Abstract: A model of “distributed cognition” is contrasted with the “mental representation” model exemplified by Tomasello and Call's Primate Cognition. Rather than using behavior as a basis for inferences to invisible mental events such as intentions, the distributed approach treats communicative interactions as, themselves, directly observable cognitive events. Similar to a Vygotskian approach, this model characterizes cognition as “co-constructed” by the participants. This approach is thus particularly suitable for studying primates (including humans), whose reliance on multiparty negotiations can undermine the researcher's ability to extrapolate from observable outcomes back to individual intentions. Detailed (e.g., frame-by-frame) analyses of such interactions reveal cross-species differences in the relevant media of information flow (e.g., behavioral coordination, relative gaze) as well as in the flexibility and complexity of the trajectories observed. Plus, with its focus on dynamics, the distributed approach is especially useful for modeling developmental and evolutionary processes. In discussing enculturation and the ontogeny of imitation, its emphasis is on changes in how expert and novice participate in such events, rather than how either may represent them. Primate cognitive evolution is seen as involving changes in context sensitivity, multi-tasking, and the coordination of social attention. Humans in particular – in, especially, the context of teaching – are seen as having specialized in linking co-perception with the refined sensory-motor coordination that enables them to translate observed behavior into strategically similar action. Highlighting the continuity between human and nonhuman development, this promising, complementary model enables us to tap the richness of micro-ethology as a cognitive science.

Abstract: Chimpanzees and young children understand much about what other individuals have and have not seen. This study investigates what they understand about their own visual perception. Chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old children were presented with a finding game in which food or stickers were hidden in one of two or three tubes. We varied whether subjects saw the baiting of the tubes, whether subjects could see through the tubes, and whether there was a delay between baiting and presentation of the tubes to subjects. We measured not only whether subjects chose the correct tube but also, more importantly, whether they spontaneously looked into one or more of the tubes before choosing one. Most apes and children appropriately looked into the tubes before choosing one more often when they had not seen the baiting than when they had seen the baiting. In general, they used efficient search strategies more often than insufficient or excessive ones. Implications of subjects' search patterns for their understanding of seeing and knowing in the self are discussed.

Abstract: Studies of vocal development in nonhuman primates have found little evidence for plasticity in vocal production, somewhat more for usage of calls, with the greatest plasticity arising in response to calls of others. Generally, similar results were obtained with callitrichid monkeys, the marmosets and tamarins, but with several interesting exceptions. Infant pygmy marmosets show babbling behavior with improvement in adult call structure related to the amount and diversity of babbling. Adult marmosets alter call structure in response to changes in social partners, and wild marmosets have vocal dialects and modify call structure according to how far they are from other group members, suggesting the potential to modify call structure in different social and environmental contexts, though direct learning of novel vocalizations has not been observed. Infant cotton-top tamarins do not produce adult-like calls in appropriate contexts, at least in the first few months of life, but through food sharing from adults infants learn about appropriate foods and the appropriate contexts for food vocalizations. Tamarins modify call structure and usage with changes in social status. Tamarins, unlike other monkeys tested, can learn to avoid noxious foods through observation of other group members, and can learn about novel food locations. Recent studies provide evidence of contextual imitation in marmosets. The plasticity in vocal communication and evidence of social learning in marmosets and tamarins relative to other monkeys may be related to the cooperative breeding system of marmosets and tamarins. With a high degree of behavioral coordination among group members, there is a priority on monitoring signals and behavior of others and adjusting one's own signals and behavior. This creates the context for vocal plasticity and social learning.

Abstract: Two bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) participating in a symbolic communication project spontaneously developed behaviors that resembled pointing and gaze alternation. The dolphins' behavior demonstrated several features reminiscent of referential communicative behavior. It was triadic, involving a signaler, receiver, and referent. It was also indicative, specifying a focus of attention. The dolphins' points were distinct from the act of attending to or acting on objects. Spontaneous dolphin pointing was influenced by the presence of a potential receiver, and the distance between that receiver and the dolphin. These findings suggest that dolphins are capable of producing referential gestures.

Abstract: Two experiments assessed the ability of four adult female chimpanzees to categorize natural objects. Chimpanzees were initially trained to match different color photographs of familiar objects from four possible categories. In training, all the comparison stimuli were from the same category in one condition, and from different categories in another condition. For all subjects, training performance was consistently better for the “different category” than for the “same category” trials. Probe trials were shown after training. In probe trials, the sample and positive comparison stimuli were different items from the same category, and the foils were selected from among the three other test categories. Individual performance was above chance in probe trials, suggesting that categorization by chimpanzees may transcend perceptual resemblance. These results were later replicated with novel stimulus items from the same four categories (experiment 2). Altogether, this research demonstrates that chimpanzees grouped perceptually different exemplars within the same category, and further suggests that these animals formed conceptual representations of the categories.