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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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Zentall, T. R. (1999). Support for a theory of memory for event duration must distinguish between test-trial ambiguity and actual memory loss. J Exp Anal Behav, 72(3), 467–472.
Abstract: Staddon and Higa's (1999) trace-strength theory of timing and memory for event duration can account for pigeons' bias to “choose short” when retention intervals are introduced and to “choose long” when, following training with a fixed retention interval, retention intervals are shortened. However, it does not account for the failure of pigeons to choose short when the intertrial interval is distinct from the retention interval. That finding suggests that stimulus generalization (or ambiguity) between the intertrial interval and the retention interval may result in an effect that has been attributed to memory loss. Such artifacts must be eliminated before a theory of memory for event duration can be adequately tested.
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Zentall, T. R. (2005). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: the role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 70(3), 209–222.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
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Zentall, T. R., Roper, K. L., & Sherburne, L. M. (1995). Most directed forgetting in pigeons can be attributed to the absence of reinforcement on forget trials during training or to other procedural artifacts. J Exp Anal Behav, 63(2), 127–137.
Abstract: In research on directed forgetting in pigeons using delayed matching procedures, remember cues, presented in the delay interval between sample and comparisons, have been followed by comparisons (i.e., a memory test), whereas forget cues have been followed by one of a number of different sample-independent events. The source of directed forgetting in delayed matching to sample in pigeons was examined in a 2 x 2 design by independently manipulating whether or not forget-cue trials in training ended with reinforcement and whether or not forget-cue trials in training included a simultaneous discrimination (involving stimuli other than those used in the matching task). Results were consistent with the hypothesis that reinforced responding following forget cues is sufficient to eliminate performance deficits on forget-cue probe trials. Only when reinforcement was omitted on forget-cue trials in training (whether a discrimination was required or not) was there a decrement in accuracy on forget-cue probe trials. When reinforcement is present, however, the pattern of responding established during and following a forget cue in training may also play a role in the directed forgetting effect. These findings support the view that much of the evidence for directed forgetting using matching procedures may result from motivational and behavioral artifacts rather than the loss of memory.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (2003). Memory and hippocampal specialization in food-storing birds: challenges for research on comparative cognition. Brain Behav Evol, 62(2), 108–116.
Abstract: The three-way association among food-storing behavior, spatial memory, and hippocampal enlargement in some species of birds is widely cited as an example of a new 'cognitive ecology' or 'neuroecology.' Whether this relationship is as strong as it first appears and whether it might be evidence for an adaptive specialization of memory and hippocampus in food-storers have recently been the subject of some controversy [Bolhuis and Macphail, 2001; Macphail and Bolhuis, 2001]. These critiques are based on misconceptions about the nature of adaptive specializations in cognition, misconceptions about the uniformity of results to be expected from applying the comparative method to data from a wide range of species, and a narrow view of what kinds of cognitive adaptations are theoretically interesting. New analyses of why food-storers (black-capped chickadees, Poecile Atricapilla) respond preferentially to spatial over color cues when both are relevant in a memory task show that this reflects a relative superiority of spatial memory as compared to memory for color rather than exceptional spatial attention or spatial discrimination ability. New studies of chickadees from more or less harsh winter climates also support the adaptive specialization hypothesis and suggest that within-species comparisons may be especially valuable for unraveling details of the relationships among ecology, memory, and brain in food-storing species.
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Matzke, S. M., Oubre, J. L., Caranto, G. R., Gentry, M. K., & Galbicka, G. (1999). Behavioral and immunological effects of exogenous butyrylcholinesterase in rhesus monkeys. Pharmacol Biochem Behav, 62(3), 523–530.
Abstract: Although conventional therapies prevent organophosphate (OP) lethality, laboratory animals exposed to such treatments typically display behavioral incapacitation. Pretreatment with purified exogenous human or equine serum butyrylcholinesterase (Eq-BuChE), conversely, has effectively prevented OP lethality in rats and rhesus monkeys, without producing the adverse side effects associated with conventional treatments. In monkeys, however, using a commercial preparation of Eq-BuChE has been reported to incapacitate responding. In the present study, repeated administration of commercially prepared Eq-BuChE had no systematic effect on behavior in rhesus monkeys as measured by a six-item serial probe recognition task, despite 7- to 18-fold increases in baseline BuChE levels in blood. Antibody production induced by the enzyme was slight after the first injection and more pronounced following the second injection. The lack of behavioral effects, the relatively long in vivo half-life, and the previously demonstrated efficacy of BuChE as a biological scavenger for highly toxic OPs make BuChE potentially more effective than current treatment regimens for OP toxicity.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
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Kendrick, K. M. (1998). Intelligent perception. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 57(3-4), 213–231.
Abstract: For an animal from any species to exhibit intelligent perception it must be capable of being consciously aware of what it perceives and capable of learning from this experience. Although many organisms, and for that matter machines, are capable of rapid adaptive learning in response to perception of environmental changes, such adaptations can occur without them being consciously aware either of external stimuli or their response to them. While behavioural and neurophysiological evidence suggests that, apart from ourselves, other higher primates must also be capable of such awareness, an important central question is whether such awareness is a characteristic of primate evolution or if it also occurs in sub-primate mammals as well. In this review I will examine our behavioural and neurophysiological evidence from visual and olfactory recognition studies in the sheep to support the argument that they are likely to be aware of and learn about both social and non-social objects and that they are therefore capable of intelligent perception. However, the impact of motivational changes on these perceptual processes suggests that they may be limited in terms of both prospection and retrospection and dealing with symbolic associations.
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Dougherty, D. M., & Lewis, P. (1991). Stimulus generalization, discrimination learning, and peak shift in horses. J Exp Anal Behav, 56(1), 97–104.
Abstract: Using horses, we investigated three aspects of the stimulus control of lever-pressing behavior: stimulus generalization, discrimination learning, and peak shift. Nine solid black circles, ranging in size from 0.5 in. to 4.5 in. (1.3 cm to 11.4 cm) served as stimuli. Each horse was shaped, using successive approximations, to press a rat lever with its lip in the presence of a positive stimulus, the 2.5-in. (6.4-cm) circle. Shaping proceeded quickly and was comparable to that of other laboratory organisms. After responding was maintained on a variable-interval 30-s schedule, stimulus generalization gradients were collected from 2 horses prior to discrimination training. During discrimination training, grain followed lever presses in the presence of a positive stimulus (a 2.5-in circle) and never followed lever presses in the presence of a negative stimulus (a 1.5-in. [3.8-cm] circle). Three horses met a criterion of zero responses to the negative stimulus in fewer than 15 sessions. Horses given stimulus generalization testing prior to discrimination training produced symmetrical gradients; horses given discrimination training prior to generalization testing produced asymmetrical gradients. The peak of these gradients shifted away from the negative stimulus. These results are consistent with discrimination, stimulus generalization, and peak-shift phenomena observed in other organisms.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2003). Signalers and receivers in animal communication. Annu Rev Psychol, 54, 145–173.
Abstract: In animal communication natural selection favors callers who vocalize to affect the behavior of listeners and listeners who acquire information from vocalizations, using this information to represent their environment. The acquisition of information in the wild is similar to the learning that occurs in laboratory conditioning experiments. It also has some parallels with language. The dichotomous view that animal signals must be either referential or emotional is false, because they can easily be both: The mechanisms that cause a signaler to vocalize do not limit a listener's ability to extract information from the call. The inability of most animals to recognize the mental states of others distinguishes animal communication most clearly from human language. Whereas signalers may vocalize to change a listener's behavior, they do not call to inform others. Listeners acquire information from signalers who do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it.
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