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Sutton, J. E., & Shettleworth, S. J. (2005). Internal sense of direction and landmark use in pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 119(3), 273–284.
Abstract: The relative importance of an internal sense of direction based on inertial cues and landmark piloting for small-scale navigation by White King pigeons (Columba livia) was investigated in an arena search task. Two groups of pigeons differed in whether they had access to visual cues outside the arena. In Experiment 1, pigeons were given experience with 2 different entrances and all pigeons transferred accurate searching to novel entrances. Explicit disorientation before entering did not affect accuracy. In Experiments 2-4, landmarks and inertial cues were put in conflict or tested 1 at a time. Pigeons tended to follow the landmarks in a conflict situation but could use an internal sense of direction to search when landmarks were unavailable.
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Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Imitation and affordance learning by pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 117(4), 414–419.
Abstract: The bidirectional control procedure was used to determine whether pigeons (Columba livia) would imitate a demonstrator that pushed a sliding screen for food. One group of observers saw a trained demonstrator push a sliding screen door with its beak (imitation group), whereas 2 other groups watched the screen move independently (possibly learning how the environment works) with a conspecific either present (affordance learning with social facilitation) or absent (affordance learning alone). A 4th group could not see the screen being pushed (sound and odor control). Imitation was evidenced by the finding that pigeons that saw a demonstrator push the screen made a higher proportion of matching screen pushes than observers in 2 appropriate control conditions. Further, observers that watched a screen move without a demonstrator present made a significantly higher proportion of matching screen pushes than would be expected by chance. Thus, these pigeons were capable of affordance learning.
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Skov-Rackette, S. I., Miller, N. Y., & Shettleworth, S. J. (2006). What-where-when memory in pigeons. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(4), 345–358.
Abstract: The authors report a novel approach to testing episodic-like memory for single events. Pigeons were trained in separate sessions to match the identity of a sample on a touch screen, to match its location, and to report on the length of the retention interval. When these 3 tasks were mixed randomly within sessions, birds were more than 80% correct on each task. However, performance on 2 different tests in succession after each sample was not consistent with an integrated memory for sample location, time, and identity. Experiment 2 tested binding of location and identity memories in 2 different ways. The results were again consistent with independent feature memories. Implications for tests of episodic-like memory are discussed.
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Aust, U., & Huber, L. (2006). Picture-object recognition in pigeons: evidence of representational insight in a visual categorization task using a complementary information procedure. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 190–195.
Abstract: Success in tasks requiring categorization of pictorial stimuli does not prove that a subject understands what the pictures stand for. The ability to achieve representational insight is by no means a trivial one because it exceeds mere detection of 2-D features present in both the pictorial images and their referents. So far, evidence for such an ability in nonhuman species is weak and inconclusive. Here, the authors report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. After being trained on pictures of incomplete human figures, the birds responded significantly more to pictures of the previously missing parts than to nonrepresentative stimuli, which demonstrates that they actually recognized the pictures' representational content.
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Katz, J. S., & Wright, A. A. (2006). Same/different abstract-concept learning by pigeons. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 80–86.
Abstract: Eight pigeons were trained and tested in a simultaneous same/different task. After pecking an upper picture, they pecked a lower picture to indicate same or a white rectangle to indicate different. Increases in the training set size from 8 to 1,024 items produced improved transfer from 51.3% to 84.6%. This is the first evidence that pigeons can perform a two-item same/different task as accurately with novel items as training items and both above 80% correct. Fixed-set control groups ruled out training time or transfer testing as producing the high level of abstract-concept learning. Comparisons with similar experiments with rhesus and capuchin monkeys showed that the ability to learn the same/different abstract concept was similar but that pigeons require more training exemplars.
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Zentall, T. R., Klein, E. D., & Singer, R. A. (2004). Evidence for detection of one duration sample and default responding to other duration samples by pigeons may result from an artifact of retention-test ambiguity. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(2), 129–134.
Abstract: S. C. Gaitan and J. T. Wixted (2000) proposed that when pigeons are trained on a conditional discrimination to associate 1 duration sample with 1 comparison and 2 other duration samples with a 2nd comparison, they detect only the single duration, and on trials involving either of the 2 other duration samples, they respond to the other comparison by default. In 2 experiments, the authors show instead that pigeons lend to treat the retention intervals (such as those used by Gaitan and Wixted) as intertrial intervals, and thus, they tend to treat all trials with a delay as 0-s sample trials. The authors tested this hypothesis by showing that divergent retention functions do not appear when the retention interval is discriminably different from the intertrial interval.
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Cerutti, D. T., & Staddon, J. E. R. (2004). Immediacy versus anticipated delay in the time-left experiment: a test of the cognitive hypothesis. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(1), 45–57.
Abstract: In the time-left experiment (J. Gibbon & R. M. Church, 1981), animals are said to compare an expectation of a fixed delay to food, for one choice, with a decreasing delay expectation for the other, mentally representing both upcoming time to food and the difference between current time and upcoming time (the cognitive hypothesis). The results of 2 experiments support a simpler view: that animals choose according to the immediacies of reinforcement for each response at a time signaled by available time markers (the temporal control hypothesis). It is not necessary to assume that animals can either represent or subtract representations of times to food to explain the results of the time-left experiment.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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Zentall, T. R. (2005). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: the role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 70(3), 209–222.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
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Friedrich, A. M., & Zentall, T. R. (2004). Pigeons shift their preference toward locations of food that take more effort to obtain. Behav. Process., 67(3), 405–415.
Abstract: Although animals typically prefer to exert less effort rather than more effort to obtain food, the present research shows that requiring greater effort to obtain food at a particular location appears to increase the value of that location. In Experiment 1, pigeons' initial preference for one feeder was significantly reduced by requiring 1 peck to obtain food from that feeder and requiring 30 pecks to obtain food from the other feeder. In Experiment 2, a similar decrease in preference was not found when pigeons received reinforcement from both feeders independently of the amount of effort required. These results are consistent with the within-trial contrast effect proposed by in which the relative hedonic value of a reward depends on the state of the animal immediately prior to the reward. The greater the improvement from that prior state the greater the value of the reinforcer.
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