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Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature, 303(5912), 11–14.
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Kozarovitskii, L. B. (1988). [Further comment on the distinction between humans and animals]. Nauchnye Doki Vyss Shkoly Biol Nauki, (3), 42–45.
Abstract: The problem of mind is considered in the aspect of natural scientific and philosophical problem of distinction between human and animal. The widespread confusion of the terms “rudiments”, “elements” of specifically human properties in animals and “biological prerequisites” of these properties are critically analysed. The idea is formulated according to which only in the process of anthropogenesis the rudiments of new social property--mind, conscience--could appear in the developing human beings.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Van Schaik, C. (2006). Why are some animals so smart? Sci Am, 294(4), 64–71.
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Williams, N. (1997). Evolutionary psychologists look for roots of cognition (Vol. 275).
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Real, L. A. (1991). Animal choice behavior and the evolution of cognitive architecture. Science, 253(5023), 980–986.
Abstract: Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates of net energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception of likelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints.
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Levy, J. (1977). The mammalian brain and the adaptive advantage of cerebral asymmetry. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 299, 264–272.
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Bouchard, T. J. J., & Loehlin, J. C. (2001). Genes, evolution, and personality. Behav Genet, 31(3), 243–273.
Abstract: There is abundant evidence, some of it reviewed in this paper, that personality traits are substantially influenced by the genes. Much remains to be understood about how and why this is the case. We argue that placing the behavior genetics of personality in the context of epidemiology, evolutionary psychology, and neighboring psychological domains such as interests and attitudes should help lead to new insights. We suggest that important methodological advances, such as measuring traits from multiple viewpoints, using large samples, and analyzing data by modern multivariate techniques, have already led to major changes in our view of such perennial puzzles as the role of “unshared environment” in personality. In the long run, but not yet, approaches via molecular genetics and brain physiology may also make decisive contributions to understanding the heritability of personality traits. We conclude that the behavior genetics of personality is alive and flourishing but that there remains ample scope for new growth and that much social science research is seriously compromised if it does not incorporate genetic variation in its explanatory models.
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Jolly, A. (1998). Pair-bonding, female aggression and the evolution of lemur societies. Folia Primatol (Basel), 69 Suppl 1, 1–13.
Abstract: Lemur societies have been described as convergent with those of anthropoids, including Papio-like female-bonded multi-male groups. Recent research, however, shows at least 5 pair-bonded species among the Lemuridae and Indriidae. Three more, Eulemur mongoz, Eulemur fulvus and Varecia variegata, have societies combining aspects of pairing with aspects of troop life. The best-known female-bonded societies, those of Lemur catta, Propithecus diadema edwardsi and Propithecus verreauxi, may be assemblages of mother-daughter dyads, capable of high aggression towards other females, but derived from more solitary female ancestors, perhaps also living as pairs. The internal structure of such lemur groups differs from the more extensive kin groups of catarrhines. This in turn may relate to the lemurs' level of social intelligence and to lemur female dominance over males.
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