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Halford, G.S., & Halford, J. M.. (1969). Secondary reinforcement: signal or substitute reward? A preliminary investigation. Aus. J. Psychol, .
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Nelson, G. S. (1970). Onchocerciasis. Adv Parasitol, 8, 173–224.
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Saayman, G. S. (1971). Behaviour of the adult males in a troop of free-ranging Chacma baboons (Papio ursinus). Folia Primatol (Basel), 15(1), 36–57.
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Manning, G. S., & Ratanarat, C. (1970). Fasciolopsis buski (Lankester, 1857) in Thailand. Am J Trop Med Hyg, 19(4), 613–619.
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Sabattini, M. S., Monath, T. P., Mitchell, C. J., Daffner, J. F., Bowen, G. S., Pauli, R., et al. (1985). Arbovirus investigations in Argentina, 1977-1980. I. Historical aspects and description of study sites. Am J Trop Med Hyg, 34(5), 937–944.
Abstract: This is the introductory paper to a series on the ecology of arboviruses in Argentina. Epizootics of equine encephalitis have occurred since at least 1908, principally in the Pampa and Espinal biogeographic zones, with significant economic losses; human cases of encephalitis have been rare or absent. Both western equine and eastern equine encephalitis viruses have been isolated from horses during these epizootics, but the mosquitoes responsible for transmission have not been identified. A number of isolations of Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus were reported between 1936 and 1958 in Argentina, but the validity of these findings has been seriously questioned. Nevertheless, serological evidence exists for human infections with a member of the VEE virus complex. Serological surveys conducted in the 1960s indicate a high prevalence of infection of humans and domestic animals with St. Louis encephalitis (SLE), and 2 SLE virus strains have been isolated from rodents. Human disease, however, has rarely been associated with SLE infection. Only 7 isolations of other arboviruses have been described (3 of Maguari, 1 of Aura, 2 of Una, and 1 of an untyped Bunyamwera group virus). In 1977, we began longitudinal field studies in Santa Fe Province, the epicenter of previous equine epizootics, and in 1980 we extended these studies to Chaco and Corrientes provinces. The study sites are described in this paper.
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Honeyman, M. S., & Miller, G. S. (1998). The effect of teaching approaches on achievement and satisfaction of field-dependent and field-independent learners in animal science. J. Anim Sci., 76(6), 1710–1715.
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Crosby, M. B., Zhang, J., Nowling, T. M., Svenson, J. L., Nicol, C. J., Gonzalez, F. J., et al. (2006). Inflammatory modulation of PPAR gamma expression and activity. Clin Immunol, 118(2-3), 276–283.
Abstract: Nitric oxide (NO) production increases with age in the lupus-prone MRL/lpr mouse, paralleling disease activity. One mechanism for excess NO production in MRL/lpr mice may be a defect in down-regulatory mechanisms of the iNOS pathway. A potential modulator of NO is the nuclear hormone receptor peroxisome proliferation activated receptor gamma (PPARgamma). We demonstrate that renal PPARgamma protein expression was altered as disease progressed in MRL/lpr mice, which paralleled increased iNOS protein expression. Additionally, MRL/lpr-derived primary mesangial cells expressed less PPARgamma than BALB/c mesangial cells and produced more NO in response to LPS and IFNgamma. Furthermore, PPARgamma activity was reduced in mesangial cells following exposure to inflammatory mediators. This activity was restored with the addition of a NOS enzyme inhibitor. These results indicate that the activation of inflammatory pathways may lead to reduced activity and expression of PPARgamma, further exacerbating the disease state.
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Quaresmini, C., Forrester, G. S., Spiezio, C., & Vallortigara, G. (2014). Social environment elicits lateralized behaviors in gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 128(3), 276–284.
Abstract: The influence of the social environment on lateralized behaviors has now been investigated across a wide variety of animal species. New evidence suggests that the social environment can modulate behavior. Currently, there is a paucity of data relating to how primates navigate their environmental space, and investigations that consider the naturalistic context of the individual are few and fragmented. Moreover, there are competing theories about whether only the right or rather both cerebral hemispheres are involved in the processing of social stimuli, especially in emotion processing. Here we provide the first report of lateralized social behaviors elicited by great apes. We employed a continuous focal animal sampling method to record the spontaneous interactions of a captive zoo-living colony of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and a biological family group of peer-reared western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). We specifically focused on which side of the body (i.e., front, rear, left, right) the focal individual preferred to keep conspecifics. Utilizing a newly developed quantitative corpus-coding scheme, analysis revealed both chimpanzees and gorillas demonstrated a significant group-level preference for focal individuals to keep conspecifics positioned to the front of them compared with behind them. More interestingly, both groups also manifested a population-level bias to keep conspecifics on their left side compared with their right side. Our findings suggest a social processing dominance of the right hemisphere for context-specific social environments. Results are discussed in light of the evolutionary adaptive value of social stimulus as a triggering factor for the manifestation of group-level lateralized behaviors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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Van Doorn G.S., Hengeveld G.M., & Weissing F.J. (2003). The Evolution of Social Dominance I: Two-player Models. Behavior, 140(10), 1305–1332.
Abstract: A difference in dominance rank is an often-used cue to resolve conflicts between two animals without escalated fights. At the group level, adherence to a dominance convention efficiently reduces the costs associated with conflicts, but from an individual's point of view, it is difficult to explain why a low ranking individual should accept its subordinate status. This is especially true if, as suggested by several authors, dominance not necessarily reflects differences in fighting ability but rather results from arbitrary historical asymmetries. According to this idea, rank differentiation emerges from behavioural strategies, referred to as winner and loser effects, in which winners of previous conflicts are more likely to win the current conflict, whereas the losers of previous conflicts are less likely to do so. In order to investigate whether dominance, based on such winner and loser effects, can be evolutionarily stable, we analyse a game theoretical model. The model focuses on an extreme case in which there are no differences in fighting ability between individuals at all. The only asymmetries that may arise between individuals are generated by the outcome of previous conflicts. By means of numerical analysis, we find alternative evolutionarily stable strategies, which all utilize these asymmetries for conventional conflict resolution. One class of these strategies is based on winner and loser effects, thus generating evolutionarily stable dominance relations even in the absence of differences in resource holding potential.
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Van Doorn G.S., Hengeveld G.M., & Weissing F.J. (2003). The Evolution of Social Dominance II: Multi-Player Models. Behavior, 140(10), 1333–1358.
Abstract: The social hierarchies observed in natural systems often show a high degree of transitivity. Transitive hierarchies do not only require rank differentiation within pairs of individuals but also a higher level ordering of relations within the group. Several authors have suggested that the formation of linear hierarchies at the group level is an emergent property of individual behavioural rules, referred to as winner and loser effects. Winner and loser effects occur if winners of previous conflicts are more likely to escalate the current conflict, whereas the losers of previous conflicts are less likely to do so. According to this idea, an individual's position in a hierarchy may not necessarily reflect its fighting ability, but may rather result from arbitrary historical asymmetries, in particular the history of victories and defeats. However, if this is the case, it is difficult to explain from an evolutionary perspective why a low ranking individual should accept its subordinate status. Here we present a game theoretical model to investigate whether winner and loser effects giving rise to transitive hierarchies can evolve and under which conditions they are evolutionarily stable. The main version of the model focuses on an extreme case in which there are no intrinsic differences in fighting ability between individuals. The only asymmetries that may arise between individuals are generated by the outcome of previous conflicts. We show that, at evolutionary equilibrium, these asymmetries can be utilized for conventional conflict resolution. Several evolutionarily stable strategies are based on winner and loser effects and these strategies give rise to transitive hierarchies.
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