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Beran, M. J., Pate, J. L., Washburn, D. A., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2004). Sequential responding and planning in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(3), 203–212.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) selected either Arabic numerals or colored squares on a computer monitor in a learned sequence. On shift trials, the locations of 2 stimuli were interchanged at some point. More errors were made when this interchange occurred for the next 2 stimuli to be selected than when the interchange was for stimuli later in the sequence. On mask trials, all remaining stimuli were occluded after the 1st selection. Performance exceeded chance levels for only 1 selection after these masks were applied. There was no difference in performance for either stimulus type (numerals or colors). The data indicated that the animals planned only the next selection during these computerized tasks as opposed to planning the entire response sequence.
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Salzen, E. A., & Cornell, J. M. (1968). Self-perception and species recognition in birds. Behaviour, 30(1), 44–65.
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Kaiser, D. H., Zentall, T. R., & Neiman, E. (2002). Timing in pigeons: effects of the similarity between intertrial interval and gap in a timing signal. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(4), 416–422.
Abstract: Previous research suggests that when a fixed interval is interrupted (known as the gap procedure), pigeons tend to reset memory and start timing from 0 after the gap. However, because the ambient conditions of the gap typically have been the same as during the intertrial interval (ITI), ambiguity may have resulted. In the present experiment, the authors found that when ambient conditions during the gap were similar to the ITI, pigeons tended to reset memory, but when ambient conditions during the gap were different from the ITI, pigeons tended to stop timing, retain the duration of the stimulus in memory, and add to that time when the stimulus reappeared. Thus, when the gap was unambiguous, pigeons timed accurately.
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2002). Second-order contrast based on the expectation of effort and reinforcement. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 64–74.
Abstract: Pigeons prefer signals for reinforcement that require greater effort (or time) to obtain over those that require less effort to obtain (T. S. Clement, J. Feltus, D. H. Kaiser, & T. R. Zentall, 2000). Preference was attributed to contrast (or to the relatively greater improvement in conditions) produced by the appearance of the signal when it was preceded by greater effort. In Experiment 1, the authors of the present study demonstrated that the expectation of greater effort was sufficient to produce such a preference (a second-order contrast effect). In Experiments 2 and 3, low versus high probability of reinforcement was substituted for high versus low effort, respectively, with similar results. In Experiment 3, the authors found that the stimulus preference could be attributed to positive contrast (when the discriminative stimuli represented an improvement in the probability of reinforcement) and perhaps also negative contrast (when the discriminative stimuli represented reduction in the probability of reinforcement).
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Zentall, T. R., & Clement, T. S. (2002). Memory mechanisms in pigeons: evidence of base-rate neglect. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 111–115.
Abstract: In delayed matching to sample, once acquired, pigeons presumably choose comparisons according to their memory for (the strength of) the sample. When memory for the sample is sufficiently weak, comparison choice should depend on the history of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli. In the present research, pigeons acquired two matching tasks in which Sample S1 was associated with one comparison from each task, C1 and C3, whereas Sample S2 was associated with Comparison C2, and Sample S3 was associated with Comparison C4. As the retention interval increased, the pigeons showed a bias to choose the comparison (C1 or C3) associated with the more frequently occurring sample (S1). Thus, pigeons were sensitive also to the (irrelevant) likelihood that each of the samples was presented. The results suggest that pigeons may allow their reference memory for the overall sample frequency to influence comparison choice, independent of the comparison stimuli present.
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Pickens, C. L., & Holland, P. C. (2004). Conditioning and cognition. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 28(7), 651–661.
Abstract: Animals' abilities to use internal representations of absent objects to guide adaptive behavior and acquire new information, and to represent multiple spatial, temporal, and object properties of complex events and event sequences, may underlie many aspects of human perception, memory, and symbolic thought. In this review, two classes of simple associative learning tasks that address these core cognitive capacities are discussed. The first set, including reinforcer revaluation and mediated learning procedures, address the power of Pavlovian conditioned stimuli to gain access, through learning, to representations of upcoming events. The second set of investigations concern the construction of complex stimulus representations, as illustrated in studies of contextual learning, the conjunction of explicit stimulus elements in configural learning procedures, and recent studies of episodic-like memory. The importance of identifying both cognitive process and brain system bases of performance in animal models is emphasized.
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Petherick, J. C., Seawright, E., & Waddington, D. (1993). Influence of motivational state on choice of food or a dustbathing/foraging substrate by domestic hens. Behav. Process., 28(3), 209–220.
Abstract: Domestic hens were trained to run a Y-maze and make an association between differently coloured doorways and access to food pellets or sand. The hens were tested for their choice of doorway when the goals were not visible from the choice point and when they were food or sand deprived. Hens made the choice appropriate to their deprivation state (correct choice) significantly more often for food than sand and were faster at choosing and entering the goal box when food deprived. In a follow up experiment, the goals were visible from the choice point. Again the hens chose correctly significantly more often when food than sand deprived and made the choice and entered the goal box faster when food deprived. Thus, failure to choose sand in the first experiment was not due to an inability to learn the association, but appears to result from a strong motivation to feed in the Y-maze, even when not food deprived, and a weak motivation to dustbathe or forage, even when sand deprived.
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Anderson, J. R., Fornasieri, I., Ludes, E., & Roeder, J. - J. (1992). Social processes and innovative behaviour in changing groups of lemur fulvus. Behav. Process., 27(2), 101–112.
Abstract: A group of brown lemurs was presented with one or two baited food-boxes requiring a specific type of motor response in order to be opened. Subsequently, four groups containing different combinations of experienced individuals from the original group and naive individuals were tested. Solutions to the problem and access to the food were recorded and considered in relation to social factors. In the original group, two adult males learned to open the boxes, with one male increasingly preventing the other from approaching. In the second group, with the subordinate male and certain females removed, the dominant male tolerated successful performances by a juvenile female. Group 3 consisted of three passive female participants from the original group and a naive female; one of the three original females now became the sole box-opener. The introduction of the subordinate male from the original group into the all-female group led to a sharing of box-opening by this subject and the skilled female. In the final group, intense aggression toward the skilled female by a new, naive adult male resulted in two previously passive females succeeding on some occasions. In lemurs, at least some `scroungers' appear able to learn to perform a new act when the social context permits.
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Kelly, D. M., & Spetch, M. L. (2001). Pigeons encode relative geometry. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 27(4), 417–422.
Abstract: Pigeons were trained to search for hidden food in a rectangular environment designed to eliminate any external cues. Following training, the authors administered unreinforced test trials in which the geometric properties of the apparatus were manipulated. During tests that preserved the relative geometry but altered the absolute geometry of the environment, the pigeons continued to choose the geometrically correct corners, indicating that they encoded the relative geometry of the enclosure. When tested in a square enclosure, which distorted both the absolute and relative geometry, the pigeons randomly chose among the 4 corners, indicating that their choices were not based on cues external to the apparatus. This study provides new insight into how metric properties of an environment are encoded by pigeons.
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Nakamura, K. (2001). Perseverative errors in object discrimination learning by aged Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 27(4), 345–353.
Abstract: To examine the nature of age-dependent cognitive decline, performance in terms of concurrent object discriminations was assessed in aged and nonaged Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata). Aged monkeys required more sessions and committed more errors than nonaged ones in the discriminations, even in simple object discriminations. Analyses of errors suggest that aged monkeys repeated the same errors and committed more errors when they chose a negative object at the 1st trial. A hypothesis analysis of behavior suggests that their incorrect choices were mainly due to object preference. Therefore, the impairment was probably caused by a failure to inhibit inappropriate responses. Together with previous neuropsychological findings, deficits of aged monkeys in the performance of object discriminations can be explained by dysfunction of the frontal cortex.
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