|
Moskat, C., & Hauber, M. E. (2007). Conflict between egg recognition and egg rejection decisions in common cuckoo (Cuculus canorus) hosts. Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: Common cuckoos (Cuculus canorus) are obligate brood parasites, laying eggs into nests of small songbirds. The cuckoo hatchling evicts all eggs and young from a nest, eliminating hosts' breeding success. Despite the consistently high costs of parasitism by common cuckoos, great reed warbler (Acrocephalus arundinaceus) hosts sometime accept and other times reject parasitic eggs. To explore the cognitive basis of this seemingly maladaptive variation in host responses, we documented differences in egg rejection rates within 1-day periods just before and during the egg-laying cycle across host nests. Hosts rejected cuckoo eggs at 28% of nests during the pre-egg-laying stage, but when cuckoos exchanged the first host egg with the parasite egg, rejections increased to 75%. Even later, when several host eggs remained in a nest after parasitism, rejection rate fell to 37.5%. Experimental parasitism with conspecific eggs on the first and second day of host laying showed a similar directional change in relative rejection rates, dropping from 35 to 0%. Mistakes in egg discrimination (ejection error and ejection cost) were observed mostly in the latter part of the laying cycle, mainly when nests contained 5-6 eggs. These correlational and experimental patterns of egg rejection support a cognitive process of egg discrimination through several shifts in hosts' optimal acceptance thresholds of foreign eggs. The results are also consistent with the evolution of foreign egg rejection in the context of nest-sanitation (i.e. the removal of foreign objects). Our results suggest that common cuckoo hosts may recognize more eggs than they reject. This implies that the experience of the host with one or more of its own eggs in the clutch is a key factor in rejecting parasite eggs by allowing inspection and learning about their own clutch.
|
|
|
Cheng, K. (2004). K.J. Jeffery (ed) The neurobiology of spatial behaviourOxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. Anim. Cogn., .
|
|
|
Dyer, F. C. (1998). Spatial Cognition: Lessons from Central-place Foraging Insects. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 119–154). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary Spatial orientation has played an extremely important role in the development of ideas about the behavioral capacities of animals. Indeed, as the modern scientific study of animal behavior emerged from its roots in zoology and experimental psychology, studies of spatial orientation figured in the work of many of the pioneering researchers, including Tinbergen (), von ), Watson () and .
|
|
|
Smith, W. J. (1998). Cognitive Implications of an Information-sharing Model of Animal Communication. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 227–243). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In social communication, one animal signals and another responds. Several cognitive steps are involved as the second animal selects its responses; these steps can be described as follows in terms of an informational model. First, the responding individual must evaluate the information made available by the signaling on the basis of other information, available from sources contextual to the signal. Second, the respondent must fit all of the relevant information into patterns generated from recall of past events (conscious recall is not generally required; pattern fitting is a fundamental skill). Third, conditional predictions must be made; and fourth, the individual must test and modify any of these predictions for which significant consequences exist. Many vertebrate animals appear to respond to signaling with considerable flexibility. Communicative events are thus complex but are by no means intractable. Indeed, communication provides us with excellent opportunities to investigate animal cognition.
|
|
|
Beer, C. G. (1998). Varying Views of Animal and Human Cognition. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 435–456). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In this chapter I want to stand back from the splendid empirical work on animal cognitive capacities that is the focus of this book, and look at the broader context of cognitive concerns within which the work can be viewed. Indeed even the term `cognitive ethology' currently connotes and denotes more than is represented here, as other collections of articles, such as and , exemplify. I include the current descendants of behavioristic learning theory, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary psychology and the recent comparative turn that has been taken in cognitive science. These several approaches, despite their considerable overlap, often appear independent and even ignorant of one another. Like the proverbial blind men feeling the hide of an elephant, they touch hands from time to time, yet collectively have only a piecemeal and distributed understanding of the shape of the whole. Although each approach may indeed need the space to work out its own conceptual and methodological preoccupations without confounding interference from other views, a utopian spirit envisages an ultimate coming together, a more comprehensive realization of the synthetic approach to animal cognition that is this book's theme.
|
|
|
Lombardi, C. Matching and oddity relational learning by pigeons ( Columba livia ): transfer from color to shape. Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: Abstract Relational learning, as opposed to perceptual learning, is based on the abstract properties of the stimuli. Although at present there is no doubt that pigeons are capable of relational behavior, this study aims to further disclose the conditions under which it occurs. Pigeons were trained in an outdoor cage on a matching-to-sample or an oddity-from-sample task, with colored cardboard stimuli presented horizontally. The apparatus involved three sliding lids on which the stimuli were drawn and which, when displaced, revealed the reinforcement. The lids were either adjacent to each other or somewhat separated. Training sessions involved two colors, and test sessions six different colors (same dimension test), or six different shapes (different dimension test). One group of birds trained under the “adjacent” condition failed when tested with new stimuli, but succeeded in both dimension tests after training under the “separate” condition. Two other groups of birds succeeded in all tests after training under the latter condition. These results show that depending on procedural details, pigeons are or are not able to transfer from one visual dimension to another, thus extending previous related findings.
|
|
|
Kamil, A. C. (1998). On the Proper Definition of Cognitive Ethology. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 1–28). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary The last 20-30 years have seen two `scientific revolutions' in the study of animal behavior: the cognitive revolution that originated in psychology, and the Darwinian, behavioral ecology revolution that originated in biology. Among psychologists, the cognitive revolution has had enormous impact. Similarly, among biologists, the Darwinian revolution has had enormous impact. The major theme of this chapter is that these two scientific research programs need to be combined into a single approach, simultaneously cognitive and Darwinian, and that this single approach is most appropriately called cognitive ethology.
|
|
|
Horowitz, A., & Hecht, J. (2016). Examining dog–human play: the characteristics, affect, and vocalizations of a unique interspecific interaction. Anim. Cogn., , 1–10.
Abstract: Despite the growing interest in research on the interaction between humans and dogs, only a very few research projects focus on the routines between dogs and their owners. In this study, we investigated one such routine: dog–human play. Dyadic interspecific play is known to be a common interaction between owner and charge, but the details of what counts as play have not been thoroughly researched. Similarly, though people represent that “play” is pleasurable, no study has yet undertaken to determine whether different forms of play are associated with different affective states. Thus, we aimed to generate an inventory of the forms of dyadic play, the vocalizations within play, and to investigate the relationship of affect to elements of play. Via a global citizen science project, we solicited videotapes of dog–human play sessions from dog owners. We coded 187 play bouts via frame-by-frame video playback. We then assessed the relationship between various intra-bout variables and owner affect (positive or neutral) during play (dog affect was overwhelmingly positive). Amount of physical contact (“touch”), level of activity of owner (“movement”), and physical closeness of dog–owner dyad (“proximity”) were highly correlated with positive affect. Owner vocalizations were found to contain different elements in positive- and neutral-affect play. One novel category of play, “tease”, was found. We conclude that not all play is created equal: the experience of play to the owner participant is strongly related to a few identifiable characteristics of the interaction.
|
|
|
Krueger, K. (2017). Perissodactyla Cognition. In J. Vonk, & T. Shackelford (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior (pp. 1–10). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
|
|
|
Taubert, J., Weldon, K. B., & Parr, L. A. (2016). Robust representations of individual faces in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) but not monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Anim. Cogn., , 1–9.
Abstract: Being able to recognize the faces of our friends and family members no matter where we see them represents a substantial challenge for the visual system because the retinal image of a face can be degraded by both changes in the person (age, expression, pose, hairstyle, etc.) and changes in the viewing conditions (direction and degree of illumination). Yet most of us are able to recognize familiar people effortlessly. A popular theory for how face recognition is achieved has argued that the brain stabilizes facial appearance by building average representations that enhance diagnostic features that reliably vary between people while diluting features that vary between instances of the same person. This explains why people find it easier to recognize average images of people, created by averaging multiple images of the same person together, than single instances (i.e. photographs). Although this theory is gathering momentum in the psychological and computer sciences, there is no evidence of whether this mechanism represents a unique specialization for individual recognition in humans. Here we tested two species, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), to determine whether average images of different familiar individuals were easier to discriminate than photographs of familiar individuals. Using a two-alternative forced-choice, match-to-sample procedure, we report a behaviour response profile that suggests chimpanzees encode the faces of conspecifics differently than rhesus monkeys and in a manner similar to humans.
|
|