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Tomasello, M., Davis-Dasilva, M., Camak, L., & Bard, K. (1987). Observational learning of tool-use by young chimpanzees. Human Evolution, 2(2), 175–183.
Abstract: In the current study two groups of young chimpanzees (4–6 and 8–9 years old) were given a T-bar and a food item that could only be reached by using the T-bar. Experimental subjects were given the opportunity to observe an adult using the stick as a tool to obtain the food; control subjects were exposed to the adult but were given no demonstration. Subjects in the older group did not learn to use the tool. Subjects in the younger group who were exposed to the demonstrator learned to use the stick as a tool much more readily than those who were not. None of the subjects demonstrated an ability to imitatively copy the demonstrator's precise behavioral strategies. More than simple stimulus enhancement was involved, however, since both groups manipulated the T-bar, but only experimental subjects used it in its function as a tool. Our findings complement naturalistic observations in suggesting that chimpanzee tool-use is in some sense «culturally transmitted» — though perhaps not in the same sense as social-conventional behaviors for which precise copying of conspecifics is crucial.
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Itakura, S., Agnetta, B., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Chimpanzee Use of Human and Conspecific Social Cues to Locate Hidden Food. Dev Sci, 2(2), 448–456.
Abstract: Two studies are reported in which chimpanzees attempted to use social cues to locate hidden food in one of two possible hiding places. In the first study four chimpanzees were exposed to a local enhancement cue (the informant approached and looked to the location where food was hidden and then remained beside it) and a gaze/point cue (the informant gazed and manually pointed towards the location where the food was hidden). Each cue was given by both a human informant and a chimpanzee informant. In the second study 12 chimpanzees were exposed to a gaze direction cue in combination with a vocal cue (the human informant gazed to the hiding location and produced one of two different vocalizations – a 'food-bark' or a human word-form). The results were – (i) all subjects were quite skillful with the local enhancement cue, no matter who produced it; (ii) few subjects were skillful with the gaze/point cue, no matter who produced it (most of these being individuals who had been raised in infancy by humans); and (iii) most subjects were skillful when the human gazed and vocalized at the hiding place, with little difference between the two types of vocal cue. Findings are discussed in terms of chimpanzees' apparent need for additional cues, over and above gaze direction cues, to indicate the presence of food.
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Call, J., Hare, B. A., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Chimpanzee gaze following in an object-choice task. Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 89–99.
Abstract: Many primate species reliably track and follow the visual gaze of conspecifics and humans, even to locations above and behind the subject. However, it is not clear whether primates follow a human's gaze to find hidden food under one of two containers in an object-choice task. In a series of experiments six adult female chimpanzees followed a human's gaze (head and eye direction) to a distal location in space above and behind them, and checked back to the human's face when they did not find anything interesting or unusual. This study also assessed whether these same subjects would also use the human's gaze in an object-choice task with three types of occluders: barriers, tubes, and bowls. Barriers and tubes permitted the experimenter to see their contents (i.e., food) whereas bowls did not. Chimpanzees used the human's gaze direction to choose the tube or barrier containing food but they did not use the human's gaze to decide between bowls. Our findings allowed us to discard both simple orientation and understanding seeing-knowing in others as the explanations for gaze following in chimpanzees. However, they did not allow us to conclusively choose between orientation combined with foraging tendencies and understanding seeing in others. One interesting possibility raised by these results is that studies in which the human cannot see the reward at the time of subject choice may potentially be underestimating chimpanzees' social knowledge.
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Buttelmann, D., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Behavioral cues that great apes use to forage for hidden food. Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: We conducted three studies to examine whether the four great ape species (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans) are able to use behavioral experimenter-given cues in an object-choice task. In the subsequent experimental conditions subjects were presented with two eggs, one of which contained food and the other did not. In Study 1 the experimenter examined both eggs by smelling or shaking them, but only made a failed attempt to open (via biting) the egg containing food. In a control condition, the experimenter examined and attempted to open both eggs, but in reverse order to control for stimulus enhancement. The apes significantly preferred the egg that was first examined and then bitten, but had no preference in a baseline condition in which there were no cues. In Study 2, we investigated whether the apes could extend this ability to cues not observed in apes so far (i.e., attempting to pull apart the egg), as well as whether they made this discrimination based on the function of the action the experimenter performed. Subjects significantly preferred eggs presented with this novel cue, but did not prefer eggs presented with a novel but functionally irrelevant action. In Study 3, apes did not interpret human actions as cues to food-location when they already knew that the eggs were empty. Thus, great apes were able to use a variety of experimenter-given cues associated with foraging actions to locate hidden food and thereby were partially sensitive to the general purpose underlying these actions.
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Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2006). Do chimpanzees know what others see ? or only what they are looking at? In M. Nudds, & S. Hurley (Eds.), Rational Animals? (pp. 371–384). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997). Primate Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Abstract: Description
Ever since Charles Darwin first formulated his theories on evolution, much research has been conducted in primate cognition. In this book, Michael Tomasello and Josep Call review what is already known about the cognitive skills of nonhuman primates, and assess the current state of our knowledge. They integrate empirical findings on the topic from the beginning of the century to the present, placing this work in theoretical perspective. The first part examines the way primates adapt to their physical world, mostly for the purpose of foraging. The second part lokos at primate social knowledhe and focuses on the adaptations of primates to their social world for purposes of competation and cooperation. In the third section, the authors construct a general theory of primate cognition, distinguishing the cognition in primates from that of other mammals (human in particular). Their broad-ranging theory should provide a guide for future research. Primate Cognition is an enlightening exploration of the cognitive capacities of our nearest primate relatives. It is a useful resource for a eide range of researchers and students in psychology, behavioral biology, primatology, and anthropology.
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Tomasello, M. (1990). Cultural transmission in the tool use and communicatory signalling of chimpanzees? In S. T. Parker, & K. R. Gibson (Eds.), Language and Intelligence in Monkeys and Apes. (pp. 274–311). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Camebridge,MA.: Harvard University Press.
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Tomasello, M. (1996). Do apes ape? In C. M. Heyes, & B. G. Galef (Eds.), Social learning in animals: the roots of culture (pp. 319–346). London: Academic Press.
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Schneider, A. - C., Melis, A. P., & Tomasello, M. (2012). How chimpanzees solve collective action problems. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, .
Abstract: We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective action situations, in which action was necessary for reward but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which group size was small, there was a positive relationship between rank and action with more dominant individuals volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios, when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary (experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging. There was highly significant variability in the action rates of different individuals as well as between dyads, suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the individual personalities and personal relationships present in the group.
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