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Tschudin, A. J. - P. C. (2001). 'Mindreading' Mammals? Attribution of Belief Tasks with Dolphins. Anim Welfare, 10, 119–127.
Abstract: 'Mindreading' or theory of mind (ToM) refers to the capacity to attribute mental states to others. This ability is regarded as a critical component of what has, to date, exclusively characterized the advanced social cognition displayed by humans. The false belief task is a key test for ToM in different animal species. On a standard non-verbal false belief task, humans pass from age 4, whereas non-human primates consistently fail. Neuroanatomical and behavioural evidence for dolphins, however, indicates that they are capable of passing ToM tasks. The current paper represents a synthesis of the relevant dolphin research on neocortical evolution and non-invasive behavioural tests of precursors for ToM and the attribution of beliefs. The success of dolphins on attribution of belief tasks, in the absence of learning or cueing, indicates that they are capable of 'mindreading'. What are the implications of animal 'mindreading'? ToM tasks probe for reflexive consciousness and, by this criterion, dolphins may display reflexive consciousness. The implication of this conclusion is that future behavioural studies of social cognition will have considerable ethical and legal implications for animal welfare.
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Wemelsfelder, F. (2001). The Inside and Outside Aspects of Consciousness: Complementary Approaches to the Study of Animal Emotion. Animal Welfare, 10, 129–139.
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Lea, S. E. G. (2001). Anticipation and Memory as Criteria for Special Welfare Consideration. Animal Welfare, 10, 195–208.
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Held, S., Mendl, M., Devereux, C., & Byrne, R. W. (2001). Studies in Social Cognition: From Primates to Pigs. Animal Welfare, 10, 209–217.
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Zentall, T. R., Clement, T. S., Bhatt, R. S., & Allen, J. (2001). Episodic-like memory in pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 8(4), 685–690.
Abstract: It has been proposed that memory for personal experiences (episodic memory, rather than semantic memory) relies on the conscious review of past experience and thus is unique to humans. In an attempt to demonstrate episodic-like memory in animals, we first trained pigeons to respond to the (nonverbal) question “Did you just peck or did you just refrain from pecking?” by training them on a symbolic matching task with differential responding required to the two line-orientation samples and reinforcing the choice of a red comparison if they had pecked and the choice of a green comparison if they had not pecked. Then, in Experiment 1, after providing the conditions for (but not requiring) the pigeons to peck at one new stimulus (a yellow hue) but not at another (a blue hue), we tested them with the new hue stimuli and the red and green comparisons. In Experiment 2, we tested the pigeons with novel stimuli (a circle, which they spontaneously pecked, and a dark response key, which they did not peck) and the red and green comparisons. In both experiments, pigeons chose the comparison appropriate to the response made to the test stimulus. Thus, the pigeons demonstrated that they could remember specific details about their past experiences, a result consistent with the notion that they have the capacity for forming episodic-like memories.
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Marfin, A. A., Petersen, L. R., Eidson, M., Miller, J., Hadler, J., Farello, C., et al. (2001). Widespread West Nile virus activity, eastern United States, 2000. Emerg Infect Dis, 7(4), 730–735.
Abstract: In 1999, the U.S. West Nile (WN) virus epidemic was preceded by widespread reports of avian deaths. In 2000, ArboNET, a cooperative WN virus surveillance system, was implemented to monitor the sentinel epizootic that precedes human infection. This report summarizes 2000 surveillance data, documents widespread virus activity in 2000, and demonstrates the utility of monitoring virus activity in animals to identify human risk for infection.
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Maestripieri, D. (2001). Comparing cognition in animals, and researchers. Trends Cogn Sci, 5(10), 452–453.
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Slotnick, B. (2001). Animal cognition and the rat olfactory system. Trends Cogn Sci, 5(5), 216–222.
Abstract: Is smell a 'primitive' sense used primarily to guide biologically basic behaviors or might it be the sensory modality that allows some species to express complex learning and other forms of cognitive behavior? Historically, the olfactory system has been considered primitive and it is not surprising that, until recently, cognitive neuroscientists have ignored odor-guided behavior. However, we now know that the olfactory system has projections to the prefrontal cortex, entorhinal cortex and hippocampus, and that these connections support the acquisition of simple and higher-order instrumental tasks, as well as a robust memory for odors. It appears that animals with a well-developed sense of smell have the neural machinery to think with their noses.
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Bolhuis, J. J., & Macphail, E. M. (2001). A critique of the neuroecology of learning and memory. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 5(10), 426–433.
Abstract: Recent years have seen the emergence of neuroecology, the study of the neural mechanisms of behaviour guided by functional and evolutionary principles. This research has been of enormous value for our understanding of the evolution of brain- and species-specific behaviour. However, we question the validity of the neuroecological approach when applied to the analysis of learning and memory, given its arbitrary assumption that different [`]problems' engage different memory mechanisms. Differences in memory-based performance in [`]natural' tasks do not prove differences in memory capacity; similarly, differences in the use of memory in the natural environment do not provide a sound basis for expecting differences in anatomical structures that subserve learning and memory. This critique is illustrated with examples taken from the study of the neurobiology of food storing and song learning in birds.
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Snowdon, C. T. (2001). Social processes in communication and cognition in callitrichid monkeys: a review. Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 247–257.
Abstract: Studies of vocal development in nonhuman primates have found little evidence for plasticity in vocal production, somewhat more for usage of calls, with the greatest plasticity arising in response to calls of others. Generally, similar results were obtained with callitrichid monkeys, the marmosets and tamarins, but with several interesting exceptions. Infant pygmy marmosets show babbling behavior with improvement in adult call structure related to the amount and diversity of babbling. Adult marmosets alter call structure in response to changes in social partners, and wild marmosets have vocal dialects and modify call structure according to how far they are from other group members, suggesting the potential to modify call structure in different social and environmental contexts, though direct learning of novel vocalizations has not been observed. Infant cotton-top tamarins do not produce adult-like calls in appropriate contexts, at least in the first few months of life, but through food sharing from adults infants learn about appropriate foods and the appropriate contexts for food vocalizations. Tamarins modify call structure and usage with changes in social status. Tamarins, unlike other monkeys tested, can learn to avoid noxious foods through observation of other group members, and can learn about novel food locations. Recent studies provide evidence of contextual imitation in marmosets. The plasticity in vocal communication and evidence of social learning in marmosets and tamarins relative to other monkeys may be related to the cooperative breeding system of marmosets and tamarins. With a high degree of behavioral coordination among group members, there is a priority on monitoring signals and behavior of others and adjusting one's own signals and behavior. This creates the context for vocal plasticity and social learning.
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