|
Allcroft, D. J., Tolkamp, B. J., Glasbey, C. A., & Kyriazakis, I. (2004). The importance of `memory' in statistical models for animal feeding behaviour. Behav. Process., 67(1), 99–109.
Abstract: We investigate models for animal feeding behaviour, with the aim of improving understanding of how animals organise their behaviour in the short term. We consider three classes of model: hidden Markov, latent Gaussian and semi-Markov. Each can predict the typical `clustered' feeding behaviour that is generally observed, however they differ in the extent to which `memory' of previous behaviour is allowed to affect future behaviour. The hidden Markov model has `lack of memory', the current behavioural state being dependent on the previous state only. The latent Gaussian model assumes feeding/non-feeding periods to occur by the thresholding of an underlying continuous variable, thereby incorporating some `short-term memory'. The semi-Markov model, by taking into account the duration of time spent in the previous state, can be said to incorporate `longer-term memory'. We fit each of these models to a dataset of cow feeding behaviour. We find the semi-Markov model (longer-term memory) to have the best fit to the data and the hidden Markov model (lack of memory) the worst. We argue that in view of effects of satiety on short-term feeding behaviour of animal species in general, biologically suitable models should allow `memory' to play a role. We conclude that our findings are equally relevant for the analysis of other types of short-term behaviour that are governed by satiety-like principles.
|
|
|
Snycerski, S., Laraway, S., & Poling, A. (2005). Response acquisition with immediate and delayed conditioned reinforcement. Behav. Process., 68(1), 1–11.
Abstract: Groups comprising eight rats initially were exposed to response-independent water deliveries, then to conditions under which a lever-press response raised an empty dipper immediately or after a resetting delay of 15, 30, or 45 s. When their performance was compared to that of control animals using a 90% confidence level, six rats in the immediate-reinforcement group met the primary criterion for response acquisition during a single 6-h session; 4, 4, and 3 did so in the 15, 30, and 45 s delay groups, respectively. Similar evidence of acquisition was obtained when a 95% confidence level was used. With a 99% confidence level, however, evidence of acquisition was not compelling. Although these data appear to provide the first demonstration of response acquisition in the absence of handshaping or autoshaping under conditions where the putative reinforcer is both conditioned and delayed, they also demonstrate that whether response acquisition occurs depends, in part, on how it is defined.
|
|
|
Lafferty, K. D. (2005). Look what the cat dragged in: do parasites contribute to human cultural diversity? Behav. Process., 68(3), 279–282.
|
|
|
Kilian, A., Fersen, L. von, & Güntürkün, O. (2005). Left hemispheric advantage for numerical abilities in the bottlenose dolphin. Behav. Process., 68(2), 179–184.
Abstract: In a two-choice discrimination paradigm, a bottlenose dolphin discriminated relational dimensions between visual numerosity stimuli under monocular viewing conditions. After prior binocular acquisition of the task, two monocular test series with different number stimuli were conducted. In accordance with recent studies on visual lateralization in the bottlenose dolphin, our results revealed an overall advantage of the right visual field. Due to the complete decussation of the optic nerve fibers, this suggests a specialization of the left hemisphere for analysing relational features between stimuli as required in tests for numerical abilities. These processes are typically right hemisphere-based in other mammals (including humans) and birds. The present data provide further evidence for a general right visual field advantage in bottlenose dolphins for visual information processing. It is thus assumed that dolphins possess a unique functional architecture of their cerebral asymmetries.
|
|
|
Zentall, T. R. (2005). Selective and divided attention in animals. Behav. Process., 69(1), 1–15.
Abstract: This article reviews some of the research on attentional processes in animals. In the traditional approach to selective attention, it is proposed that in addition to specific response attachments, animals also learn something about the dimension along which the stimuli fall (e.g., hue, brightness, or line orientation). More recently, there has been an attempt to find animal analogs to methodologies originally applied to research with humans. One line of research has been directed to the question of whether animals can locate a target among distracters faster if they are prepared for the presentation of the target (search image and priming). In the study of search image, the target is typically a food item and the cue consists of previous trials on which the same target is presented. In research on priming effects, the cue is typically different from the target but is a good predictor of its occurrence. The study of preattentive processes shows that perceptually, certain stimuli stand out from distracters better than others, depending not only on characteristics of the target relative to the distracters, but also on relations among the distracters. Research on divided attention is examined with the goal of determining whether an animal can process two elements of a compound sample with the same efficiency as one. Taken together, the reviewed research indicates that animals are capable of centrally (not just peripherally) attending to selective aspects of a stimulus display.
|
|
|
Shettleworth, S. J. (2005). Taking the best for learning. Behav. Process., 69(2), 147–9; author reply 159–63.
Abstract: Examples of how animals learn when multiple, sometimes redundant, cues are present provide further examples not considered by Hutchinson and Gigerenzer that seem to fit the principle of taking the best. “The best” may the most valid cue in the present circumstances; evolution may also produce species-specific biases to use the most functionally relevant cues.
|
|
|
Dunbar, R. I. M., McAdam, M. R., & O'connell, S. (2005). Mental rehearsal in great apes (Pan troglodytes and Pongo pygmaeus) and children. Behav. Process., 69(3), 323–330.
Abstract: The ability to rehearse possible future courses of action in the mind is an important feature of advanced social cognition in humans, and the “social brain” hypothesis implies that it might also be a feature of primate social cognition. We tested two chimpanzees, six orangutans and 63 children aged 3-7 years on a set of four puzzle boxes, half of which were presented with an opportunity to observe the box before being allowed to open it (“prior view”), the others being given without an opportunity to examine the boxes before handling them (“no prior view”). When learning effects are partialled out, puzzle boxes in the “prior view” condition were opened significantly faster than boxes given in the “no prior view” condition by the children, but not by either of the great apes. The three species differ significantly in the speed with which they opened boxes in the “no prior view” condition. The three species' performance on this task was a function of relative frontal lobe volume, suggesting that it may be possible to identify quantitative neuropsychological differences between species.
|
|
|
Zentall, T. R. (2005). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: the role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 70(3), 209–222.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
|
|
|
Zentall, T. R. (2006). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: The role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 71(2-3), 88–97.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
|
|
|
Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
|
|