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Macphail, E. M., & Boldhuis, J. J. (2001). The evolution of intelligence: adaptive specializations versusgeneral process. Biological Reviews, 76(3), 341–364.
Abstract: Darwin argued that between-species differences in intelligence were differences of degree, not of kind. The contemporary ecological approach to animal cognition argues that animals have evolved species-specific and problem-specific processes to solve problems associated with their particular ecological niches: thus different species use different processes, and within a species, different processes are used to tackle problems involving different inputs. This approach contrasts both with Darwin's view and with the general process view, according to which the same central processes of learning and memory are used across an extensive range of problems involving very different inputs. We review evidence relevant to the claim that the learning and memory performance of non-human animals varies according to the nature of the stimuli involved. We first discuss the resource distribution hypothesis, olfactory learning-set formation, and the 'biological constraints' literature, but find no convincing support from these topics for the ecological account of cognition. We then discuss the claim that the performance of birds in spatial tasks of learning and memory is superior in species that depend heavily upon stored food compared to species that either show less dependence upon stored food or do not store food. If it could be shown that storing species enjoy a superiority specifically in spatial (and not non-spatial) tasks, this would argue that spatial tasks are indeed solved using different processes from those used in non-spatial tasks. Our review of this literature does not find a consistent superiority of storing over non-storing birds in spatial tasks, and, in particular, no evidence of enhanced superiority of storing species when the task demands are increased, by, for example, increasing the number of items to be recalled or the duration of the retention period. We discuss also the observation that the hippocampus of storing birds is larger than that of non-storing birds, and find evidence contrary to the view that hippocampal enlargement is associated with enhanced spatial memory; we are, however, unable to suggest a convincing alternative explanation for hippocampal enlargement. The failure to find solid support for the ecological view supports the view that there are no qualitative differences in cognition between animal species in the processes of learning and memory. We also argue that our review supports our contention that speculation about the phylogenetic development and function of behavioural processes does not provide a solid basis for gaining insight into the nature of those processes. We end by confessing to a belief in one major qualitative difference in cognition in animals: we believe that humans alone are capable of acquiring language, and that it is this capacity that divides our intelligence so sharply from non-human intelligence.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Bergman, T. J. (2005). Primate social cognition and the origins of language. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(6), 264–266.
Abstract: Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.
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Moses, S. N., Villate, C., & Ryan, J. D. (2006). An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species. Neuropsychologia, 44(8), 1370–1387.
Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
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Hemelrijk, C. K., & Wantia, J. (2005). Individual variation by self-organisation. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 29(1), 125–136.
Abstract: In this paper, we show that differences in dominance and spatial centrality of individuals in a group may arise through self-organisation. Our instrument is a model, called DomWorld, that represents two traits that are often found in animals, namely grouping and competing. In this model individual differences grow under the following conditions: (1) when the intensity of aggression increases and grouping becomes denser, (2) when the degree of sexual dimorphism in fighting power increases. In this case the differences among females compared to males grow too, (3) when, upon encountering another individual, the tendency to attack is 'obligate' and not conditional, namely 'sensitive to risks'. Results resemble phenomena described for societies of primates, mice, birds and pigs.
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Suzuki, Y., & Toquenaga, Y. (2005). Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses. J. Theor. Biol., 232(2), 191–201.
Abstract: An altruistic individual has to gamble on cooperation to a stranger because it does not know whether the stranger is trustworthy before direct interaction. Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 393 (1998a) 573; J. Theor. Biol. 194 (1998b) 561) presented a new theoretical framework of indirect reciprocal altruism by image scoring game where all individuals are informed about a partner's behavior from its image score without direct interaction. Interestingly, in a simplified version of the image scoring game, the evolutionarily stability condition for altruism became a similar form of Hamilton's rule, i.e. inequality that the probability of getting correct information is more than the ratio of cost to benefit. Since the Hamilton's rule was derived by evolutionarily stable analysis, the evolutionary meaning of the probability of getting correct information has not been clearly examined in terms of kin and group selection. In this study, we applied covariance analysis to the two-score model for deriving the Hamilton's rule. We confirmed that the probability of getting correct information was proportional to the bias of altruistic interactions caused by using information about a partner's image score. The Hamilton's rule was dependent on the number of game bouts even though the information reduced the risk of cooperation to selfish one at the first encounter. In addition, we incorporated group structure to the two-score model to examine whether the probability of getting correct information affect selection for altruism by group selection. We calculated a Hamilton's rule of group selection by contextual analysis. Group selection is very effective when either the probability of getting correct information or that of future interaction, or both are low. The two Hamilton's rules derived by covariance and contextual analyses demonstrated the effects of information and group structure on the evolution of altruism. We inferred that information about a partner's behavior and group structure can produce flexible pathways for the evolution of altruism.
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Griffin, A. S. (2008). Socially acquired predator avoidance: Is it just classical conditioning? Special Issue:Brain Mechanisms, Cognition and Behaviour in Birds, 76(3), 264–271.
Abstract: Associative learning theories presume the existence of a general purpose learning process, the structure of which does not mirror the demands of any particular learning problem. In contrast, learning scientists working within an Evolutionary Biology tradition believe that learning processes have been shaped by ecological demands. One potential means of exploring how ecology may have modified properties of acquisition is to use associative learning theory as a framework within which to analyse a particular learning phenomenon. Recent work has used this approach to examine whether socially transmitted predator avoidance can be conceptualised as a classical conditioning process in which a novel predator stimulus acts as a conditioned stimulus (CS) and acquires control over an avoidance response after it has become associated with alarm signals of social companions, the unconditioned stimulus (US). I review here a series of studies examining the effect of CS/US presentation timing on the likelihood of acquisition. Results suggest that socially acquired predator avoidance may be less sensitive to forward relationships than traditional classical conditioning paradigms. I make the case that socially acquired predator avoidance is an exciting novel one-trial learning paradigm that could be studied along side fear conditioning. Comparisons between social and non-social learning of danger at both the behavioural and neural level may yield a better understanding of how ecology might shape properties and mechanisms of learning.
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Hamilton, W. D. (1971). Geometry for the selfish herd. J. Theor. Biol., 31(2), 295–311.
Abstract: This paper presents an antithesis to the view that gregarious behaviour is evolved through benefits to the population or species. Following Galton (1871) and Williams (1964) gregarious behaviour is considered as a form of cover-seeking in which each animal tries to reduce its chance of being caught by a predator.
It is easy to see how pruning of marginal individuals can maintain centripetal instincts in already gregarious species; some evidence that marginal pruning actually occurs is summarized. Besides this, simply defined models are used to show that even in non-gregarious species selection is likely to favour individuals who stay close to others.
Although not universal or unipotent, cover-seeking is a widespread and important element in animal aggregation, as the literature shows. Neglect of the idea has probably followed from a general disbelief that evolution can be dysgenic for a species. Nevertheless, selection theory provides no support for such disbelief in the case of species with outbreeding or unsubdivided populations.
The model for two dimensions involves a complex problem in geometrical probability which has relevance also in metallurgy and communication science. Some empirical data on this, gathered from random number plots, is presented as of possible heuristic value.
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Knopff, K., & Pavelka, M. (2006). Feeding Competition and Group Size in Alouatta pigra. Int. J. Primatol., 27(4), 1059–1078.
Abstract: Researchers consider group size in primates to be determined by complex relationships among numerous ecological forces. Antipredator benefits and better resource defense are the primary pressures for large groups. Conversely, intragroup limited food availability, can result in greater intragroup feeding competition and individual energy expenditure in larger groups, creating energetic advantages for individuals in small groups and placing an upper limit group size. However, the extent to which food availability constrains group size remains unclear for many species, including black howlers (Alouatta pigra), which ubiquitously live in small social groups (≤10 individuals). We studied the relationship between group size and 2 key indices of feeding competition-day journey length and activity budgets in 3 groups of wild Alouatta pigra at a hurricane-damaged site in Belize, Central America. We controlled for differences in food availability between home ranges (food tree density) and compared both indicators of feeding competition directly with temporal variation in food availability for each group. Our results show no consistent association between resource availability, group size, and either index of competition, indicating that feeding competition does not limit group size at the site i.e., that larger groups can form without increased costs of feeding competition. The results support the search for other explanations, possibly social ones, for small group size in the primates, and we conclude with suggestions and evidence for such alternative explanations.
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Watanabe, S., & Huber, L. (2006). Animal logics: decisions in the absence of human language. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 235–245.
Abstract: Without Abstract
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Imitation: definitions, evidence, and mechanisms. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 335–353.
Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.
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