings.
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Real, L. A. (1991). Animal choice behavior and the evolution of cognitive architecture. Science, 253(5023), 980–986.
Abstract: Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates of net energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception of likelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints.
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Roper, K. L., & Zentall, T. R. (1993). Directed forgetting in animals. Psychol Bull, 113(3), 513–532.
Abstract: Directed-forgetting research with animals suggests that animals show disrupted test performance only under certain conditions. Important variables are (a) whether during training, the cue to forget (F cue) signals nonreward (i.e., that the trial is over) versus reward (i.e., that reinforcement can be obtained) and (b) given that reinforcement can be obtained on F-cue trials, whether the post-F-cue response pattern is compatible with the baseline memory task. It is proposed that some findings of directed forgetting can be attributed to trained response biases, whereas others may be attributable perhaps to frustration-produced interference. It is suggested that directed forgetting in animals should be studied using procedures similar to those used to study directed forgetting in humans. This can be accomplished by presenting, within a trial, both to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten material.
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