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Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297–299.
Abstract: During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.
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Rands, S. A., Cowlishaw, G., Pettifor, R. A., Rowcliffe, J. M., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs. Nature, 423(6938), 432–434.
Abstract: Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals.
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Johnson, D. D. P., Stopka, P., & Knights, S. (2003). Sociology: The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature, 421(6926), 911–2; discussion 912.
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Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 421(6919), 155–158.
Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.
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Dyer, F. C. (2002). Animal behaviour: when it pays to waggle (Vol. 419).
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Wilson, A. M., McGuigan, M. P., Su, A., & van Den Bogert, A. J. (2001). Horses damp the spring in their step. Nature, 414(6866), 895–899.
Abstract: The muscular work of galloping in horses is halved by storing and returning elastic strain energy in spring-like muscle-tendon units.These make the legs act like a child's pogo stick that is tuned to stretch and recoil at 2.5 strides per second. This mechanism is optimized by unique musculoskeletal adaptations: the digital flexor muscles have extremely short fibres and significant passive properties, whereas the tendons are very long and span several joints. Length change occurs by a stretching of the spring-like digital flexor tendons rather than through energetically expensive length changes in the muscle. Despite being apparently redundant for such a mechanism, the muscle fibres in the digital flexors are well developed. Here we show that the mechanical arrangement of the elastic leg permits it to vibrate at a higher frequency of 30-40 Hz that could cause fatigue damage to tendon and bone. Furthermore, we show that the digital flexor muscles have minimal ability to contribute to or regulate significantly the 2.5-Hz cycle of movement, but are ideally arranged to damp these high-frequency oscillations in the limb.
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Whiten, A., & McGrew, W. C. (2001). Is this the first portrayal of tool use by a chimp? (Vol. 409).
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de Waal, F. B., & Berger, M. L. (2000). Payment for labour in monkeys. Nature, 404(6778), 563.
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Parr, L. A., & de Waal, F. B. (1999). Visual kin recognition in chimpanzees (Vol. 399).
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de Waal, F. B. (1999). Cultural primatology comes of age. Nature, 399(6737), 635–636.
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