Abstract: Differences in behavioural characteristics between individuals of the same species are often described as being due to the temperament of the individuals. These differences can have enormous implications for welfare with some individuals apparently being able to adapt to environmental challenge more easily than others. Such differences have resulted in animals often being described as either `active' copers, which try to escape from or remove an aversive stimulus, or `passive' copers, which show no outward signs of a situation being aversive, thus, appearing to be unaffected. Tests previously developed to assess the temperament of animals have been criticised for several reasons. Behaviour is often recorded and categorised using methods that are not objective and tests are generally carried out once with no consideration of whether or not behavioural responses are consistent over time. This study takes these factors into account. The behaviour of 33 horses was recorded in three types of test--an arena test, response to a person and response to an object. In order to test whether or not responses were consistent over time, the tests were repeated three times with an average of 9 days between trials. Test results were validated using responses from questionnaires completed by the farm team leader. The data were analysed using an initial principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis. The horses were found to behave consistently over the three trials in their responses in the arena test. The responses to the person test and the object test were similar to each other; however, these responses were not consistent over trials. The behaviour in the arena test was unable to be used to make a prediction of behaviour in the person and object tests and vice versa. The responses shown by the horses did not enable them to be categorised as either active or passive copers. Behavioural responses in the tests were not predictive of the response to a startle test (water spray), nor could they be used to predict status or response to being reintroduced to the group after testing. There was no relationship between the responses in the tests and the ratings given by the farm team leader. It was concluded that horses vary widely in their responses to artificial behavioural tests, with only the responses to an open-field arena test being consistent over time, and therefore, the only type of test which can indicate some core factor of temperament.

Abstract: Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication.

Abstract: The 'social brain hypothesis' for the evolution of large brains in primates has led to evidence for the coevolution of neocortical size and social group sizes, suggesting that there is a cognitive constraint on group size that depends, in some way, on the volume of neural material available for processing and synthesizing information on social relationships. More recently, work on both human and non-human primates has suggested that social groups are often hierarchically structured. We combine data on human grouping patterns in a comprehensive and systematic study. Using fractal analysis, we identify, with high statistical confidence, a discrete hierarchy of group sizes with a preferred scaling ratio close to three: rather than a single or a continuous spectrum of group sizes, humans spontaneously form groups of preferred sizes organized in a geometrical series approximating 3-5, 9-15, 30-45, etc. Such discrete scale invariance could be related to that identified in signatures of herding behaviour in financial markets and might reflect a hierarchical processing of social nearness by human brains.

Abstract: At present, the most general evolutionary theory of honest communication is Grafen's model of Zahavi's 'handicap' signalling system, in which honesty of signals about the signaller's quality (e.g. mate suitability or fighting ability) is maintained by the differentially high cost of signals to signallers having lower quality. The latter model is here further generalized to include any communication between signallers and receivers that are genetically related (e.g. parents and begging offspring, cooperative or competing siblings). Signalling systems involving relatives are shown to be evolutionarily stable, despite a potential pay-off for false signalling, if the Zahavian assumption of differential signal costs holds and there are diminishing reproductive returns to the signaller as the receiver's assessed value of its attribute increases, or if, regardless of whether the Zahavian assumption holds, signallers with high values of the attribute benefit more from a given receiver assessment than signallers with low values (e.g. begging chicks that are hungrier benefit more from being fed). In stable systems of signalling among kin, it is also shown to be generally true that (i) levels of signalling and thus observed signal costs will decline as relatedness increases or as the receiver's reproductive penalty for erroneous assessment increases, and (ii) receivers will consistently, altruistically overestimate the true value of the signalled attribute.

Abstract: ahavi's handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives.
In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling.