Abstract: Despite the long divergent evolutionary history of birds and mammals, early avian and primate cognitive development have many convergent features. Some of these features were investigated with a series of tasks designed to assess human infant development. The tasks were presented to young parakeets to assess their means-end problem solving abilities. Examples of these early skills are: attaining and playing with objects, retrieving rewards through use of a stick or rake, or by pulling in rewards on supports or on the ends of strings. Twelve such tasks were presented to 11 young yellow-crowned parakeets ( Cyanoramphus auriceps) to investigate their natural abilities; there was no attempt to train them to do those tasks that they did not spontaneously perform. Six of the birds were parent-raised and five were hand-raised. The birds completed 9 of the 12 tasks, demonstrating all the Piagetian sensorimotor circular reactions, but they failed to hand-watch (“claw-watch”), to stack objects, or to fill a container. Their ordinality on the tasks differed from that of human infants in that locomotion to obtain objects occurred earlier in the avian sequence of development and the mid-level tasks were performed by the two groups of avian subjects in a mixed order perhaps indicating that these abilities may not emerge in any particular order for these birds as they supposedly do for human infants. The hand-raised group needed fewer sessions to complete these means-end tasks.

Abstract: Twelve pigeons ( Columba livia) were trained on a go/no-go schedule to discriminate between two kinds of movement patterns of dots, which to human observers appear to be “intentional” and “non-intentional” movements. In experiment 1, the intentional motion stimulus contained one dot (a “wolf”) that moved systematically towards another dot as though stalking it, and three distractors (“sheep”). The non-intentional motion stimulus consisted of four distractors but no stalker. Birds showed some improvement of discrimination as the sessions progressed, but high levels of discrimination were not reached. In experiment 2, the same birds were tested with different stimuli. The same parameters were used but the number of intentionally moving dots in the intentional motion stimulus was altered, so that three wolves stalked one sheep. Despite the enhanced difference of movement patterns, the birds did not show any further improvement in discrimination. However, birds for which the non-intentional stimulus was associated with reward showed a decline in discrimination. These results indicated that pigeons can discriminate between stimuli that do and do not contain an element that human observer see as moving intentionally. However, as no feature-positive effect was found in experiment 1, it is assumed that pigeons did not perceive or discriminate these stimuli on the basis that the intentional stimuli contained a feature that the non-intentional stimuli lacked, though the convergence seen in experiment 2 may have been an effective feature for the pigeons. Pigeons seem to be able to recognise some form of multiple simultaneously goal-directed motions, compared to random motions, as a distinctive feature, but do not seem to use simple “intentional” motion paths of two geometrical figures, embedded in random motions, as a feature whose presence or absence differentiates motion displays.

Abstract: This study investigated the effect of stimulus height on the ability of horses to learn a simple visual discrimination task. Eight horses were trained to perform a two-choice, black/white discrimination with stimuli presented at one of two heights: ground level or at a height of 70 cm from the ground. The height at which the stimuli were presented was alternated from one session to the next. All trials within a single session were presented at the same height. The criterion for learning was four consecutive sessions of 70% correct responses. Performance was found to be better when stimuli were presented at ground level with respect to the number of trials taken to reach the criterion (P < 0.05), percentage of correct first choices (P < 0.01), and repeated errors made (P < 0.01). Thus, training horses to carry out tasks of visual discrimination could be enhanced by placing the stimuli on the ground. In addition, the results of the present study suggest that the visual appearance of ground surfaces is an important factor in both horse management and training.

Abstract: In research on directed forgetting in pigeons using delayed matching procedures, remember cues, presented in the delay interval between sample and comparisons, have been followed by comparisons (i.e., a memory test), whereas forget cues have been followed by one of a number of different sample-independent events. The source of directed forgetting in delayed matching to sample in pigeons was examined in a 2 x 2 design by independently manipulating whether or not forget-cue trials in training ended with reinforcement and whether or not forget-cue trials in training included a simultaneous discrimination (involving stimuli other than those used in the matching task). Results were consistent with the hypothesis that reinforced responding following forget cues is sufficient to eliminate performance deficits on forget-cue probe trials. Only when reinforcement was omitted on forget-cue trials in training (whether a discrimination was required or not) was there a decrement in accuracy on forget-cue probe trials. When reinforcement is present, however, the pattern of responding established during and following a forget cue in training may also play a role in the directed forgetting effect. These findings support the view that much of the evidence for directed forgetting using matching procedures may result from motivational and behavioral artifacts rather than the loss of memory.

Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.