Abstract: We investigated whether capuchin monkeys cooperate to solve a task and to what extent they take into account the behaviour of another individual when cooperating. Two groups of capuchin monkeys (N=5 and 6) were tested in a task whose solution required simultaneous pulling of two handles which were too far from one another to be pulled by one monkey. Before carrying out the cooperation study, individual monkeys were trained to pull one handle (training phase 1) and to pull two handles simultaneously (training phase 2) for a food reward. Nine subjects were successful in training phase 1, and five in training phase 2. In the cooperation study seven subjects were successful, that is, pulled one handle while a companion pulled the other. Further analyses revealed that capuchins did not increase their pulling actions when a partner was close to or at the other handle, that is, when cooperation might occur. These data suggest that capuchin monkeys acted together at the task and got the reward without understanding the role of the partner and without taking its behaviour into consideration. Social tolerance, as well as their tendency to explore and their manual dexterity, were the major factors accounting for the capuchins' success.

Abstract: A model for the evolution of cooperation shows that two conditions are necessary for cooperation to be stable: a hunting success rate that is low for single hunters and increases with group size, and a social mechanism limiting access to meat by non-hunters. Testing this model on TaI chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, showed that (1) it pays for individuals to hunt in groups of three or four rather than alone or in pairs, and (2) cooperation is stable because hunters gain more at these group sizes than cheaters, owing to a meat-sharing pattern in which hunting, dominance and age, in that order, determine how much an individual gets. In addition, hunters provide cheaters (about 45% of the meat eaters) with the surplus they produce during the hunts. Thus, cooperation in Tai male chimpanzees is an evolutionarily stable strategy, and its success allows cheating to be an evolutionarily stable strategy for Tai female chimpanzees. In Gombe chimpanzees, cooperation is not stable, first, because hunting success is very high for single hunters, and second, because no social mechanism exists that limits access to meat by non-hunters. The analysis showed that some assumptions made when discussing cooperation in other social hunters might be wrong. This might downgrade our general perception of the importance of cooperation as an evolutionary cause of sociality.

Abstract: Abstract. Peaceful interventions in conflicts are an extremely rare phenomenon in most primate species. In contrast to aggressive interventions, they cannot lead to gains in terms of competition. To clarify the function and origin of this behaviour, the patterning and consequences of peaceful and aggressive interventions were studied in a semi-free ranging group of tonkean macaques, Macaca tonkeana. Intense conflicts frequently elicited both types of intervention. Interveners preferentially targeted the initiator of the conflict, who was generally the dominant of the two opponents. Males tended to intervene more than females, especially using peaceful interventions. Interventions were frequently performed on behalf of the most closely kin-related opponent; this was true particularly for aggressive interventions. In peaceful interventions, the intervener was usually dominant over both parties. Lipsmacking, clasping, mounting and social play were mainly used, and were successful in halting aggression. Peaceful interventions were frequently followed by an affinitive interaction, such as grooming, between intervener and target. Peaceful interventions thus appear to protect the beneficiary while preserving the social relationship between intervener and target. The origin of the behaviour can be traced to the epigenetic constraints arising from the species-specific social organization.

Abstract: Recent models of the social transmission of behaviour by animals have repeatedly led their authors to the counterintuitive (and counterfactual) conclusion that traditional behaviour patterns in animals are often not locally adaptive. This deduction results from the assumption in such models that frequency of expression of socially learned behaviour patterns is not affected by rewards or punishments contingent upon their expression. An alternative approach to analysis of social learning processes, based on Staddon-Simmelhag's conditioning model, is proposed here. It is assumed that social interactions affect the probability of introduction of novel behaviour patterns into a naive individual's repertoire and that consequences of engaging in a socially learned behaviour determine whether that behaviour continues to be expressed. Review of several recently analysed instances of animal social learning suggests that distinguishing processes that introduce behaviour patterns into the repertoires of individuals from processes that select among behavioural alternatives aids in understanding observed differences in the longevity of various traditional behaviour patterns studied in both laboratory and field. Finally, implications of the present approach for understanding the role of social learning in evolutionary process are discussed.