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Crowley, P.H.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Alfieri, M. |
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Title |
Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition |
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Journal Article |
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Year |
1996 |
Publication |
Biosystems |
Abbreviated Journal |
Biosystems |
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37 |
Issue |
1-2 |
Pages |
49-66 |
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Keywords |
Game theory; Genetic algorithms; Individual recognition; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism |
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Abstract |
To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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483 |
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Dugatkin, L.; Alfieri, M. |
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Title |
Tit-For-Tat in guppies (Poecilia reticulata): the relative nature of cooperation and defection during predator inspection |
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1991 |
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Evolutionary Ecology |
Abbreviated Journal |
Evol. Ecol. |
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5 |
Issue |
3 |
Pages |
300-309 |
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Game theory – Tit-For-Tat – predator inspection – guppy |
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Summary The introduction of game-theoretical thinking into evolutionary biology has laid the groundwork for a heuristic view of animal behaviour in which individuals employ “strategies” – rules that instruct them how to behave in a given circumstance to maximize relative fitness. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) found that a strategy called Tit-For-Tat (TFT) is one robust cooperative solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. There exists, however, little empirical evidence that animals employ TFT. Predator inspection in fish provides one ecological context in which to examine the use of the TFT strategy. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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2177 |
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Dugatkin, L.A.; Alfieri, M. |
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Title |
Guppies and the TIT FOR TAT strategy: preference based on past interaction |
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1991 |
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Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology |
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Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. |
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28 |
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4 |
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243-246 |
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The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assuming sophisticated animal cognition, they are more likely to be met if animals can remember individuals with whom they have interacted, associate past interactions with these individuals, and base future behavior on this information. Here we show that guppies (Poecilia reticulata), in the context of predator inspection behavior, can identify and remember (for at least 4 h) the “more cooperative” among two conspecifics and subsequently choose to be near these individuals in future encounters. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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3397 |
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