|
|
SchäFer M,. (1981). Beobachtungen zum interspezifischen Aggressionsverhalten eines Halbeselhybrid. Säugetierk Mitt, 29, 49–58.
|
|
|
|
Roberts, J., Hunter, M. L., & Kacelnik, A. (1981). The ground effect and acoustic communication. Anim. Behav., 29(2), 633–634.
|
|
|
|
Barnard, C. J., & Sibly, R. M. (1981). Producers and scroungers: A general model and its application to captive flocks of house sparrows. Anim. Behav., 29(2), 543–550.
Abstract: Many forms of interaction within and between species appear to be based on `scrounger' individuals or species exploiting a limited resource provided `producers'. A mathematical model is presented which shows whether or not scroungers are maintained in a group, depending on their frequency and the group size. Some of the predictions of the model were tested in captive flocks of house sparrows Passer domesticus L. Here the scroungers obtained most of their food (mealworms) by interaction and the producers found most of their food by actively foraging: the pay-off to each type was measured as mealworm capture rate. Neither type changed strategy opportunistically in response to instantaneous flock composition but, not surprisingly, scroungers fared better when one of more producers were present. However, scrougers did much worse than expected when greatly outnumbered by producers, perhaps because producers then found the available food very quickly.
|
|
|
|
Parker, G. A., & Rubenstein, D. I. (1981). Role assessment, reserve strategy, and acquisition of information in asymmetric animal conflicts. Anim. Behav., 29(1), 221–240.
Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.
|
|
|
|
Cambefort, J. P. (1981). A comparative study of culturally transmitted patterns of feeding habits in the chacma baboon Papio ursinus and the vervet monkey Cercopithecus aethiops. Folia Primatol (Basel), 36(3-4), 243–263.
Abstract: Japanese workers have studied social acquisition patterns of new feeding habits in Macaca fuscata which they have termed precultural. The present study investigates the same phenomenon in the chacma baboon and the vervet monkey in their natural habitat. The questions addressed are: (1) How a new feeding habit enters a troop and by which age and sex category, also how it is propagated? (2) When individuals are permitted with a choice between palatable and unpalatable food, can they learn by demonstration only or do they have to pass through a direct learning process? (3) Can the results from the above questions be explained by social parameters such as the social structure of the individual species? It was found that juvenile baboons discover new food and that after the discovery propagation is instantaneous. In vervets discovery is random among the age classes and propagation is slow and takes place through certain 'pivot' individuals. Both species fail to learn about palatability by demonstration but have to go through a direct learning process. This contrasts strongly with the forest baboon Mandrillus sphinx that have been shown to learn by demonstration. Socially, baboon juveniles stay closer to each other than the adults who force them to live at the periphery of the troop. Vervets again forage without precise sub-group formation. The link between social and cultural propagation and social structure is discussed on the basis of these findings.
|
|
|
|
Waage Jk,. (1981). How the zebra got its stripes – biting flies as selective agents in the evolution of zebra coloration. J ent Soc S Afr, 44, 351–358.
|
|
|
|
Groves Cp, W. D. (1981). Studies on the taxonomy and phylogeny of the genus Equus. Mammalia, 45, 321–354.
|
|
|
|
R. A. J. Taylor. (1981). The Behavioural Basis of Redistribution I. The Delta -Model Concept. T. J. Anim. Ecol., 50(2), 573–586.
Abstract: (1) A conceptual model is developed in which spatial behaviour is density-dependent. The behaviour is classified as congregatory or migratory according to whether it results in movement towards or away from population concentrations. (2) Spatial behaviour is shown to result from both individual and population interactions. (3) The stability properties of the model are explored and it is shown how, under particular conditions, populations obeying the model have a population density regulating mechanism. (4) The similarity between the model and the potential energy curve of physics is noted, but it is emphasized that this is a behavioural not a physical model.
|
|
|
|
Kaseda Y,. (1981). The structure of the groups of Misaki horses in Toi Cape. Jpn. J Zootech Sci, 52, 227–235.
|
|
|
|
Heird, J. C., Lennon, A. M., & Bell, R. W. (1981). Effects of early experience on the learning ability of yearling horses. J. Anim Sci., 53(5), 1204–1209.
Abstract: Twenty-four yearling Quarter Horse fillies were divided into three groups (I) very limited handling, (II) intermediate handling and (III) extensive handling. At about 14 months of age, each horse was preconditioned for 2 weeks and then run in a simple place-learning T-maze test in which it had to locate its feed. Thirty trials were run daily for 20 days, with the location of the feed changed each day. To retire from the maze, a horse had to meet the criterion: 11 correct responses in 12 tries, with the last eight being consecutive. Horses in Group II required the fewest trials to reach criterion. These horses also learned more and had the highest percentage of correct responses (P less than .05). Mean trainability tended to predict learning ability; however, trainability and trials to criterion were not significantly correlated. Mean emotionality scores indicated a tendency for horses in the intermediately handled group to be less emotional than those in Group I or III. Results indicated that horses with an intermediate amount of handling scored higher on an intermediate test of learning. All handled horses scored higher on learning tests than those not handled.
|
|
