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Loveland, K. A. (1995). Self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: ecological considerations. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 254–257.
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Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
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Anderson, J. R. (1995). Self-recognition in dolphins: credible cetaceans; compromised criteria, controls, and conclusions. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 239–243.
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Marten, K., & Psarakos, S. (1995). Using self-view television to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 205–224.
Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.
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Tomkins, L. M., Williams, K. A., Thomson, P. C., & McGreevy, P. D. (2010). Sensory Jump Test as a measure of sensory (visual) lateralization in dogs (Canis familiaris). Journal of Veterinary Behavior, 5(5), 256–267.
Abstract: Sensory lateralization in dogs (n = 74) was investigated in this study using our innovation, the Sensory Jump Test. This required the modification of head halters to create three different ocular treatments (binocular, right, and left monocular vision) for eye preference assessment in a jumping task. Ten jumps were recorded as a jump set for each treatment. Measurements recorded included (i) launch and landing paws, (ii) type of jump, (iii) approach distance, (iv) clearance height of the forepaw, hindpaw, and the lowest part of the body to clear the jump, and (v) whether the jump was successful. Factors significantly associated with these jump outcomes included ocular treatment, jump set number, and replication number. Most notably, in the first jump set, findings indicated a left hemispheric dominance for the initial navigation of the Sensory Jump Test, as left monocular vision (LMV) compromised of jumping more than right monocular (RMV) and binocular vision, with a significantly reduced approach distance and forepaw clearance observed in dogs with LMV. However, by the third jump set, dogs undergoing LMV launched from a greater approach distance and with a higher clearance height, corresponding to an increase in success rate of the jump, in comparison with RMV and binocular vision dogs. A marginally non-significant RMV bias was observed for eye preference based on the laterality indices for approach distance (P = 0.060) and lowest body part clearance height (P = 0.067). A comparison between eye preference and launching or landing paws showed no association between these measures of sensory and motor laterality. To our knowledge, this is the first study to report on sensory lateralization in the dog, and furthermore, to compare both motor and sensory laterality in dogs.
Keywords: sensory lateralization; monocular vision; binocular vision; jump kinematics; dog
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Regolin, L., Marconato, F., & Vallortigara, G. (2004). Hemispheric differences in the recognition of partly occluded objects by newly hatched domestic chicks (Gallus gallus). Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 162–170.
Abstract: Domestic chicks are capable of perceiving as a whole objects partly concealed by occluders (“amodal completion”). In previous studies chicks were imprinted on a certain configuration and at test they were required to choose between two alternative versions of it. Using the same paradigm we now investigated the presence of hemispheric differences in amodal completion by testing newborn chicks with one eye temporarily patched. Separate groups of newly hatched chicks were imprinted binocularly: (1) on a square partly occluded by a superimposed bar, (2) on a whole or (3) on an amputated version of the square. At test, in monocular conditions, each chick was presented with a free choice between a complete and an amputated square. In the crucial condition 1, chicks tested with only their left eye in use chose the complete square (like binocular chicks would do); right-eyed chicks, in contrast, tended to choose the amputated square. Similar results were obtained in another group of chicks imprinted binocularly onto a cross (either occluded or amputated in its central part) and required to choose between a complete or an amputated cross. Left-eyed and binocular chicks chose the complete cross, whereas right-eyed chicks did not choose the amputated cross significantly more often. These findings suggest that neural structures fed by the left eye (mainly located in the right hemisphere) are, in the chick, more inclined to a “global” analysis of visual scenes, whereas those fed by the right eye seem to be more inclined to a “featural” analysis of visual scenes.
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Adler, L. L., & Adler, H. E. (1977). Ontogeny of observational learning in the dog (Canis familiaris). Dev Psychobiol, 10(3), 267–271.
Abstract: A split-litter technique was used to test observational learning in 4 litters of Miniature Dachshund puppies, 21, 28, 38, and 60 days old at the beginning of the experiment. In one side of a duplicate cage, one puppy of a litter, the demonstrator, learned to pull in a food cart on a runner by means of a ribbon, while another puppy, the observer, watched from an adjacent compartment, separated by a wire screen. Observational learning was demonstrated by the saving in time for the 1st trial when the observer was given the same problem to solve. Maturation, particularly the development of visual function and motor coordination, set a lower age limit for the emergence of observational learning.
Keywords: Animals; Dogs/*physiology; Female; Learning/*physiology; Male; Vision, Ocular/physiology
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Anderson, C., & Franks, N. R. (2001). Teams in animal societies. Behav. Ecol., 12(5), 534–540.
Abstract: We review the existence of teams in animal societies. Teams have previously been dismissed in all but a tiny minority of insect societies. “Team” is a term not generally used in studies of vertebrates. We propose a new rigorous definition of a team that may be applied to both vertebrate and invertebrate societies. We reconsider what it means to work as a team or group and suggest that there are many more teams in insect societies than previously thought. A team task requires different subtasks to be performed concurrently for successful completion. There is a division of labor within a team. Contrary to previous reviews of teams in social insects, we do not constrain teams to consist of members of different castes and argue that team members may be interchangeable. Consequently, we suggest that a team is simply the set of individuals that performs a team task. We contrast teams with groups and suggest that a group task requires the simultaneous performance and cooperation of two or more individuals for successful completion. In a group, there is no division of labor--each individual performs the same task. We also contrast vertebrate and invertebrate teams and find that vertebrate teams tend to be associated with hunting and are based on individual recognition. Invertebrate teams occur in societies characterized by a great deal of redundancy, and we predict that teams in insect societies are more likely to be found in large polymorphic (“complex”) societies than in small monomorphic (“simple”) societies.
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Farmer, K., Krueger, K., & Byrne, R. (2010). Visual laterality in the domestic horse (Equus caballus) interacting with humans. Anim. Cogn., 13, 229–238.
Abstract: Most horses have a side on which they are easier to handle and a direction they favour when working on a circle, and recent studies have suggested a correlation between emotion and visual laterality when horses observe inanimate objects. As such lateralisation could provide important clues regarding the horse’s cognitive processes, we investigated whether horses also show laterality in association with people. We gave horses the choice of entering a chute to left or right, with and without the passive, non-interactive presence of a person unknown to them. The left eye was preferred for scanning under both conditions, but significantly more so when a person was present. Traditionally, riders handle horses only from the left, so we repeated the experiment with horses specifically trained on both sides. Again, there was a consistent preference for left eye scanning in the presence of a person, whether known to the horses or not. We also examined horses interacting with a person, using both traditionally and bilaterally trained horses. Both groups showed left eye preference for viewing the person, regardless of training and test procedure. For those horses tested under both passive and interactive conditions, the left eye was preferred significantly more during interaction. We suggest that most horses prefer to use their left eye for assessment and evaluation, and that there is an emotional aspect to the choice which may be positive or negative, depending on the circumstances. We believe these results have important practical implications and that emotional laterality should be taken into account in training methods.
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Harman, A. M., Moore, S., Hoskins, R., & Keller, P. (1999). Horse vision and an explanation for the visual behaviour originally explained by the 'ramp retina'. Equine Vet J, 31(5), 384–390.
Abstract: Here we provide confirmation that the 'ramp retina' of the horse, once thought to result in head rotating visual behaviour, does not exist. We found a 9% variation in axial length of the eye between the streak region and the dorsal periphery. However, the difference was in the opposite direction to that proposed for the 'ramp retina'. Furthermore, acuity in the narrow, intense visual streak in the inferior retina is 16.5 cycles per degree compared with 2.7 cycles per degree in the periphery. Therefore, it is improbable that the horse rotates its head to focus onto the peripheral retina. Rather, the horse rotates the nose up high to observe distant objects because binocular overlap is oriented down the nose, with a blind area directly in front of the forehead.
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