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Cerutti, D. T., & Staddon, J. E. R. (2004). Immediacy versus anticipated delay in the time-left experiment: a test of the cognitive hypothesis. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(1), 45–57.
Abstract: In the time-left experiment (J. Gibbon & R. M. Church, 1981), animals are said to compare an expectation of a fixed delay to food, for one choice, with a decreasing delay expectation for the other, mentally representing both upcoming time to food and the difference between current time and upcoming time (the cognitive hypothesis). The results of 2 experiments support a simpler view: that animals choose according to the immediacies of reinforcement for each response at a time signaled by available time markers (the temporal control hypothesis). It is not necessary to assume that animals can either represent or subtract representations of times to food to explain the results of the time-left experiment.
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Beckers, T., Miller, R. R., De Houwer, J., & Urushihara, K. (2006). Reasoning rats: forward blocking in Pavlovian animal conditioning is sensitive to constraints of causal inference. J Exp Psychol Gen, 135(1), 92–102.
Abstract: Forward blocking is one of the best-documented phenomena in Pavlovian animal conditioning. According to contemporary associative learning theories, forward blocking arises directly from the hardwired basic learning rules that govern the acquisition or expression of associations. Contrary to this view, here the authors demonstrate that blocking in rats is flexible and sensitive to constraints of causal inference, such as violation of additivity and ceiling considerations. This suggests that complex cognitive processes akin to causal inferential reasoning are involved in a well-established Pavlovian animal conditioning phenomenon commonly attributed to the operation of basic associative processes.
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Ikeda, M., Patterson, K., Graham, K. S., Ralph, M. A. L., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). A horse of a different colour: do patients with semantic dementia recognise different versions of the same object as the same? Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 566–575.
Abstract: Ten patients with semantic dementia resulting from bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy, and 10 matched controls, were tested on an object recognition task in which they were invited to choose (from a four-item array) the picture representing “the same thing” as an object picture that they had just inspected and attempted to name. The target in the response array was never physically identical to the studied picture but differed from it – in the various conditions – in size, angle of view, colour or exemplar (e.g. a different breed of dog). In one test block for each patient, the response array was presented immediately after the studied picture was removed; in another block, a 2 min filled delay was inserted between study and test. The patients performed relatively well when the studied object and target response differed only in the size of the picture on the page, but were significantly impaired as a group in the other three type-of-change conditions, even with no delay between study and test. The five patients whose structural brain imaging revealed major right-temporal atrophy were more impaired overall, and also more affected by the 2 min delay, than the five patients with an asymmetric pattern characterised by predominant left-sided atrophy. These results are interpreted in terms of a hypothesis that successful classification of an object token as an object type is not a pre-semantic ability but rather results from interaction of perceptual and conceptual processing.
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Overli, O., Sorensen, C., Pulman, K. G. T., Pottinger, T. G., Korzan, W., Summers, C. H., et al. (2007). Evolutionary background for stress-coping styles: relationships between physiological, behavioral, and cognitive traits in non-mammalian vertebrates. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 31(3), 396–412.
Abstract: Reactions to stress vary between individuals, and physiological and behavioral responses tend to be associated in distinct suites of correlated traits, often termed stress-coping styles. In mammals, individuals exhibiting divergent stress-coping styles also appear to exhibit intrinsic differences in cognitive processing. A connection between physiology, behavior, and cognition was also recently demonstrated in strains of rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) selected for consistently high or low cortisol responses to stress. The low-responsive (LR) strain display longer retention of a conditioned response, and tend to show proactive behaviors such as enhanced aggression, social dominance, and rapid resumption of feed intake after stress. Differences in brain monoamine neurochemistry have also been reported in these lines. In comparative studies, experiments with the lizard Anolis carolinensis reveal connections between monoaminergic activity in limbic structures, proactive behavior in novel environments, and the establishment of social status via agonistic behavior. Together these observations suggest that within-species diversity of physiological, behavioral and cognitive correlates of stress responsiveness is maintained by natural selection throughout the vertebrate sub-phylum.
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Sarter, M. (2004). Animal cognition: defining the issues. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 28(7), 645–650.
Abstract: The assessment of cognitive functions in rodents represents a critical experimental variable in many research fields, ranging from the basic cognitive neurosciences to psychopharmacology and neurotoxicology. The increasing use of animal behavioral tests as 'assays' for the assessment of effects on learning and memory has resulted in a considerable heterogeneity of data, particularly in the field of behavioral and psycho pharmacology. The limited predictive validity of changes in behavioral performance observed in standard animal tests of learning and memory indicates that a renewed effort to scrutinize the validity of these tests is warranted. In humans, levels of processing (effortful vs. automatic) and categories of information (procedural vs. episodic/declarative) are important variables of cognitive operations. The design of tasks that assess the recall of 'episodic' or 'declarative' information appears to represent a particular challenge for research using laboratory rodents. For example, the hypothesis that changes in inspection time for a previously encountered place or object are based on the recall of declarative/episodic information requires substantiation. In order to generalize findings on the effects of neuronal or pharmacological manipulations on learning and memory, obtained from one species and one task, to other species and other tasks, the mediating role of important sets of variables which influence learning and memory (e.g. attentional, affective) needs to be determined. Similar to the view that a neuronal manipulation (e.g. a lesion) represents a theory of the condition modeled (e.g. a degenerative disorder), an animal behavioral task represents a theory of the behavioral/cognitive process of interest. Therefore, the test of hypotheses regarding the validity of procedures used to assess cognitive functions in animals is an inherent part of the research process.
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Pickens, C. L., & Holland, P. C. (2004). Conditioning and cognition. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 28(7), 651–661.
Abstract: Animals' abilities to use internal representations of absent objects to guide adaptive behavior and acquire new information, and to represent multiple spatial, temporal, and object properties of complex events and event sequences, may underlie many aspects of human perception, memory, and symbolic thought. In this review, two classes of simple associative learning tasks that address these core cognitive capacities are discussed. The first set, including reinforcer revaluation and mediated learning procedures, address the power of Pavlovian conditioned stimuli to gain access, through learning, to representations of upcoming events. The second set of investigations concern the construction of complex stimulus representations, as illustrated in studies of contextual learning, the conjunction of explicit stimulus elements in configural learning procedures, and recent studies of episodic-like memory. The importance of identifying both cognitive process and brain system bases of performance in animal models is emphasized.
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Landsberg, G., & Araujo, J. A. (2005). Behavior problems in geriatric pets. Vet Clin North Am Small Anim Pract, 35(3), 675–698.
Abstract: Aging pets often suffer a decline in cognitive function (eg, memory,learning, perception, awareness) likely associated with age-dependent brain alterations. Clinically, cognitive dysfunction may result in various behavioral signs, including disorientation; forgetting of previously learned behaviors, such as house training; alterations in the manner in which the pet interacts with people or other pets;onset of new fears and anxiety; decreased recognition of people, places, or pets; and other signs of deteriorating memory and learning ability. Many medical problems, including other forms of brain pathologic conditions, can contribute to these signs. The practitioner must first determine the cause of the behavioral signs and then determine an appropriate course of treatment, bearing in mind the constraints of the aging process. A diagnosis of cognitive dysfunction syndrome is made once other medical and behavioral causes are ruled out.
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Gould, J. L. (2004). Animal cognition. Curr Biol, 14(10), R372–5.
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Friedrich, A. M., Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2004). Functional equivalence in pigeons involving a four-member class. Behav. Process., 67(3), 395–403.
Abstract: Research suggests that animals are capable of forming functional equivalence relations or stimulus classes of the kind usually demonstrated by humans (e.g., the class defined by an object and the word for that object). In pigeons, such functional equivalences are typically established using many-to-one matching-to-sample in which two samples are associated with one comparison stimulus and two different samples are associated with the other. Evidence for the establishment of functional equivalences between samples associated with the same comparison comes from transfer tests. In Experiment 1, we found that pigeons can form a single class consisting of four members (many-to-one matching) when the alternative class has only one member (one-to-one matching). In Experiment 2, we ruled out the possibility that the pigeons acquired the hybrid one-to-one/many-to-one task by developing a single-code/default coding strategy as earlier research suggested that it might. Thus, pigeons can develop a functional class consisting of as many as four members, with the alternative class consisting of a single member.
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Heschl, A., & Burkart, J. (2006). A new mark test for mirror self-recognition in non-human primates. Primates, 47(3), 187–198.
Abstract: For 30 years Gallup's (Science 167:86-87, 1970) mark test, which consists of confronting a mirror-experienced test animal with its own previously altered mirror image, usually a color mark on forehead, eyebrow or ear, has delivered valuable results about the distribution of visual self-recognition in non-human primates. Chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and, less frequently, gorillas can learn to correctly understand the reflection of their body in a mirror. However, the standard version of the mark test is good only for positively proving the existence of self-recognition. Conclusive statements about the lack of self-recognition are more difficult because of the methodological constraints of the test. This situation has led to a persistent controversy about the power of Gallup's original technique. We devised a new variant of the test which permits more unequivocal decisions about both the presence and absence of self-recognition. This new procedure was tested with marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus), following extensive training with mirror-related tasks to facilitate performance in the standard mark test. The results show that a slightly altered mark test with a new marking substance (chocolate cream) can help to reliably discriminate between true negative results, indicating a real lack of ability to recognize oneself in a mirror, from false negative results that are due to methodological particularities of the standard test. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesis is put forward as to why many primates can use a mirror instrumentally – i.e. know how to use it for grasping at hidden objects – while failing in the decisive mark test.
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