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Zentall, T. R., Sutton, J. E., & Sherburne, L. M. (1996). True imitative learning in pigeons. Psychol Sci, 7.
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Martin, T. I., Zentall, T. R., & Lawrence, L. (2006). Simple discrimination reversals in the domestic horse (Equus caballus): Effect of discriminative stimulus modality on learning to learn. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 101(3-4), 328–338.
Abstract: The cognitive capacity of an organism, relative to that of other species, can be assessed by using a relative measure of learning. One such measure is the ability of an organism to learn about the reversal of a discrimination. The present study compared the performance of two groups of horses on a simple discrimination reversal task when the only difference between the groups was the modality of the relevant cue. For the visual group (absence or presence of a light), the spatial position was irrelevant. For the spatial group, a spatial cue (left/right) was available and the visual cue was irrelevant. Horses in the spatial group learned the original discrimination and six reversals; they also showed evidence of learning to learn. Horses in the visual group did not reach criterion during the study. As a result, there was no evidence of learning to learn.
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Zentall, T. R., & Hogan, D. E. (1978). Same/different concept learning in the pigeon: the effect of negative instances and prior adaptation to transfer stimuli. J Exp Anal Behav, 30(2), 177–186.
Abstract: Pigeons were trained on a matching-to-sample or oddity-from-sample task with shapes (circle and plus). Half of each group was exposed to “negative instance” trials i.e., for matching birds, neither comparison key matched the sample, and for oddity birds both comparison keys matched the sample. When all birds were transferred to a new task involving colors (red and green), nonshifted birds (transferred from matching to matching, or oddity to oddity) performed significantly better than shifted birds (transferred from matching to oddity, or oddity to matching), but only if they had experienced negative instances of the training concept. When all birds were exposed to negative instances of the transfer task and then transferred to a new color task (yellow and blue), dramatic transfer effects were observed. The effect of pre-exposure to the yellow and blue colors, in order to reduce transfer-stimulus novelty, had a minor effect on transfer.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Imitation: definitions, evidence, and mechanisms. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 335–353.
Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.
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Zentall, T. R. (2001). The case for a cognitive approach to animal learning and behavior. Behav Processes, 54(1-3), 65–78.
Abstract: The dangers of hypothesizing about unobservable cognitive mechanisms are well known to behavior analysts. I propose, however, that carefully fashioned cognitive theories that make predictions that are inconsistent with current behavioral theories can provide useful research tools for the understanding of behavior. Furthermore, even if the results of such research may be accommodated by modifying existing behavioral theories, our understanding of behavior is often advanced by the empirical findings because it is unlikely that the research would have been conducted in the absence of such cognitive hypothesizing. Two examples of the development of emergent relations are described: The first deals with the nature of a pigeon's 'representation' of two stimuli both of which are associated with correct responding to a third in a many-to-one matching task (stimulus equivalence or common representations). The second has to do with transitive inference, the emergent relation between two stimuli mediated by their relation to a common stimulus in a simultaneous discrimination.
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Zentall, S. S., Zentall, T. R., & Barack, R. C. (1978). Distraction as a function of within-task stimulation for hyperactive and normal children. J Learn Disabil, 11(9), 540–548.
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Zentall, T. R., Galizio, M., & Critchfied, T. S. (2002). Categorization, concept learning, and behavior analysis: an introduction. J Exp Anal Behav, 78(3), 237–248.
Abstract: Categorization and concept learning encompass some of the most important aspects of behavior, but historically they have not been central topics in the experimental analysis of behavior. To introduce this special issue of the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB), we define key terms; distinguish between the study of concepts and the study of concept learning; describe three types of concept learning characterized by the stimulus classes they yield; and briefly identify several other themes (e.g., quantitative modeling and ties to language) that appear in the literature. As the special issue demonstrates, a surprising amount and diversity of work is being conducted that either represents a behavior-analytic perspective or can inform or constructively challenge this perspective.
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Zentall, T. R. (1999). Support for a theory of memory for event duration must distinguish between test-trial ambiguity and actual memory loss. J Exp Anal Behav, 72(3), 467–472.
Abstract: Staddon and Higa's (1999) trace-strength theory of timing and memory for event duration can account for pigeons' bias to “choose short” when retention intervals are introduced and to “choose long” when, following training with a fixed retention interval, retention intervals are shortened. However, it does not account for the failure of pigeons to choose short when the intertrial interval is distinct from the retention interval. That finding suggests that stimulus generalization (or ambiguity) between the intertrial interval and the retention interval may result in an effect that has been attributed to memory loss. Such artifacts must be eliminated before a theory of memory for event duration can be adequately tested.
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Zentall, T. R., Roper, K. L., & Sherburne, L. M. (1995). Most directed forgetting in pigeons can be attributed to the absence of reinforcement on forget trials during training or to other procedural artifacts. J Exp Anal Behav, 63(2), 127–137.
Abstract: In research on directed forgetting in pigeons using delayed matching procedures, remember cues, presented in the delay interval between sample and comparisons, have been followed by comparisons (i.e., a memory test), whereas forget cues have been followed by one of a number of different sample-independent events. The source of directed forgetting in delayed matching to sample in pigeons was examined in a 2 x 2 design by independently manipulating whether or not forget-cue trials in training ended with reinforcement and whether or not forget-cue trials in training included a simultaneous discrimination (involving stimuli other than those used in the matching task). Results were consistent with the hypothesis that reinforced responding following forget cues is sufficient to eliminate performance deficits on forget-cue probe trials. Only when reinforcement was omitted on forget-cue trials in training (whether a discrimination was required or not) was there a decrement in accuracy on forget-cue probe trials. When reinforcement is present, however, the pattern of responding established during and following a forget cue in training may also play a role in the directed forgetting effect. These findings support the view that much of the evidence for directed forgetting using matching procedures may result from motivational and behavioral artifacts rather than the loss of memory.
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Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Imitation and affordance learning by pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 117(4), 414–419.
Abstract: The bidirectional control procedure was used to determine whether pigeons (Columba livia) would imitate a demonstrator that pushed a sliding screen for food. One group of observers saw a trained demonstrator push a sliding screen door with its beak (imitation group), whereas 2 other groups watched the screen move independently (possibly learning how the environment works) with a conspecific either present (affordance learning with social facilitation) or absent (affordance learning alone). A 4th group could not see the screen being pushed (sound and odor control). Imitation was evidenced by the finding that pigeons that saw a demonstrator push the screen made a higher proportion of matching screen pushes than observers in 2 appropriate control conditions. Further, observers that watched a screen move without a demonstrator present made a significantly higher proportion of matching screen pushes than would be expected by chance. Thus, these pigeons were capable of affordance learning.
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