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Fujita, K., Kuroshima, H., & Masuda, T. (2002). Do tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) spontaneously deceive opponents? A preliminary analysis of an experimental food-competition contest between monkeys. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 19–25.
Abstract: A new laboratory procedure which allows the study of deceptive behavior in nonhuman primates is described. Pairs of tufted capuchin monkeys faced each other in a food-competition contest. Two feeder boxes were placed between the monkeys. A piece of food was placed in one of the boxes. The subordinate individual was able to see the food and to open the box to obtain the bait. A dominant male was unable to see the food or to open the box but was able to take the food once the box was opened by the subordinate. In experiment 1, two of four subordinate monkeys spontaneously started to open the unbaited box first with increasing frequency. Experiment 2 confirmed that this “deceptive” act was not due to a drop in the rate of reinforcement caused by the usurping dominant male, under the situation in which food sometimes automatically dropped from the opened box. In experiment 3, two subordinate monkeys were rerun in the same situation as experiment 1. One of them showed some recovery of the “deceptive” act but the other did not; instead the latter tended to position himself on the side where there was no food before he started to open the box. Although the results do not clearly indicate spontaneous deception, we suggest that operationally defined spontaneous deceptive behaviors in monkeys can be analyzed with experimental procedures such as those used here.
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Bshary, R., Wickler, W., & Fricke, H. (2002). Fish cognition: a primate's eye view. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 1–13.
Abstract: We provide selected examples from the fish literature of phenomena found in fish that are currently being examined in discussions of cognitive abilities and evolution of neocortex size in primates. In the context of social intelligence, we looked at living in individualized groups and corresponding social strategies, social learning and tradition, and co-operative hunting. Regarding environmental intelligence, we searched for examples concerning special foraging skills, tool use, cognitive maps, memory, anti-predator behaviour, and the manipulation of the environment. Most phenomena of interest for primatologists are found in fish as well. We therefore conclude that more detailed studies on decision rules and mechanisms are necessary to test for differences between the cognitive abilities of primates and other taxa. Cognitive research can benefit from future fish studies in three ways: first, as fish are highly variable in their ecology, they can be used to determine the specific ecological factors that select for the evolution of specific cognitive abilities. Second, for the same reason they can be used to investigate the link between cognitive abilities and the enlargement of specific brain areas. Third, decision rules used by fish could be used as 'null-hypotheses' for primatologists looking at how monkeys might make their decisions. Finally, we propose a variety of fish species that we think are most promising as study objects.
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Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
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Anderson, J. R. (1995). Self-recognition in dolphins: credible cetaceans; compromised criteria, controls, and conclusions. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 239–243.
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Marten, K., & Psarakos, S. (1995). Using self-view television to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 205–224.
Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.
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Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. Nat Rev Neurosci, 4(3), 165–178.
Abstract: We are an intensely social species--it has been argued that our social nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.
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Keiper, R. R. (1986). Social structure. Vet Clin North Am Equine Pract, 2(3), 465–484.
Abstract: Socially feral horses live in stable social groups characterized by one adult male, a number of adult females, and their offspring up to 2 years of age. Extra males either live by themselves or with other males in bachelor groups. The bands occupy nondefended home ranges that often overlap. Many abnormal behaviors seen in domestic horses occur because some aspect of their normal social behavior cannot be carried out in captivity.
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Beery, A. K., & Kaufer, D. (2015). Stress, social behavior, and resilience: Insights from rodents. Neurobiol. Stress, 1(Stress Resilience), 116–127.
Abstract: The neurobiology of stress and the neurobiology of social behavior are deeply intertwined. The social environment interacts with stress on almost every front: social interactions can be potent stressors; they can buffer the response to an external stressor; and social behavior often changes in response to stressful life experience. This review explores mechanistic and behavioral links between stress, anxiety, resilience, and social behavior in rodents, with particular attention to different social contexts. We consider variation between several different rodent species and make connections to research on humans and non-human primates.
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Klingel, H. (1975). Social organization and reproduction in equids. J Reprod Fertil Suppl, (23), 7–11.
Abstract: There are two distinct types of social organization and, accordingly, two types of mating systems in equids. In the horse, Plains zebra and Mountain zebra, the adults live in non-territorial and cohesive one-male groups and in stallion groups. The family stallions have exclusive mating rights which are respected by all others. In Grevy's zebra and in the African and Asiatic wild asses, the stallions are permanently territorial and have exclusive mating rights within their territories. Ecological and evolutionary aspects are discussed.
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Goodwin, D. (1999). The importance of ethology in understanding the behaviour of the horse. Equine Vet J Suppl, (28), 15–19.
Abstract: Domestication has provided the horse with food, shelter, veterinary care and protection, allowing individuals an increased chance of survival. However, the restriction of movement, limited breeding opportunities and a requirement to expend energy, for the benefit of another species, conflict with the evolutionary processes which shaped the behaviour of its predecessors. The behaviour of the horse is defined by its niche as a social prey species but many of the traits which ensured the survival of its ancestors are difficult to accommodate in the domestic environment. There has been a long association between horses and man and many features of equine behaviour suggest a predisposition to interspecific cooperation. However, the importance of dominance in human understanding of social systems has tended to overemphasize its importance in the human-horse relationship. The evolving horse-human relationship from predation to companionship, has resulted in serial conflicts of interest for equine and human participants. Only by understanding the nature and origin of these conflicts can ethologists encourage equine management practices which minimise deleterious effects on the behaviour of the horse.
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