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Santos, L. R., Pearson, H. M., Spaepen, G. M., Tsao, F., & Hauser, M. D. (2006). Probing the limits of tool competence: experiments with two non-tool-using species (Cercopithecus aethiops and Saguinus oedipus). Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 94–109.
Abstract: Non-human animals vary in their ability to make and use tools. The goal of the present study was to further explore what, if anything, differs between tool-users and non-tool-users, and whether these differences lie in the conceptual or motor domain. We tested two species that typically do not use tools-cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)-on problems that mirrored those designed for prolific tool users such as chimpanzees. We trained subjects on a task in which they could choose one of two canes to obtain an out-of-reach food reward. After training, subjects received several variations on the original task, each designed to examine a specific conceptual aspect of the pulling problem previously studied in other tool-using species. Both species recognized that effective pulling tools must be made of rigid materials. Subsequent conditions revealed significant species differences, with vervets outperforming tamarins across many conditions. Vervets, but not tamarins, had some recognition of the relationship between a tool's orientation and the position of the food reward, the relationship between a tool's trajectory and the substance that it moves on, and that tools must be connected in order to work properly. These results provide further evidence that tool-use may derive from domain-general, rather than domain-specific cognitive capacities that evolved for tool use per se.
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Collier-Baker, E., Davis, J. M., Nielsen, M., & Suddendorf, T. (2006). Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) understand single invisible displacement? Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 55–61.
Abstract: Previous research suggests that chimpanzees understand single invisible displacement. However, this Piagetian task may be solvable through the use of simple search strategies rather than through mentally representing the past trajectory of an object. Four control conditions were thus administered to two chimpanzees in order to separate associative search strategies from performance based on mental representation. Strategies involving experimenter cue-use, search at the last or first box visited by the displacement device, and search at boxes adjacent to the displacement device were systematically controlled for. Chimpanzees showed no indications of utilizing these simple strategies, suggesting that their capacity to mentally represent single invisible displacements is comparable to that of 18-24-month-old children.
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Riedel, J., Buttelmann, D., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use a physical marker to locate hidden food. Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 27–35.
Abstract: Dogs can use the placement of an arbitrary marker to locate hidden food in an object-choice situation. We tested domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) in three studies aimed at pinning down the relative contributions of the human's hand and the marker itself. We baited one of two cups (outside of the dogs' view) and gave the dog a communicative cue to find the food. Study 1 systematically varied dogs' perceptual access to the marker placing event, so that dogs saw either the whole human, the hand only, the marker only, or nothing. Follow-up trials investigated the effect of removing the marker before the dog's choice. Dogs used the marker as a communicative cue even when it had been removed prior to the dog's choice and attached more importance to this cue than to the hand that placed it although the presence of the hand boosted performance when it appeared together with the marker. Study 2 directly contrasted the importance of the hand and the marker and revealed that the effect of the marker diminished if it had been associated with both cups. In contrast touching both cups with the hand had no effect on performance. Study 3 investigated whether the means of marker placement (intentional or accidental) had an effect on dogs' choices. Results showed that dogs did not differentiate intentional and accidental placing of the marker. These results suggest that dogs use the marker as a genuine communicative cue quite independently from the experimenter's actions.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
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Gomez, J. - C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(3), 118–125.
Abstract: The comparative study of infant development and animal cognition brings to cognitive science the promise of insights into the nature and origins of cognitive skills. In this article, I review a recent wave of comparative studies conducted with similar methodologies and similar theoretical frameworks on how two core components of human cognition--object permanence and gaze following--develop in different species. These comparative findings call for an integration of current competing accounts of developmental change. They further suggest that evolution has produced developmental devices capable at the same time of preserving core adaptive components, and opening themselves up to further adaptive change, not only in interaction with the external environment, but also in interaction with other co-developing cognitive systems.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Luttrell, L. M. (1988). Mechanisms of social reciprocity in three primate species: Symmetrical relationship characteristics or cognition? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2–4), 101–118.
Abstract: Agonistic intervention behavior was observed in captive groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and stumptail monkeys (M. arctoides). Reciprocity correlations of interventions were determined while removing from the data the effects of several symmetrical relationship characteristics, that is, matrillineal kinship, proximity relations, and same-sex combination. It was considered likely that if significant reciprocity persisted after controlling for these characteristics, the reciprocity was based on cognitive mechanisms. Statistical significance was tested by means of recently developed matrix permutation procedures. All three species exhibited significant reciprocity with regard to beneficial interventions, even after controlling for symmetrical traits. Harmful interventions were, however, reciprocal among chimpanzees only. This species showed a “revenge system”, that is, if A often intervened against B, B did the same to A. In contrast, both macaque species showed significantly inversed reciprocity in their harmful interventions: if A often intervened against B, B rarely intervened against A. Further analysis indicates that the strict hierarchy of macaques prevents them from achieving complete reciprocity. Compared to chimpanzees, macaques rarely intervene against higher ranking group members. The observed contrast can be partially explained on the basis of differences in available space, as indicated by a comparison of indoor and outdoor living conditions for the chimpanzee colony. Yet, even when such spatial factors are taken into account, substantial behavior differences between chimpanzees and macaques remain.
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Esch, L., Wöhr, C., Erhard, M., & Krueger, K. (2019). Horses� (Equus Caballus) Laterality, Stress Hormones, and Task Related Behavior in Innovative Problem-Solving. Animals, 9(5), 265.
Abstract: Domesticated horses are constantly confronted with novel tasks. A recent study on anecdotal data indicates that some are innovative in dealing with such tasks. However, innovative behavior in horses has not previously been investigated under experimental conditions. In this study, we investigated whether 16 horses found an innovative solution when confronted with a novel feeder. Moreover, we investigated whether innovative behavior in horses may be affected by individual aspects such as: age, sex, size, motor and sensory laterality, fecal stress hormone concentrations (GCMs), and task-related behavior. Our study revealed evidence for 25% of the horses being capable of innovative problem solving for operating a novel feeder. Innovative horses of the present study were active, tenacious, and may be considered to have a higher inhibitory control, which was revealed by their task related behavior. Furthermore, they appeared to be emotional, reflected by high baseline GCM concentrations and a left sensory and motor laterality. These findings may contribute to the understanding of horses� cognitive capacities to deal with their environment and calls for enriched environments in sports and leisure horse management.
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Agrillo, C., Dadda, M., & Bisazza, A. (2007). Quantity discrimination in female mosquitofish. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 63–70.
Abstract: The ability in animals to count and represent different numbers of objects has received a great deal of attention in the past few decades. Cumulative evidence from comparative studies on number discriminations report obvious analogies among human babies, non-human primates and birds and are consistent with the hypothesis of two distinct and widespread mechanisms, one for counting small numbers (<4) precisely, and one for quantifying large numbers approximately. We investigated the ability to discriminate among different numerosities, in a distantly related species, the mosquitofish, by using the spontaneous choice of a gravid female to join large groups of females as protection from a sexually harassing male. In one experiment, we found that females were able to discriminate between two shoals with a 1:2 numerosity ratio (2 vs. 4, 4 vs. 8 and 8 vs. 16 fish) but failed to discriminate a 2:3 ratio (8 vs. 12 fish). In the second experiment, we studied the ability to discriminate between shoals that differed by one element; females were able to select the larger shoal when the paired numbers were 2 vs. 3 or 3 vs. 4 but not 4 vs. 5 or 5 vs. 6. Our study indicates that numerical abilities in fish are comparable with those of other non-verbal creatures studied; results are in agreement with the hypothesis of the existence of two distinct systems for quantity discrimination in vertebrates.
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Zucca, P., Milos, N., & Vallortigara, G. (2007). Piagetian object permanence and its development in Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius). Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 243–258.
Abstract: Object permanence in Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) was investigated using a complete version of the Uzgiris and Hunt scale 1. Nine hand-raised jays were studied, divided into two groups according to their different developmental stages (experiment 1, older jays: 2-3 months old, n = 4; experiment 2, younger jays: 15 days old, n = 5). In the first experiment, we investigated whether older jays could achieve piagetian stage 6 of object permanence. Tasks were administered in a fixed sequence (1-15) according to the protocols used in other avian species. The aim of the second experiment was to check whether testing very young jays before their development of “neophobia” could influence the achievement times of piagetian stages. Furthermore, in this experiment tasks were administered randomly to investigate whether the jays' achievement of stage 6 follows a fixed sequence related to the development of specific cognitive abilities. All jays tested in experiments 1 and 2 fully achieved piagetian stage 6 and no “A not B” errors were observed. Performance on visible displacement tasks was better than performance on invisible ones. The results of experiment 2 show that “neophobia” affected the response of jays in terms of achievement times; the older jays in experiment 1 took longer to pass all the tasks when compared with the younger, less neophobic, jays in experiment 2. With regard to the achieving order, jays followed a fixed sequence of acquisition in experiment 2, even if tasks were administered randomly, with the exception of one subject. The results of these experiments support the idea that piagetian stages of cognitive development exist in avian species and that they progress through relatively fixed sequences.
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