Abstract: A computer-controlled push-door system was designed and tested as a method for measuring motivation. Eleven domestic hens were trained to use the push-door to gain access to food. They were deprived of food for 12 h or 43 h on 12 occasions and the push-door was used to measure the amount of “work” (measured as force × time) that they performed to gain access to a food reward. When deprived of food for 12 h the hens took significantly longer (P<0.01) to reach the required threshold of work, than when deprived for 43 h. This difference arose from the amount of time that the hens spent not pushing at the door. The problems encountered with this system and such an approach to measuring motivation are discussed.

Abstract: Przewalski's horses (Equus przewalskii) are believed to be extinct in the wild; the current known population of 797 animals exists wholly in zoos. The Species Survival Commission of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources is proposing to reintroduce this endangered species into its former Mongogian habitat within the next decade. Knowledge of the behavior of harem-forming equids in general and of Przewalski's horses in particular, is of great importance to the captive propagation and eventual reintroduction of this species. Horses are rarely solitary by nature. Solitary captive animals are prone to pacing. Juvenile male feral horses (Equus caballus) form bachelor herds upon dispersal from their natal band. Zoos can set up bachelor herds as a way of managing surplus males. The older, more dominant feral horse bachelors are the first to acquire mares. Bachelors do not generally obtain females until they are 4 or 5 years of age. The first females acquired are usually 1- and 2-year-old fillies dispersing from their natal band. Because of the age differential, the stallions are generally dominant to their mares. Behavioral impotence may result if captive stallions are given a harem at too young an age, especially if the harem contains older, more dominant, females. Typical harem sizes in the wild are 3-5 mares. Captive stallions with too large a harem may become either apathetic or aggressive toward their mares. Wild horses spend 60-70% of their time foraging. Captive animals may quickly consume their limited amounts of food and develop vices out of boredom. Provision of hay ad libitum reduces the amount of pacing seen in captive animals, and virtually eliminates coprophagy.

Abstract: Herding behavior in ungulates is executed mainly by males. There are several forms of herding: guarding a single estrous female; rounding up a bunch of females during the rutting season; territorial herding by which a male keeps females inside his territory; herding of a moving, permanent, harem group; social herding in which group members of both sexes are herded by one dominant male. When put into this sequence, a phenotypical trend is illustrated, leading from an intimate connection of herding with mating behavior toward an increasing independence from sexual behavior and culminating in a complete socialization of herding. Aspects and problems of herding behavior are the recognition of, and the animal's respect for, partners in gregarious species; the animal “taking offense” at activities of others which deviate from its own activity; the active coordination and synchronization of group activities; the use of, and the effects of, threat, dominance and courtship displays in herding; the possibility of substitution among expressive displays in relation to partners of different sex; the communicative function of the animal's orientation relative to the partner; social hierarchy and leadership in a group; the possibility of interspecific herding, particularly in man-animal relationships, which is closely linked to the process of domestication.

Abstract: Many forms of interaction within and between species appear to be based on `scrounger' individuals or species exploiting a limited resource provided `producers'. A mathematical model is presented which shows whether or not scroungers are maintained in a group, depending on their frequency and the group size. Some of the predictions of the model were tested in captive flocks of house sparrows Passer domesticus L. Here the scroungers obtained most of their food (mealworms) by interaction and the producers found most of their food by actively foraging: the pay-off to each type was measured as mealworm capture rate. Neither type changed strategy opportunistically in response to instantaneous flock composition but, not surprisingly, scroungers fared better when one of more producers were present. However, scrougers did much worse than expected when greatly outnumbered by producers, perhaps because producers then found the available food very quickly.

Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.