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Moskat, C., & Hauber, M. E. (2007). Conflict between egg recognition and egg rejection decisions in common cuckoo (Cuculus canorus) hosts. Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: Common cuckoos (Cuculus canorus) are obligate brood parasites, laying eggs into nests of small songbirds. The cuckoo hatchling evicts all eggs and young from a nest, eliminating hosts' breeding success. Despite the consistently high costs of parasitism by common cuckoos, great reed warbler (Acrocephalus arundinaceus) hosts sometime accept and other times reject parasitic eggs. To explore the cognitive basis of this seemingly maladaptive variation in host responses, we documented differences in egg rejection rates within 1-day periods just before and during the egg-laying cycle across host nests. Hosts rejected cuckoo eggs at 28% of nests during the pre-egg-laying stage, but when cuckoos exchanged the first host egg with the parasite egg, rejections increased to 75%. Even later, when several host eggs remained in a nest after parasitism, rejection rate fell to 37.5%. Experimental parasitism with conspecific eggs on the first and second day of host laying showed a similar directional change in relative rejection rates, dropping from 35 to 0%. Mistakes in egg discrimination (ejection error and ejection cost) were observed mostly in the latter part of the laying cycle, mainly when nests contained 5-6 eggs. These correlational and experimental patterns of egg rejection support a cognitive process of egg discrimination through several shifts in hosts' optimal acceptance thresholds of foreign eggs. The results are also consistent with the evolution of foreign egg rejection in the context of nest-sanitation (i.e. the removal of foreign objects). Our results suggest that common cuckoo hosts may recognize more eggs than they reject. This implies that the experience of the host with one or more of its own eggs in the clutch is a key factor in rejecting parasite eggs by allowing inspection and learning about their own clutch.
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Chiandetti, C., Regolin, L., Sovrano, V. A., & Vallortigara, G. (2007). Spatial reorientation: the effects of space size on the encoding of landmark and geometry information. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 159–168.
Abstract: The effects of the size of the environment on animals' spatial reorientation was investigated. Domestic chicks were trained to find food in a corner of either a small or a large rectangular enclosure. A distinctive panel was located at each of the four corners of the enclosures. After removal of the panels, chicks tested in the small enclosure showed better retention of geometrical information than chicks tested in the large enclosure. In contrast, after changing the enclosure from a rectangular-shaped to a square-shaped one, chicks tested in the large enclosure showed better retention of landmark (panels) information than chicks tested in the small enclosure. No differences in the encoding of the overall arrangement of landmarks were apparent when chicks were tested for generalisation in an enclosure differing from that of training in size together with a transformation (affine transformation) that altered the geometric relations between the target and the shape of the environment. These findings suggest that primacy of geometric or landmark information in reorientation tasks depends on the size of the experimental space, likely reflecting a preferential use of the most reliable source of information available during visual exploration of the environment.
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Neiworth, J. J., Hassett, J. M., & Sylvester, C. J. (2007). Face processing in humans and new world monkeys: the influence of experiential and ecological factors. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 125–134.
Abstract: This study tests whether the face-processing system of humans and a nonhuman primate species share characteristics that would allow for early and quick processing of socially salient stimuli: a sensitivity toward conspecific faces, a sensitivity toward highly practiced face stimuli, and an ability to generalize changes in the face that do not suggest a new identity, such as a face differently oriented. The look rates by adult tamarins and humans toward conspecific and other primate faces were examined to determine if these characteristics are shared. A visual paired comparison (VPC) task presented subjects with either a human face, chimpanzee face, tamarin face, or an object as a sample, and then a pair containing the previous stimulus and a novel stimulus was presented. The stimuli were either presented all in an upright orientation, or all in an inverted orientation. The novel stimulus in the pair was either an orientation change of the same face/object or a new example of the same type of face/object, and the stimuli were shown either in an upright orientation or in an inverted orientation. Preference to novelty scores revealed that humans attended most to novel individual human faces, and this effect decreased significantly if the stimuli were inverted. Tamarins showed preferential looking toward novel orientations of previously seen tamarin faces in the upright orientation, but not in an inverted orientation. Similarly, their preference to look longer at novel tamarin and human faces within the pair was reduced significantly with inverted stimuli. The results confirmed prior findings in humans that novel human faces generate more attention in the upright than in the inverted orientation. The monkeys also attended more to faces of conspecifics, but showed an inversion effect to orientation change in tamarin faces and to identity changes in tamarin and human faces. The results indicate configural processing restricted to particular kinds of primate faces by a New World monkey species, with configural processing influenced by life experience (human faces and tamarin faces) and specialized to process orientation changes specific to conspecific faces.
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Ward, C., & Smuts, B. B. (2007). Quantity-based judgments in the domestic dog (Canis lupus familiaris). Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 71–80.
Abstract: We examined the ability of domestic dogs to choose the larger versus smaller quantity of food in two experiments. In experiment 1, we investigated the ability of 29 dogs (results from 18 dogs were used in the data analysis) to discriminate between two quantities of food presented in eight different combinations. Choices were simultaneously presented and visually available at the time of choice. Overall, subjects chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity, but they found numerically close comparisons more difficult. In experiment 2, we tested two dogs from experiment 1 under three conditions. In condition 1, we used similar methods from experiment 1 and tested the dogs multiple times on the eight combinations from experiment 1 plus one additional combination. In conditions 2 and 3, the food was visually unavailable to the subjects at the time of choice, but in condition 2, food choices were viewed simultaneously before being made visually unavailable, and in condition 3, they were viewed successively. In these last two conditions, and especially in condition 3, the dogs had to keep track of quantities mentally in order to choose optimally. Subjects still chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity when the food was not simultaneously visible at the time of choice. Olfactory cues and inadvertent cuing by the experimenter were excluded as mechanisms for choosing larger quantities. The results suggest that, like apes tested on similar tasks, some dogs can form internal representations and make mental comparisons of quantity.
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Lea, S. E. G., Goto, K., Osthaus, B., & Ryan, C. M. E. (2006). The logic of the stimulus. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 247–256.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.
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Alves, C., Chichery, R., Boal, J. G., & Dickel, L. (2007). Orientation in the cuttlefish Sepia officinalis: response versus place learning. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 29–36.
Abstract: Several studies have demonstrated that mammals, birds and fish use comparable spatial learning strategies. Unfortunately, except in insects, few studies have investigated spatial learning mechanisms in invertebrates. Our study aimed to identify the strategies used by cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis) to solve a spatial task commonly used with vertebrates. A new spatial learning procedure using a T-maze was designed. In this maze, the cuttlefish learned how to enter a dark and sandy compartment. A preliminary test confirmed that individual cuttlefish showed an untrained side-turning preference (preference for turning right or left) in the T-maze. This preference could be reliably detected in a single probe trial. In the following two experiments, each individual was trained to enter the compartment opposite to its side-turning preference. In Experiment 1, distal visual cues were provided around the maze. In Experiment 2, the T-maze was surrounded by curtains and two proximal visual cues were provided above the apparatus. In both experiments, after acquisition, strategies used by cuttlefish to orient in the T-maze were tested by creating a conflict between the formerly rewarded algorithmic behaviour (turn, response learning) and the visual cues identifying the goal (place learning). Most cuttlefish relied on response learning in Experiment 1; the two strategies were used equally often in Experiment 2. In these experiments, the salience of cues provided during the experiment determined whether cuttlefish used response or place learning to solve this spatial task. Our study demonstrates for the first time the presence of multiple spatial strategies in cuttlefish that appear to closely parallel those described in vertebrates.
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Church, D. L., & Plowright, C. M. S. (2006). Spatial encoding by bumblebees (Bombus impatiens) of a reward within an artificial flower array. Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 131–140.
Abstract: We presented bumblebees a spatial memory task similar to that used with other species (e.g., cats, dogs, and pigeons). In some conditions we allowed for presence of scent marks in addition to placing local and global spatial cues in conflict. Bumblebees (Bombus impatiens) were presented an array of artificial flowers within a flight cage, one flower offering reward (S+), while the others were empty (S-). Bees were tested with empty flowers. In Experiment 1, flowers were either moved at the time of testing or not. Bees returned to the flower in the same absolute position of the S+ (the flower-array-independent (FAI) position), even if it was in the wrong position relative to the S- and even when new flower covers prevented the use of possible scent marks. New flower covers (i.e., without possible scent marks) had the effect of lowering the frequency of probing behavior. In Experiment 2, the colony was moved between training and testing. Again, bees chose the flower in the FAI position of the S+, and not the flower that would be chosen using strictly memory for a flight vector. Together, these experiments show that to locate the S+ bees did not rely on scent marks nor the positions of the S-, though the S- were prominent objects close to the goal. Also, bees selected environmental features to remember the position of the S+ instead of relying upon a purely egocentric point of view. Similarities with honeybees and vertebrates are discussed, as well as possible encoding mechanisms.
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Suda, C., & Call, J. (2005). Piagetian conservation of discrete quantities in bonobos (Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 220–235.
Abstract: This study investigated whether physical discreteness helps apes to understand the concept of Piagetian conservation (i.e. the invariance of quantities). Subjects were four bonobos, three chimpanzees, and five orangutans. Apes were tested on their ability to conserve discrete/continuous quantities in an over-conservation procedure in which two unequal quantities of edible rewards underwent various transformations in front of subjects. Subjects were examined to determine whether they could track the larger quantity of reward after the transformation. Comparison between the two types of conservation revealed that tests with bonobos supported the discreteness hypothesis. Bonobos, but neither chimpanzees nor orangutans, performed significantly better with discrete quantities than with continuous ones. The results suggest that at least bonobos could benefit from the discreteness of stimuli in their acquisition of conservation skills.
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Santos, L. R., Rosati, A., Sproul, C., Spaulding, B., & Hauser, M. D. (2005). Means-means-end tool choice in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus): finding the limits on primates' knowledge of tools. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 236–246.
Abstract: Most studies of animal tool use require subjects to use one object to gain access to a food reward. In many real world situations, however, animals perform more than one action in sequence to achieve their goals. Of theoretical interest is whether animals have the cognitive capacity to recognize the relationship between consecutive action sequences in which there may be one overall goal and several subgoals. Here we ask if cotton-top tamarins, a species that in captivity uses tools to solve means-end problems, can go one step further and use a sequence of tools (means) to obtain food (end). We first trained subjects to use a pulling tool to obtain a food reward. After this initial training, subjects were presented with problems in which one tool had to be used in combination with a second in order to obtain food. Subjects showed great difficulty when two tools were required to obtain the food reward. Although subjects attended to the connection between the tool and food reward, they ignored the physical connection between the two tools. After training on a two-tool problem, we presented subjects with a series of transfer tests to explore if they would generalize to new types of connections between the tools. Subjects readily transferred to new connections. Our results therefore provide the first evidence to date that tamarins can learn to solve problems involving two tools, but that they do so only with sufficient training.
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Werner, C. W., Tiemann, I., Cnotka, J., & Rehkamper, G. (2005). Do chickens (Gallus gallus f. domestica) decompose visual figures? Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 129–140.
Abstract: To investigate whether learning to discriminate between visual compound stimuli depends on decomposing them into constituting features, hens were first trained to discriminate four features (red, green, horizontal, vertical) from two dimensions (colour, line orientation). After acquisition, hens were trained with compound stimuli made up from these dimensions in two ways: a separable (line on a coloured background) stimulus and an integral one (coloured line). This compound training included a reversal of reinforcement of only one of the two dimensions (half-reversal). After having achieved the compound stimulus discrimination, a second dimensional training identical to the first was performed. Finally, in the second compound training the other dimension was reversed. Two major results were found: (1) an interaction between the dimension reversed and the type of compound stimulus: in compound training with colour reversal, separable compound stimuli were discriminated worse than integral compounds and vice versa in compound training with line orientation reversed. (2) Performance in the second compound training was worse than in the first one. The first result points to a similar mode of processing for separable and integral compounds, whereas the second result shows that the whole stimulus is psychologically superior to its constituting features. Experiment 2 repeated experiment 1 using line orientation stimuli of reversed line and background brightness. Nevertheless, the results were similar to experiment 1. Results are discussed in the framework of a configural exemplar theory of discrimination that assumes the representation of the whole stimulus situation combined with transfer based on a measure of overall similarity.
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