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Trim, C. M., Moore, J. N., & Clark, E. S. (1989). Renal effects of dopamine infusion in conscious horses. Equine Vet J Suppl, (7), 124–128.
Abstract: An ultrasonic flow probe was implanted around a branch of the left renal artery in five horses. The effects of dopamine were studied in the unsedated horses 10 days after surgery. Three experiments, separated by at least two days, were performed in random order on each horse. In two experiments, dopamine was infused intravenously for 60 mins at either 2.5 and 5.0 micrograms/kg bodyweight (bwt)/min. Saline was infused for 60 mins before and after each infusion, and for 180 mins in the third experiment as a control. Renal blood flow increased during administration of dopamine at both dose rates (P = 0.0001). Urine volume increased (P = 0.055), and osmolality decreased (P < 0.05), with infusion of dopamine at 5.0 micrograms/kg bwt/min. Arterial blood pressure and heart rate were not significantly affected. Fractional excretions of sodium and potassium were not significantly changed with dopamine infusion. The higher dopamine dose rate was accompanied by dysrhythmias in some horses.
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Kozarovitskii, L. B. (1988). [Further comment on the distinction between humans and animals]. Nauchnye Doki Vyss Shkoly Biol Nauki, (3), 42–45.
Abstract: The problem of mind is considered in the aspect of natural scientific and philosophical problem of distinction between human and animal. The widespread confusion of the terms “rudiments”, “elements” of specifically human properties in animals and “biological prerequisites” of these properties are critically analysed. The idea is formulated according to which only in the process of anthropogenesis the rudiments of new social property--mind, conscience--could appear in the developing human beings.
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Marinsek, N. L., Gazzaniga, M. S., & Miller, M. B. (2016). Chapter 17 – Split-Brain, Split-Mind. In S. Laureys, O. Gosseries, & G. Tononi (Eds.), The Neurology of Conciousness (Second Edition) (pp. 271–279). San Diego: Academic Press.
Abstract: The corpus callosum anatomically and functionally connects the two cerebral hemispheres. Despite its important role in interhemispheric communication however, severing the corpus callosum produces few--if any--noticeable cognitive or behavioral abnormalities. Incredibly, split-brain patients do not report any drastic changes in their conscious experience even though nearly all interhemispheric communication ceases after surgery. Extensive research has shown that both hemispheres remain conscious following disconnection and the conscious experience of each hemisphere is private and independent of the other. Additionally, the conscious experiences of the hemispheres appear to be qualitatively different, such that the consciousness of the left hemisphere is more enriched than the right. In this chapter, we offer explanations as to why split-brain patients feel unified despite possessing dual conscious experiences and discuss how the divided consciousness of split-brain patients can inform current theories of consciousness.
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