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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2003). The Structure of Social Knowledge in Monkeys. In F. B. M. de Waal, & P. L. Tyack (Eds.), Animal Social Complexity: Intelligence, Culture, and Individualized Societies. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1988). Social and non.social knowledge in vervet monkeys. In Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 255–270). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). How Monkeys See the World.
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Manser, M. B., Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2002). Suricate alarm calls signal predator class and urgency (Vol. 6).
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Kitchen, D. M., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2005). Male chacma baboons (Papio hamadryas ursinus) discriminate loud call contests between rivals of different relative ranks. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 1–6.
Abstract: Males in multi-male groups of chacma baboons (Papio hamadryas ursinus) in Botswana compete for positions in a linear dominance hierarchy. Previous research suggests that males treat different categories of rivals differently; competitive displays between males of similar rank are more frequent and intense than those between disparately ranked males. Here we test whether males also respond differently to male-male interactions in which they are not directly involved, using playbacks of the loud 'wahoo' calls exchanged between competing males in aggressive displays. We played paired sequences of vocal contests between two adjacently ranked and two disparately ranked males to ten subjects, half ranking below the signalers in the call sequences and half above. Subjects who ranked above the two signalers showed stronger responses than lower-ranking subjects. Higher-ranking subjects also responded more strongly to sequences involving disparately ranked, as opposed to adjacently ranked opponents, suggesting that they recognized those individuals' relative ranks. Strong responses to sequences between disparately ranked opponents might have occurred either because such contests typically involve resources of high fitness value (defense of meat, estrous females or infants vulnerable to infanticide) or because they indicate a sudden change in one contestant's condition. In contrast, subjects who ranked lower than the signalers responded equally strongly to both types of sequences. These subjects may have been able to distinguish between the two categories of opponents but did not respond differently to them because they had little to lose or gain by a rank reversal between males that already ranked higher than they did.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Bergman, T. J. (2005). Primate social cognition and the origins of language. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(6), 264–266.
Abstract: Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.
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Owren, M. J., Dieter, J. A., Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1993). Vocalizations of rhesus (Macaca mulatta) and Japanese (M. fuscata) macaques cross-fostered between species show evidence of only limited modification. Dev Psychobiol, 26(7), 389–406.
Abstract: Two rhesus and two Japanese macaque infants were cross-fostered between species in order to study the effects of auditory experience on vocal development. Both the cross-fostered and normally raised control subjects were observed over the first 2 years of life and their vocalizations were tape-recorded. We classified 8053 calls by ear, placed each call in one of six acoustic categories, and calculated the rates at which different call-types were used in different social contexts. Species differences were found in the use of “coo” and “gruff” vocalizations among control subjects. Japanese macaques invariably produced coos almost exclusively. In contrast, rhesus macaques produced a mixture of coos and gruffs and showed considerable interindividual variation in the relative use of one call type or the other. Cross-fostered Japanese macaques adhered to their species-typical behavior, rarely using gruffs. Cross-fostered rhesus subjects also exhibited species-typical behavior in many contexts, but in some situations produced coos and gruffs at rates that were intermediate between those shown by normally raised animals of the two species. This outcome suggests that environmentally mediated modification of vocal behavior may have occurred, but that the resulting changes were quite limited.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1986). The recognition of social alliances among vervet monkeys. Anim. Behav., 34, 1722–1731.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). The representation of social relations by monkeys. Cognition, 37(1-2), 167–196.
Abstract: Monkeys recognize the social relations that exist among others in their group. They know who associates with whom, for example, and other animals' relative dominance ranks. In addition, monkeys appear to compare types of social relations and make same/different judgments about them. In captivity, longtailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) trained to recognize the relation between one adult female and her offspring can identify the same relation among other mother-offspring pairs, and distinguish this relation from bonds between individuals who are related in a different way. In the wild, if a vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops) has seen a fight between a member of its own family and a member of Family X, this increases the likelihood that it will act aggressively toward another member of Family X. Vervets act as if they recognize some similarity between their own close associates and the close associates of others. To make such comparisons the monkeys must have some way of representing the properties of social relationships. We discuss the adaptive value of such representations, the information they contain, their structure, and their limitations.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2000). Social Awareness in Monkeys. Amer. Zool., 40(6), 902–909.
Abstract: Tests of self-awareness in nonhuman primates have to date been concerned almost entirely with the recognition of an animal's reflection in a mirror. By contrast, we know much less about non-human primates' perception of their place within a social network, or of their understanding of themselves as individuals with unique sets of social relationships. Here we review evidence that monkeys who fail the mirror test may nonetheless behave as if they recognize themselves as distinct individuals, each of whom occupies a unique place in society and has a specific set of relations with others. A free-ranging vervet monkey, baboon, or macaque recognizes other members of his group as individuals. He also recognizes matrilineal kin groups, linear dominance rank orders, and behaves as if he recognizes his own unique place within them. This sense of “social self” in monkeys, however, is markedly different from self-awareness in humans. Although monkeys may behave in ways that accurately place themselves within a social network, they are unaware of the knowledge that allows them to do so: they do not know what they know, cannot reflect on what they know, and cannot become the object of their own attention.
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