Abstract: Six ponies were used to investigate the effect of tolazoline antagonism of detomidine on physiological responses, behavior, epinephrine, norepinephrine, cortisol, glucose, and free fatty acids in awake ponies. Each pony had a catheter inserted into a jugular vein 1 hour before beginning the study. Awake ponies were administered detomidine (0.04 mg/kg intravenously [i.v.]) followed 20 minutes later by either tolazoline (4.0 mg/kg i.v.) or saline. Blood samples were drawn from the catheter 5 minutes before detomidine administration (baseline), 5 minutes after detomidine administration, 20 minutes before detomidine administration which was immediately before the administration of tolazoline or saline (time [T] = 0), and at 5, 30, and 60 minutes after injections of tolazoline or saline (T = 5, 30, and 60 minutes, respectively). Compared with heart rate at T = 0, tolazoline antagonism increased heart rate 45% at 5 minutes. There was no difference in heart rate between treatments at 30 minutes. Blood pressure remained stable after tolazoline, while it decreased over time after saline. Compared with concentrations at T = 0, tolazoline antagonism of detomidine in awake ponies resulted in a 55% increase in cortisol at 30 minutes and a 52% increase in glucose at 5 minutes. The change in free fatty acids was different for tolazoline and saline over time. Free fatty acids decreased after detomidine administration. Free fatty acids did not change after saline administration. After tolazoline administration, free fatty acids increased transiently. Tolazoline tended to decrease sedation and analgesia at 15 and 60 minutes postantagonism. Antagonism of detomidine-induced physiological and behavioral effects with tolazoline in awake ponies that were not experiencing pain appears to precipitate a stress response as measured by cortisol, glucose, and free fatty acids. If antagonism of an alpha-agonist is contemplated, the potential effect on hormones and metabolites should be considered.

Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.

Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.

Abstract: Cardiac output in the horse was measured before and at predetermined times during 2-hour periods of thiopentone-halothane and thiopentone-diethyl ether anaesthesia. Left ventricular stroke volume was decreased to a similar extent during anaesthesia with each volatile agent, but a greater reduction in cardiac output occurred during halothane anaesthesia. This finding reflected the differing effects of halothane and ether on heart rate, a slight bradycardia occurring with the former agent while ether produced a small degree of tachycardia. The latter effect was attributed to enhanced sympathoadrenal activity. Changes in cardiac output and stroke volume were considered in relation to other factors, including arterial blood pH and tensions of oxygen and carbon dioxide. Positive correlations between some of these variables and cardiac function were established. With both volatile agents the reductions in stroke volume and cardiac output were related to the duration of anaesthesia, being greatest during the early stages. Possible reasons for the tendency of stroke volume and cardiac output to return towards control levels are discussed.

Abstract: This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious.