Abstract: After Charles Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, published in 1872, we had to wait 60 years before the theme of animal expressions was picked up by another astute observer. In 1935, Nadezhda Ladygina-Kohts published a detailed comparison of the expressive behavior of a juvenile chimpanzee and of her own child. After Kohts, we had to wait until the 1960s for modern ethological analyses of primate facial and gestural communication. Again, the focus was on the chimpanzee, but ethograms on other primates appeared as well. Our understanding of the range of expressions in other primates is at present far more advanced than that in Darwin's time. A strong social component has been added: instead of focusing on the expressions per se, they are now often classified according to the social situations in which they typically occur. Initially, quantitative analyses were sequential (i.e., concerned with temporal associations between behavior patterns), and they avoided the language of emotions. I will discuss some of this early work, including my own on the communicative repertoire of the bonobo, a close relative of the chimpanzee (and ourselves). I will provide concrete examples to make the point that there is a much richer matrix of contexts possible than the common behavioral categories of aggression, sex, fear, play, and so on. Primate signaling is a form of negotiation, and previous classifications have ignored the specifics of what animals try to achieve with their exchanges. There is also increasing evidence for signal conventionalization in primates, especially the apes, in both captivity and the field. This process results in group-specific or “cultural” communication patterns.

Abstract: Hemispheric specialisation for speech in humans has been well documented. The lateralisation for song production observed in songbirds is reminiscent of this hemispheric dominance. In order to investigate whether song perception is also lateralised, we made multiunit recordings of the neuronal activity in the field L of starlings during the presentation of species-specific and artificial non-specific sounds. We observed a systematic stronger activation in one hemisphere than in the other one during the playback of species-specific sounds, with inter-subject variability in the predominant hemisphere for song perception. Such an asymmetry was not observed for artificial non-specific sounds. Thus, our results suggest that, at least at the individual level, the two hemispheres of the starlings' brain perceive and process conspecific signals differently.

Abstract: Isoluminant stimulus is an image whose edges are defined only by a change in color, not by change in brightness. The stimulus here is imperfect: the blue parts and the green parts of the image are only as nearly equal in brightness as they can be on the printed page. Moreover, the change in brightness beyond the edge of the page is apparent, and so is the fact that the reader is holding the magazine at reading distance. When such cues are removed under laboratory conditions, subjects faced with an isoluminant stimulus prove unable to bring its edges into focus. This deficiency contributes to making a familiar face hard to recognize. The experiment indicates that the brain process underlying visual accommodation (the focusing of the eyes) cannot “see” color; it is a hidden process distinct from the processes that lead to perception. The image shows Groucho Marx as he appeared in the motion picture Horse Feathers.

Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.

Abstract: During locomotion, mammals update their position with respect to a fixed point of reference, such as their point of departure, by processing inertial cues, proprioceptive feedback and stored motor commands generated during locomotion. This so-called path integration system (dead reckoning) allows the animal to return to its home, or to a familiar feeding place, even when external cues are absent or novel. However, without the use of external cues, the path integration process leads to rapid accumulation of errors involving both the direction and distance of the goal. Therefore, even nocturnal species such as hamsters and mice rely more on previously learned visual references than on the path integration system when the two types of information are in conflict. Recent studies investigate the extent to which path integration and familiar visual cues cooperate to optimize the navigational performance.