Abstract: Dogs learn a great deal from humans and other dogs. Previous studies of socially influenced learning between dogs have typically used a highly trained demonstrator dog who is unfamiliar to the observer. Because of this, it is unknown how dynamics between familiar dogs may influence their likelihood of learning from each other. In this study, we tested dogs living together in two-dog households on whether individual dogs’ rivalry scores were associated with performance on a local enhancement task. Specifically, we wanted to know whether dog rivalry impacted whether an observer dog would approach a plate from which a demonstrator dog had eaten all available food, or whether the observer dog would approach the adjacent plate that still contained food. Dog rivalry scores were calculated using the Canine Behavioral Assessment and Research Questionnaire and indicated each dog’s tendency to engage aggressively with the other household dog. Low-rivalry dogs were more likely to approach the empty plate than high-rivalry dogs when the observer dog was allowed to approach the plates immediately after the demonstrator had moved out of sight. This difference between low- and high-rivalry dogs disappeared, however, when observer dogs had to wait 5 s before approaching the plates. The same pattern was observed during a control condition when a human removed the food from a plate. Compared to low-rivalry dogs, high-rivalry dogs may pay less attention to other dogs due to a low tolerance for having other dogs in close proximity.

Abstract: Two brain hemispheres are unequally involved in the processing of social stimuli, as demonstrated in a wide range of vertebrates. A considerable number of studies have shown the right hemisphere advantage for social processing. At the same time, an approach-withdrawal hypothesis, mainly based on experimental evidence, proposes the involvement of both brain hemispheres according to approach and withdrawal motivation. The present study aimed to test the relative roles of the two hemispheres in social responses displayed in a natural context. Visual biases, implicating hemispheric lateralization, were estimated in the social interactions of saiga antelope in the wild. In individually identified males, the left/right visual field use during approach and withdrawal responses was recorded based on the lateral head/body position, relative to the conspecific. Lateralized approach responses were investigated in three types of interactions, with left visual field bias found for chasing a rival, no bias--for attacking a rival, and right visual field bias--for pursuing a female. In two types of withdrawal responses, left visual field bias was found for retreating after fighting, while no bias was evident in fight rejecting. These findings demonstrate that neither the right hemisphere advantage nor the approach-withdrawal distinction can fully explain the patterns of lateralization observed in social behaviour. It is clear that both brain hemispheres play significant roles in social responses, while their relative contribution is likely determined by a complex set of motivational and emotional factors rather than a simple dichotomous distinction such as, for example, approach versus withdrawal motivation.

Abstract: This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious.

Abstract: This research examined token-mediated tool-use in a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). We conducted five experiments. In experiment 1 we examined the use of plastic color-coded chips to request food, and in experiments 2-5 we examined the use of color-coded chips to request tools. Our subject learned to use chips to request tools following the same general pattern seen in great apes performing analogous tasks, that is, initial discrimination followed by an understanding of the relationship among tokens, tools, and their functions. Our findings are consistent with the view that parallel representational processes underlie the tool-related behavior of capuchins and great apes.

Abstract: Many primate species reliably track and follow the visual gaze of conspecifics and humans, even to locations above and behind the subject. However, it is not clear whether primates follow a human's gaze to find hidden food under one of two containers in an object-choice task. In a series of experiments six adult female chimpanzees followed a human's gaze (head and eye direction) to a distal location in space above and behind them, and checked back to the human's face when they did not find anything interesting or unusual. This study also assessed whether these same subjects would also use the human's gaze in an object-choice task with three types of occluders: barriers, tubes, and bowls. Barriers and tubes permitted the experimenter to see their contents (i.e., food) whereas bowls did not. Chimpanzees used the human's gaze direction to choose the tube or barrier containing food but they did not use the human's gaze to decide between bowls. Our findings allowed us to discard both simple orientation and understanding seeing-knowing in others as the explanations for gaze following in chimpanzees. However, they did not allow us to conclusively choose between orientation combined with foraging tendencies and understanding seeing in others. One interesting possibility raised by these results is that studies in which the human cannot see the reward at the time of subject choice may potentially be underestimating chimpanzees' social knowledge.