Abstract: Wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have a rich cultural repertoire--traditions common in some communities are not present in others. The majority of reports describe functional, material traditions, such as tool use. Arbitrary conventions have received far less attention. In the same way that observations of material culture in wild apes led to experiments to confirm social transmission and identify underlying learning mechanisms, experiments investigating how arbitrary habits or conventions arise and spread within a group are also required. The few relevant experimental studies reported thus far have relied on cross-species (i.e. human-ape) interaction offering limited ecological validity, and no study has successfully generated a tradition not involving tool use in an established group. We seeded one of two rewarded alternative endpoints to a complex sequence of behaviour in each of two chimpanzee groups. Each sequence spread in the group in which it was seeded, with many individuals unambiguously adopting the sequence demonstrated by a group member. In one group, the alternative sequence was discovered by a low ranking female, but was not learned by others. Since the action-sequences lacked meaning before the experiment and had no logical connection with reward, chimpanzees must have extracted both the form and benefits of these sequences through observation of others.

Abstract: Economic decision-making depends on our social environment. Humans tend to respond differently to inequity in close relationships, yet we know little about the potential for such variation in other species. We examine responses to inequity in several groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in a paradigm similar to that used previously in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). We demonstrate that, like capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees show a response to inequity of rewards that is based upon the partner receiving the reward rather than the presence of the reward alone. However, we also found a great amount of variation between groups tested, indicating that chimpanzees, like people, respond to inequity in a variable manner, which we speculate could be caused by such variables as group size, the social closeness of the group (as reflected in length of time that the group has been together) and group-specific traditions.

Abstract: Conflict management is one of the primary requirements for social complexity. Of the many forms of conflict management, one of the rarest and most interesting is third-party policing, or intervening impartially to control conflict. Third-party policing should be hard to evolve because policers personally pay a cost for intervening, while the benefits are diffused over the whole group. In this study we investigate the incidence and costs of policing in a primate society. We report quantitative evidence of non-kin policing in the nonhuman primate, the pigtailed macaque. We find that policing is effective at reducing the intensity of or terminating conflict when performed by the most powerful individuals. We define a measure, social power consensus, that predicts effective low-cost interventions by powerful individuals and ineffective, relatively costly interventions by low-power individuals. Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic model to explore whether the degree to which policing can effectively reduce the societal cost of conflict is dependent on variance in the distribution of power. Our data and simple model suggest that third-party policing effectiveness and cost are dependent on power structure and might emerge only in societies with high variance in power.