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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Imitation: definitions, evidence, and mechanisms. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 335–353.
Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.
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Martin, T. I., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Post-choice information processing by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 273–278.
Abstract: In a conditional discrimination (matching-to-sample), a sample is followed by two comparison stimuli, one of which is correct, depending on the sample. Evidence from previous research suggests that if the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect response (the so-called penalty-time procedure), acquisition by pigeons is facilitated. The present research tested the hypothesis that the penalty-time procedure allows the pigeons to review and learn from the maintained stimulus display following an incorrect choice. It did so by including a penalty-time group for which, following an incorrect choice, the sample changed to match the incorrect comparison, thus providing the pigeons with post-choice 'misinformation.' This misinformation group acquired the matching task significantly slower than the standard penalty-time group (that had no change in the sample following an error). Furthermore, acquisition of matching by a control group that received no penalty time fell midway between the other two groups, suggesting that the pigeons did not merely take more care in making choices because of the aversiveness of penalty-time. Thus, it appears that in the acquisition of matching-to-sample, when the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect choice, the pigeons can review or acquire information from the display. This is the first time that such an effect has been reported for a nonhuman species.
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Zentall, T. R. (2005). Configural/holistic processing or differential element versus compound similarity. Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 141–142.
Abstract: Before accepting a configural or holistic account of visual perception, one should be sure that an analytic (elemental) account does not provide an equal or better explanation of the results. I suggest that when one forms a compound of a color and a line orientation with one element previously trained as an S+ and the other as an S-, the resulting transfer found will depend on the relative salience of the two elements, and most important, the similarity of the compound to each of the training stimuli. Thus, if a line orientation is placed on a colored background (a separable compound), it will appear more like the colored field used in training, and color will control responding. However, if the line itself is colored (an integral compound), the compound will appear more like the line used in training, and line orientation will control responding. Not only does this account do a better job of explaining the data but it is simpler and it is testable.
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Hanggi, E. B., & Ingersoll, J. F. (2009). Long-term memory for categories and concepts in horses (Equus caballus). Anim. Cogn., 13(3), 451–462.
Abstract: Three horses (Equus caballus) with a history of performing cognitive tasks including discrimination learning, categorization, and concept use were tested to evaluate their long-term memory (LTM) in three experiments. In addition, use of LCD multi-displays for stimulus presentation was incorporated into cognition testing protocol for the first time with horses. Experiment 1 tested LTM for discrimination learning that originally occurred 6 years earlier. Five sets of stimuli were used and the two horses tested showed no decrement in performance on four of the sets; however, both horses did score below chance on one set. Experiment 2 examined long-term categorization recall 10 years after horses had demonstrated the ability to make stimulus selections based on shared characteristics within a given category. The horse tested for LTM after the decade-long interval immediately and consistently applied the previously learned categorization rule to not only familiar but also novel sets of stimuli. Experiment 3 tested another horse for LTM for a relative size concept. This horse had originally demonstrated concept rule use in order to select stimuli based on their relative size to one another. More than 7 years later and without further training, this horse reliably applied the previously established size concept to both familiar and novel sets of stimuli. These findings are the first reports of long-term categorical and conceptual memory in horses and are consistent with observations of domestic and wild horses, which indicate that behavioral and ecological events may be remembered for long periods of time. These studies also demonstrate the adaptive nature of horses with regard to their ability to generalize over several different testing conditions.
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Agrillo, C., Dadda, M., & Bisazza, A. (2007). Quantity discrimination in female mosquitofish. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 63–70.
Abstract: The ability in animals to count and represent different numbers of objects has received a great deal of attention in the past few decades. Cumulative evidence from comparative studies on number discriminations report obvious analogies among human babies, non-human primates and birds and are consistent with the hypothesis of two distinct and widespread mechanisms, one for counting small numbers (<4) precisely, and one for quantifying large numbers approximately. We investigated the ability to discriminate among different numerosities, in a distantly related species, the mosquitofish, by using the spontaneous choice of a gravid female to join large groups of females as protection from a sexually harassing male. In one experiment, we found that females were able to discriminate between two shoals with a 1:2 numerosity ratio (2 vs. 4, 4 vs. 8 and 8 vs. 16 fish) but failed to discriminate a 2:3 ratio (8 vs. 12 fish). In the second experiment, we studied the ability to discriminate between shoals that differed by one element; females were able to select the larger shoal when the paired numbers were 2 vs. 3 or 3 vs. 4 but not 4 vs. 5 or 5 vs. 6. Our study indicates that numerical abilities in fish are comparable with those of other non-verbal creatures studied; results are in agreement with the hypothesis of the existence of two distinct systems for quantity discrimination in vertebrates.
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Ottoni, E. B., de Resende, B. D., & Izar, P. (2005). Watching the best nutcrackers: what capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) know about others' tool-using skills. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 215–219.
Abstract: The present work is part of a decade-long study on the spontaneous use of stones for cracking hard-shelled nuts by a semi-free-ranging group of brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Nutcracking events are frequently watched by other individuals--usually younger, less proficient, and that are well tolerated to the point of some scrounging being allowed by the nutcracker. Here we report findings showing that the choice of observational targets is an active, non-random process, and that observers seem to have some understanding of the relative proficiency of their group mates, preferentially watching the more skilled nutcrackers, which enhances not only scrounging payoffs, but also social learning opportunities.
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Miklósi, Á., & Soproni, K. (2006). A comparative analysis of animals' understanding of the human pointing gesture. Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 81–93.
Abstract: We review studies demonstrating the ability of some animals to understand the human pointing gesture. We present a 3-step analysis of the topic. (1) We compare and evaluate current experimental methods (2) We compare available experimental results on performance of different species and investigate the interaction of species differences and other independent variables (3) We evaluate how our present understanding of pointing comprehension answers questions about function, evolution and mechanisms. Recently, a number of different hypotheses have been put forward to account for the presence of this ability in some species and for the lack of such comprehension in others. In our view, there is no convincing evidence for the assumption that the competitive lifestyles of apes would inhibit the utilization of this human gesture. Similarly, domestication as a special evolutionary factor in the case of some species falls short in explaining high levels of pointing comprehension in some non-domestic species. We also disagree with the simplistic view of describing the phenomenon as a simple form of conditioning. We suggest that a more systematic comparative research is needed to understand the emerging communicative representational abilities in animals that provide the background for comprehending the human pointing gesture.
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B. Agnetta,, B. Hare,, & M. Tomasello,. (2000). Cues to food location that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) of different ages do and do not use. Anim. Cogn., 3(2), 107–112.
Abstract: Autoren
B. Agnetta, B. Hare, M. Tomasello
Zusammenfassung
The results of three experiments are reported. In the main study, a human experimenter presented domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) with a variety of social cues intended to indicate the location of hidden food. The novel findings of this study were: (1) dogs were able to use successfully several totally novel cues in which they watched a human place a marker in front of the target location; (2) dogs were unable to use the marker by itself with no behavioral cues (suggesting that some form of human behavior directed to the target location was a necessary part of the cue); and (3) there were no significant developments in dogs' skills in these tasks across the age range 4 months to 4 years (arguing against the necessity of extensive learning experiences with humans). In a follow-up study, dogs did not follow human gaze into “empty space” outside of the simulated foraging context. Finally, in a small pilot study, two arctic wolves (Canis lupus) were unable to use human cues to locate hidden food. These results suggest the possibility that domestic dogs have evolved an adaptive specialization for using human-produced directional cues in a goal-directed (especially foraging) context. Exactly how they understand these cues is still an open question.
Schlüsselwörter
Key words Dogs – Arctic wolves – Social cognition – Gaze following – Communication
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Kitchen, D. M., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2005). Male chacma baboons (Papio hamadryas ursinus) discriminate loud call contests between rivals of different relative ranks. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 1–6.
Abstract: Males in multi-male groups of chacma baboons (Papio hamadryas ursinus) in Botswana compete for positions in a linear dominance hierarchy. Previous research suggests that males treat different categories of rivals differently; competitive displays between males of similar rank are more frequent and intense than those between disparately ranked males. Here we test whether males also respond differently to male-male interactions in which they are not directly involved, using playbacks of the loud 'wahoo' calls exchanged between competing males in aggressive displays. We played paired sequences of vocal contests between two adjacently ranked and two disparately ranked males to ten subjects, half ranking below the signalers in the call sequences and half above. Subjects who ranked above the two signalers showed stronger responses than lower-ranking subjects. Higher-ranking subjects also responded more strongly to sequences involving disparately ranked, as opposed to adjacently ranked opponents, suggesting that they recognized those individuals' relative ranks. Strong responses to sequences between disparately ranked opponents might have occurred either because such contests typically involve resources of high fitness value (defense of meat, estrous females or infants vulnerable to infanticide) or because they indicate a sudden change in one contestant's condition. In contrast, subjects who ranked lower than the signalers responded equally strongly to both types of sequences. These subjects may have been able to distinguish between the two categories of opponents but did not respond differently to them because they had little to lose or gain by a rank reversal between males that already ranked higher than they did.
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Horner, V., & Whiten, A. (2005). Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn., 8(3), 164–181.
Abstract: This study explored whether the tendency of chimpanzees and children to use emulation or imitation to solve a tool-using task was a response to the availability of causal information. Young wild-born chimpanzees from an African sanctuary and 3- to 4-year-old children observed a human demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a puzzle-box. The demonstration involved both causally relevant and irrelevant actions, and the box was presented in each of two conditions: opaque and clear. In the opaque condition, causal information about the effect of the tool inside the box was not available, and hence it was impossible to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demonstration. However, in the clear condition causal information was available, and subjects could potentially determine which actions were necessary. When chimpanzees were presented with the opaque box, they reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant actions, thus imitating the overall structure of the task. When the box was presented in the clear condition they instead ignored the irrelevant actions in favour of a more efficient, emulative technique. These results suggest that emulation is the favoured strategy of chimpanzees when sufficient causal information is available. However, if such information is not available, chimpanzees are prone to employ a more comprehensive copy of an observed action. In contrast to the chimpanzees, children employed imitation to solve the task in both conditions, at the expense of efficiency. We suggest that the difference in performance of chimpanzees and children may be due to a greater susceptibility of children to cultural conventions, perhaps combined with a differential focus on the results, actions and goals of the demonstrator.
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