Abstract: The dynamic behavior of various types of cytochromes c in the redox reaction with iron hexacyanides was studied using a temperature-jump method in order to elucidate the molecular mechanism of the redox reaction of cytochromes with their oxidoreductants. Transmittance after the temperature jump changed through a single exponential decay for all cytochromes investigated. Under a constant concentration of anion, the redox reaction of various types of cytochrome c with iron hexacyanides was analyzed according to the scheme: Ki=kt/k-i (i=1,2,3) where C(III) and C(II) are ferric and ferrous cytochromes, respectively, Fe(III) and Fe(II) are ferri- and ferrocyanides, respectively, C(III) [middle dot] Fe(II) is the ferricytochrome-ferrocyanide complex and C(II) [middle dot] Fe(III) is the ferrocytochrome-ferricyanide complex. When step B is slower than the other two steps A and C, τ-1 can be represented approximately as where the bar over the variables denotes the equilibrium value. In a large excess of ferrocyanide against cytochrome, we can estimate k2, k-2, K1 and K3 independently. In the case of horse cytochrome c at 18[degree sign]C in 0.1 M phosphate buffer at pH 7 with 0.3 M KNO3, the estimated parameters are k2 = 100 +/- 50 s-1, k-2 = (3.5 +/- 1.0) [middle dot] 103 s-1, K1 = 15 +/- 7 M-1 and K3 = (8.5 +/- 1.5) [middle dot] 10-4 M. From the same experiments for seven cytochromes (cytochrome c from horse, tuna, Candida krusei, Saccharomyces oviformis, Rhodospirillum rubrum cytochrome c2, Spirulina platensis cytochrome c-554 and Thermus thermophilus cytochrome c-552), the following results can be deduced. (1) Each parameter defined in the scheme above (k2, k-2, K1, K3) diverged beyond the error range. Above all, k2 values of cytochromes c-554 and c-552 are as large as 1 [middle dot] 104 s-1 and much larger than those for the other cytochromes (to 50 approx. 700 S-1). (2) The variance of k2K1 and k-2/K3 are relatively less than the variances of individual parameters (k2, k-2, K1 and K3), which suggests that the values of k2K1 and k-2/K3 have been conserved during the course of evolution.

Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.