Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.

Abstract: Living in complex social systems requires perceptual and cognitive capacities for the recognition of group membership and individual competitors. Olfaction is one means by which this can be achieved. Many animals can identify individual proteins in urine, skin secretions, or saliva by scent. Additionally, marking behaviour in several mammals and especially in horses indicates the importance of sniffing conspecifics’ faeces for olfactory recognition. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two separate experiments: Experiment 1 addressed the question of whether horses can recognise the group membership of other horses by sniffing their faeces. The horses were presented with four faecal samples: (1) their own, (2) those of other members of their own group, (3) those of unfamiliar mares, and (4) those of unfamiliar geldings. Experiment two was designed to assess whether horses can identify the group member from whom a faecal sample came. Here, we presented two groups of horses with faecal samples from their group mates in random distribution. As controls, soil heaps and sheep faecal samples were used. In experiment one, horses distinguished their own from their conspecifics’ faeces, but did not differentiate between familiarity and sex. In experiment two, the horses from both groups paid most attention to the faeces of the horses from which they received the highest amount of aggressive behaviours. We therefore suggest that horses of both sexes can distinguish individual competitors among their group mates by the smell of their faeces.